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There is a widespread consensus in the literature that financial sector development plays a 
significant role in economic growth. Several studies have also shown that economic growth is 
associated with an efficient banking sector with low ratios of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs). 
Against this background, the government of Rwanda holds the view that developing the 
financial sector can lead to the country’s economic growth. However, there is no agreement 
in the literature on whether or not individuals and companies increase borrowing in response 
to financial sector development. In the case of Rwanda, no study that the researcher is aware 
of has established the directional influence between borrowing and financial sector 
development, and its links to economic growth. Similarly, no assessment has been made of 
the country’s financial sector efficiency and the causes of NPLs. Therefore, the main 
objective of this study is to assess the mechanism that relates financial sector development to 
economic growth in Rwanda. The study is made of three inter-related papers corresponding 
to the three specific objectives that together contribute to the achievement of the general 
objective of understanding how finance relates to economic growth in Rwanda. The first 
paper sets to investigate the relationship between financial intermediation and economic 
growth in Rwanda. Using a Cointegrated Structural Vector Autoregressive model on 
quarterly data for the period 1996:1 to 2010:4, the study finds the existence of a cointegrating 
relationship between financial intermediation and economic growth. It also observes that 
domestic credit to private sector shock accounts for the largest proportion of fluctuations in 
real output growth, followed by potential liquidity available, supporting the supply-leading 
hypothesis in the intermediation link between financial sector development and economic 
growth in Rwanda. The second paper aims at assessing the efficiency of commercial banks in 
Rwanda. Using a stochastic frontier analysis for the period 2007 to 2013, the study finds that 
the commercial banking sector has a mean cost efficiency score of 88.56 percent, suggesting 
that in order to enhance their efficiency, banks can reduce their input composition by 11.44 
percent. Finally, the third paper investigates the microeconomic factors that influence NPLs 
in the Rwandan banking sector. Applying a multivariate logistic model, the study finds a 
negative relationship between repayment period and NPLs, indicating that an extension of the 
repayment period up to four years can lead to decreases in NPLs. Thus, for Rwanda to attract 
businesses that can easily make use of current financial services, it should reinforce 
incentives regarding the legal framework to conduct business. The country should also 




financial intermediaries to extend the repayment period. Combined, these measures could 
boost the financial sector’s efficiency, hence stimulating economic growth. 
Keywords: Financial Sector Development, Economic growth, Cointegration, Structural 
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The interaction between financial sector development and economic growth has attracted 
considerable attention in the economic growth literature for decades. Many studies have 
reported the significant role of financial sector development in economic growth (King and 
Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997; Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000). For instance,  Havránek, 
Horváth, and Valίcková' s (2013) survey of 67 empirical studies on this  relationship observes 
that 48 percent of these studies found that the relationship between financial sector 
development and economic growth is positive and statistically significant while 33 percent 
show that it is positive but not significant. 
It is argued that financial sector development leads to economic growth by easing investors’ 
funding concerns (Schumpeter, 1934; Benhabib and Spiegel, 2000). Financial sector 
development can also lead to a reduction in disparities in the prices of loans in line with the 
implementation of more efficient business practices, improved information conduits, and the 
use of technology as well as increased competition among financial institutions (Lynch, 
1996). In line with this perspective, financial sector development prompted the wave of 
industrialization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the United Kingdom (UK) ( 
Adams, J. Andersson, L.-F. Andersson and Lindmark, 2009). The sector provided 
indispensable resources to the industrialists of that period, hence growing the economies of 
early industrialized countries ( Adams et al., 2009).  
However, there is no agreement on whether or not individuals and companies increase 
borrowing in response to financial sector development. Some studies argue that financial 
sector development improves the availability of funds through a well-functioning financial 
system, which leads to an increase in borrowing (Khan and Semlali, 2000; Levine et al., 
2000; Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2005; Apergis, Filippidis and Economidou, 2007). Others 
maintain that investors’ decision to borrow is a function of the health of the economy, and is 
not necessarily due to financial sector development (Gurley and Shaw, 1955; De Gregorio 




consideration, include the interdependent approach where the response is bidirectional 
(Arestis and Demetriades, 1997; Odhiambo, 2005) or absent (Demetriades and Law, 2004; 
Muchai, 2013). However, there has been very little research work carried out to assess the 
relationship that exist between finance-growth in the Rwandan context as well as the efficient 
allocation of finance to productive uses while identifying factors that limit non-performing 
loans. The researcher is not aware of any study that investigated the directional influence in 
borrowing and its links to economic growth in Rwanda, the efficiency of the country’s 
commercial banks and the factors influencing NPLs. This study aims to fill this gap in the 
literature. 
Rwanda’s economy is still recovering from the 1994 genocide, which led to the loss of many 
lives and the large-scale destruction of social, economic, and physical infrastructure. The 
economic growth rate reached a low level of -50 percent in 1994 (Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning [MINECOFIN], 2013). However, since then, Rwanda has been putting 
measures in place to develop the financial sector, with the ultimate objective of achieving 
sustainable economic growth via private sector development. This private sector is one of the 
pillars of the Rwandan Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy, second 
generation (EDPRS 2) that spans from 2013 to 2018. As a result, the Rwandan economy has 
been growing steadily with some notable developments in the financial sector.  
In 2013, the poverty rate in the country was estimated at 44.1 percent, down from 70 percent 
in 1997 (MINECOFIN, 2013). Per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) improved from 
US$ 233 in 1996 to US$ 632 in 2013, with an average annual growth rate of 7.6 percent 
(World Bank, 2014). In the financial sector, important improvements have also been 
observed, as shown by several financial indicators (World Bank, 2014). The domestic savings 
rate as a percentage of GDP increased from -5.1 percent in 2000 to 10.25 percent in 2013. 
Domestic credit to the private sector as a ratio of GDP rose from 6.8 percent in 2000 to 12.1 
percent in 2010. NPLs dropped from 57 percent in 2002 to 7 percent in 2013; and the ratio of 
broad money (M2) to GDP remained at an average rate of 16 percent for the period 2000 to 
2010. 
Like many developing countries, the banking sector dominates the Rwandan financial 
system. It includes a small microfinance sector, and some Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
(NBFIs). NBFIs comprise insurance companies, pension funds, and insurance intermediaries. 




31 December 2015, the banking sector accounted for about 67 percent of the financial 
sector’s total assets (Banque Nationale du Rwanda [BNR], 2016). The microfinance sector, 
insurance sector, and pensions funds account respectively contributed 6.6 percent, 9.3 
percent, and 17.1 percent (BNR, 2016). 
Given the fact that banking institutions represent the largest proportion of about two third of 
the financial sector’ assets and are hence expected to make a substantial contribution in the 
intermediation between savers and borrowers; this study focuses on these institutions. 
In the EDPRS 2, the Government of Rwanda is committed to achieving annual economic 
growth rate of 11.5 percent, in order to achieve the Vision 2020 objective of making Rwanda 
a middle-income country, with an average per capita GDP of US$ 1,240 by 2020 
(MINECOFIN, 2013). This would require that the poverty rate be reduced by at least 24 
percent, and the creation of 1.8 million new off-farm jobs, a 35 percent increase in 
urbanisation, and a 28 percent increase in export growth with the private sector receiving the 
dominant share of investment between 2012 and 2020 (MINECOFIN, 2013). An important 
question is; how does the private sector obtain funding to undertake the desired investments? 
The literature identifies two channels of private sector access to financial resources, namely, 
direct finance from capital markets or individual non-bank lenders and indirect finance from 
financial intermediaries (Casu, Girardone and Molyneux, 2015). 
Rwanda’s banking sector is relatively less developed and is dominated by commercial banks 
(BNR, 2014). A large albeit declining proportion of the population (43 percent in 2008 and 
28 percent in 2012) has no access to formal banking services (MINECOFIN, 2013). Savings 
rates are also low and were recorded at 10.25 percent of GDP in 2013, up from -5.1 percent 
in 2000 (World Bank, 2014). Furthermore, the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to 
GDP is very low, estimated at an average of 15 percent for the period 2005 to 2010. In 
addition, the country has a low per capita GDP, estimated at US$ 488.1 for the same period. 
This compares unfavorably with many countries categorized as low-income countries that 
were comparable with Rwanda in the 1960s, but have managed to change their status over 
time. They include China, Mauritius and Thailand that are now upper middle-income 
countries, and Hong Kong, and Singapore, which are presently among the high-income 
countries. In these countries, average savings as a percentage of GDP for the period 2005 to 
2010 was estimated at 51.6 percent for China, 30.6 percent for Thailand, 33.5 percent for 




Their average domestic credit to the private sector as a ratio of GDP is 115.4 percent for 
China, 128.2 percent for Thailand, 146.0 percent for Hong Kong, 79.5 percent for Mauritius, 
and 92.0 percent for Singapore. Average per capita GDP is US$ 3,609.4 for China, US$ 
4,494.1 for Thailand, US$ 7,745.2 for Mauritius, US$ 36,046.1 for Hong Kong, and US$ 
45,508.1 for Singapore. In terms of assets quality Rwanda’s average ratio of NPLs to total 
loans during the same period (2005 to 2010) was estimated at 17.9 percent. This is very high 
in comparison with Hong Kong (1.0 percent), Singapore (1.8 percent), Mauritius (2.7 
percent), China (4.5 percent) and Thailand (6.6 percent). 
Since Rwanda considers the private sector to be a driver of its economic growth, the 
questions that require further investigation are, first whether efforts to develop the financial 
sector will lead to sustainable economic growth? What is the mechanism that relates financial 
sector development to economic growth? Does the availability of finance attract investors, or 
does anticipated future economic growth create demand for financial services? Put 
differently, what kind of finance-growth relationship exists in the Rwandan context? What 
are the qualities of the financial sector in terms of efficiency that may lead to its 
sustainability? Which factors influence most NPLs and can have an impact on economic 
growth?  This study will contribute to the literature by answering these and other questions. 
The literature emphasizes that the efficiency of the financial sector is an important condition 
for its development and its effects on economic growth. For example, a study by Kablan 's 
(2010) on bank efficiency and financial development in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) found that 
banks which are less developed have problems in translating mobilised deposits into loans to 
the private sector. In 2003, the whole SSA region displayed an intermediation ratio of 51 
percent, compared to 75 percent for Latin America and 91 percent for Asia. Not only was the 
financial sector in SSA found to be inefficient in transforming deposits into loans, but it also 
recorded a higher level of cost inefficiency due to NPLs (Kirkpatrick, Murinde and Tefula, 
2008). In their study on SSA Anglophone countries, Kirkpatrick et al. (2008) concluded that 
bad loans have contributed to increasing the score of cost inefficiency by 42.8 percent. 
Considering the allocation of credit, if the financial sector performs well, the economy enjoys 
a period of growth due to efficient allocation of credit to productive uses (Schumpeter, 1934; 
Benhabib and Spiegel, 2000; Freixas and Rochet, 2008). In contrast, if this sector is 
performing at high inefficiency levels, this suggests that with the available resources, the 




growth. Berger and DeYoung's (1997) study on problem loans and cost efficiency in United 
States (US) commercial banks from 1985 to 1994 reported bi-directional causation. The 
study, carried out at four-year intervals, found that a one standard deviation increase in NPLs 
leads to a 1.7 percent increase in predicted cost inefficiency. An increase in NPLs suggests an 
increase in cost by incurring additional costs in the process of loan recovery such as 
telephone calls, visiting a borrower with repayment problems and the legal costs associated 
with collateral foreclosure and execution. 
Studies have also shown that a large number of bank failures have been associated with large 
proportions of NPLs prior to failure (Hughes and Mester, 1993; Berger and DeYoung, 1997). 
The case of bank instability in Cyprus in 2010-2012 supports the view that financial distress 
goes hand in hand with increases in NPLs and a slowdown in economic growth. In this three-
year period, NPLs grew more than threefold from 5.6 percent to 18.6 percent. Economic 
growth slowed down from 1.3 percent in 2010 to -2.4 percent in 2012  (World Bank, 2014). 
The same trends were observed in Greece where NPLs increased from 9.1 percent in 2010 to 
23.3 percent in 2012 and economic growth slowed down from -4.9 percent to -7.0 percent in 
2010 and 2012, respectively. Thus, a relationship has been established between loans quality 
and efficiency because at the point of failure, banks have higher ratios of NPLs, and tend to 
be located far from the best practice efficient frontier (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Berger 
and Humphrey, 1997). From the foregoing discussion, it is probable that economic growth 
has links with an efficient banking sector with low ratios of NPLs. 
This study, therefore, comprises three inter-related papers matching to the three specific 
objectives that support the general objective of understanding how finance influences 
economic growth in Rwanda. It commences by investigating the directional relationship 
between finance and economic growth. Once this relationship is established, the next step is 
to analyze the efficiency of the banking sector. Finally, the study investigates the factors 
limiting financial sector development; in this case, NPLs. Non-performing loans not only 
adversely affect the sector’s profits, but also limit the financial sector in financing the 
economy through financial intermediaries’ capacity to grant more loans, which indirectly 
constrains business expansion, thereby constraining economic growth. Accordingly, this 
study set three specific objectives, namely, 
(1) to investigate the directional influence of finance to economic growth in Rwanda; 




(3) to identify the factors influencing NPLs in the Rwandan banking sector. 
In order to achieve these objectives, the study answers the following questions: 
1) What causal relationship exists between finance and economic growth in Rwanda? 
2) How efficient is the Rwandan commercial banking sector? 
3) What microeconomic factors influence NPLs in the Rwandan banking sector? 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the study’s objectives 
and significance, and the econometric model employed for the empirical analysis for each 
objective. Section 1.3 presents the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2 Objectives, Methods and Significance 
 
The main objective of this study is to assess the mechanism that relates financial sector 
development to economic growth. This is achieved by exploring three specific objectives. 
The first objective is to investigate the relationship between finance and economic growth in 
Rwanda with a special focus on financial intermediation. This is achieved by using quarterly 
data for the period 1996:1 to 2010:4. A Cointegrated Structural Vector Autoregressive model 
is employed for this analysis. The main argument is that a good understanding of the 
directional relationship between finance and economic growth is essential given the 
Government of Rwanda’s belief that financial sector development can propel economic 
growth in the country by financing the private sector. 
The second objective is to assess the efficiency of commercial banks in Rwanda. This is 
carried out using a stochastic frontier analysis for the period 2007 to 2013. Efficiency 
evaluation of banks is of interest to many players. Shareholders and potential investors seek 
assurance of the efficiency of this sector as this implies the potential sustainability of banks’ 
profitability. Managers and directors benefit by understanding the extent to which they can 
improve their performance to limit wasted resources in order to attain the overall objective of 
value maximisation. Regulators gain information on the soundness of the banking sector and 
can formulate policy to correct inefficiencies in regulation or supervision. 
The third objective is to identify the factors influencing NPLs in Rwanda. This is achieved 
using a logistic regression approach. The findings are expected to be useful to financial 




intermediary may work out to find solutions to reduce existing NPLs while preventing the 
proliferation of new ones. Collectively, financial intermediaries can engage stakeholders such 
as shareholders, regulators and policymakers to find solutions to the identified causes of 
problems that require combined efforts. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no study 
has focused on these pooled together as in this study. Thus, the study’s contribution is 
threefold. Firstly, it provides a comprehensive analysis of the financial sector and economic 
growth covering three issues, while other studies have focused only on one aspect. Secondly, 
the study proposes a solution to some internal shocks to the financial sector related to NPLs 
that can limit the efficiency of the sector; hence, it could assist in enhancing economic 
growth. Last, but not least, it uses Rwanda as a case, pioneering research in this area which 
could serve as a reference for decision makers as well as other researchers. 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The study sets out to investigate the probable relationship between finance and economic 
growth in Rwanda placing emphasis on an efficient banking sector with low ratios of NPLs. 
It is organized into six chapters. Chapter Two surveys the general state of financial sector 
development, and provides a brief description of the situation in Rwanda. It identifies the 
forces that have driven changes in the sector as well as expanded opportunities across 
geographical markets that offer space for competition. In addition, the chapter discusses the 
rationale for regulation and supervision of the financial sector and the instruments used by the 
central bank to achieve low inflation and the stability of the financial sector. 
Chapter Three answers the first research question by investigating the directional relationship 
between finance and economic growth in Rwanda. It sets out different hypotheses on the link 
between financial intermediation and economic growth. It also provides an empirical analysis 
of this relationship, which is very important for policymakers and investors. The chapter 
concludes with a short overview of the empirical findings in relation to the study’s first 
objective. 
Chapter Four assesses the efficiency of the banking sector in Rwanda to answer the second 
research question in relation to the study’s second objective. The efficiency of the banking 




which is then ultimate aim of any economic policy. The chapter closes with concluding 
remarks and recommendations. 
Chapter Five investigates the factors that influence the level of NPLs that in turn affect the 
efficiency of the financial sector and hence economic growth. This chapter achieves the 
study’s third objective and answers the third research question. The chapter ends with 
concluding remarks and recommendations. 
Finally, chapter six compiles the study’s findings based on the theoretical and empirical data 






























The preceding chapter noted that there is no consensus in the financial intermediation 
literature on the linkages between finance and growth and the causality relationship between 
these two variables. While empirical studies have reported mixed results, none has explicitly 
focused on Rwanda. Since this study aims to analyse how the financial sector development 
relates to economic growth in Rwanda, it begins with an overview of the Rwandan economy 
and the development of the financial sector in general, and in Rwanda in particular. This 
chapter thus examines the components of the financial development and new developments in 
this financial sector since the 1980s. It also discusses some features used to measure the 
development of the financial sector and highlights the regulation of this sector to ensure its 
safety and soundness. Furthermore, since the scope of this study is limited to the financial 
development in Rwanda where businesses primarily rely on banks in their transactions, much 
of the focus is on the banking sector. 
 
2.2 An Overview of the Rwandan Economy 
 
2.2.1 Geographical features  
 
Rwanda is a small landlocked country between Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, and Democratic 
Republic of Congo, respectively in the north, south, east and west. The country’s capital city, 
Kigali is 1,740 km from Mombasa and 1,480 km from Dar es-Salaam, the two major ports 
used for Rwandan exports and imports. These long distances make for high transport costs. 
For example, Rwandan exporters pay US$ 3,245 to export a container, in comparison to those 





Rwanda covers an area of 26,338 square kilometers (sq.km). While agriculture is the 
dominant economic activity, it has only 1.4 million hectares of arable land (MINECOFIN, 
2000). The country is marked by irregular, hilly land with an average elevation of 1,500 m 





Rwanda is the ninetieth most densely population in the world and the second highly densely 
populated country in Africa with 464 inhabitants per sq.km in 2012. At 636 people per sq.km, 
Mauritius is the most densely populated country in Africa (World Bank, 2014). Despite the 
1990-1994 war and the 1994 genocide that led to the loss of many lives, Rwanda’s population 
increased more than 3.8 times over a period of 54 years (1962-2015) while per capita GDP 
almost doubled (World Bank, 2016). 
Figure 2- 1: Total population of Rwanda for the period 1962 - 2015 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
It is estimated that more than a million people were killed in the 1990-1994 war and the 
genocide of 1994, with many orphaned and widowed. For example, after the genocide of 
1994, there were 85,000 child-headed households and 21 percent of households were headed 
by female widows, and the poverty rate was above 60 percent (MINECOFIN, 2002). A 
further challenge was maintaining internal security that was threatened between 1997 and 


































2000 in the Western, Central and Northern provinces of the country by the perpetrators of 
genocide seeking a return to power (MINECOFIN, 2002). 
 
2.2.3 The Structure of the Rwandan Economy 
 
The Rwandan economy is dominated by agriculture, mainly in the form of subsistence 
farming. Agriculture accounts for 40 percent of GDP (MINECOFIN, 2013). The industrial 
sector is still in its infancy and mainly consists of factories that transform imported semi-
manufactured products. Coffee, tea, and minerals account for more than 50 percent of total 
exports (BNR, 2015). Their share of total exports was 69.7 percent in 2010; 74.75 percent in 
2011; 54.35 percent in 2012; 58.7 percent in 2013 and 52.5 percent in 2014 respectively. The 
share of each product is shown in Figure 2-2, below. 
Figure 2- 2: Share of coffee, tea and minerals in total exports of Rwanda from 2010 – 2014 
 
Source: BNR (2015) 
In addition to the limited number of products for export, a further constraint is that, their 
prices depend on international market prices that are themselves subject to exogenous 
fluctuations. For example, the mining sector’s share of total exports decreased in 2012 due to 
a fall of about 25.9 percent in the price of tin on international markets (BNR, 2012). 
Furthermore, the agricultural sector’s dependence on climatic conditions, demographic 
pressure on arable land and its low value account for the low level of per capita GDP in the 
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country. Prohibitive transportation costs adversely affect international trade transactions 
given that Rwanda is a landlocked country. 
However, a positive development in the past decade has been the decreasing share of 
agricultural production to the benefit of the services sector and a substantial improvement in 
the industrial sector (see table 2-1 for the sector’s share of total production from 2005 to 
2014). 
Table 2- 1: Sectors’ contribution to GDP 
Sector 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Agriculture (%) 38.4 39.3  35.1 32.7 33.9 32.6 32.3 33.4 33.4 33.1 
Industry (%) 11.8 11.6 12.4 12.6 12.3 12.9 14.4 14.4 14.9 14.3 
Services (%) 49.8 49.1 52.5 54.7 53.8 54.5 53.3 52.2 51.7 52.6 
Per capita GDP 
constant 2010 
US$) 
425 453 474 513 530 554 582 618 632 660 
 Source: World Bank (2016) 
 
Economically, Rwanda is among the poorest countries in the world. Per capita GDP nearly 
doubled from US$ 335.40 (constant 2010 US$) in 1962 to US$ 689.68 in 2015. In contrast,  
China’s per capita GDP grew more than 49 times in the same period from US$ 130.14 
(constant 2010 US$) in 1962 to US$ 6,416.18 in 2015 (World Bank, 2016). China is 
currently, counted among the lower middle-income countries. Table 2-2 compares GDP 
growth in Rwanda with selected countries for the period 2005-2014. 
Table 2- 2: GDP growth rate of selected countries for the period 2005 – 2014 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Rwanda 6.91 9.23 7.61 11.16 6.26 7.31 7.85 8.78 4.68 7.00 
Burundi 0.9 5.38 4.78 5.04 3.46 3.78 4.19 4.01 4.59 4.66 
Tanzania 8.71 4.66 8.46 5.56 5.38 6.35 7.90 5.14 7.26 6.96 
Kenya 5.9 6.47 6.85 0.23 3.3 8.4 6.11 4.55 5.69 5.33 
Uganda 6.33 10.78 8.41 8.71 7.25 5.17 9.67 4.41 3.27 4.81 
Ghana 5.91 6.39 4.35 9.14 4.84 7.90 14.04 9.29 7.31 3.98 
China 10.69 12.06 13.60 9.06  8.69 10.09 8.96 7.22 7.15 6.72 
Mexico 3.03 4.94 3.20 1.40 - 4.7 5.11 4.04 4.01 1.34 2.25 
Turkey 8.4 6.89 4.66 0.65 - 4.8 9.15 8.77 2.13 4.19 3.03 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
Table 2-2 shows, that, China is the fastest growing economy in this period. This is largely 
due to the revival  of its private sector from the 1990s (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001). 




phases of Vision 2020. The poverty rate is reported to have decreased from 60 percent to 58.9 
percent in 2000/2001; and 56.7 percent and 44.9 percent, respectively, in 2005/2006 and 
2010/2011. The extreme poverty rate dropped from 40 percent in 2000/2001 to 35.8 percent 
in 2005/2006 and 24.1 percent in 2010/2011 (National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda 
[NISR], 2012).   
 
2.2.4 Vision 2020 : Rwanda’s Long-term Development Strategic Plan 
 
In 2000, the government of Rwanda adopted a long-term strategic development plan called 
“Vision 2020”. The plan serves as a roadmap for the country’s economic transformation into 
a middle-income economy by the year 2020 (MINECOFIN, 2000). It set out phases for 
poverty reduction and economic development. These include the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP) that covered the period 2002 to 2006, the first Economic Development and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS 1) spanning 2008 to 2012, and the current ongoing 
EDPRS2 (2013 to 2018). While complementing one another, each phase has a major focus. 
The PRSP was prepared in a post conflict environment and its central emphasis was 
managing a smooth transition from emergency aid to restoring and rebuilding the various 
sectors of the country. Rural development and agricultural transformation, human 
development, economic infrastructure, governance, private sector development and 
institutional capacity building were the six priorities identified for action. 
EDPRS 1 aimed to kick start development by accelerating economic growth, creating 
employment and generating exports. These complementary objectives were set to benefit 
from public investment in infrastructure, and attractive regulatory reforms in order to reduce 
the costs and risks of conducting business, hence creating an attractive environment for 
private sector investment. 
On the other hand, EDPRS 2 was designed to address the lack of cross-sector coordination 
identified in EDPRS 1. It is organized around four thematic areas, reflecting emerging 
priorities. The areas are economic transformation, rural development, productivity and youth 
employment and accountable governance. Economic transformation envisages accelerated 
economic restructuring and growth in order to achieve the status of a middle-income country. 
Rural development aims to address the major needs of the majority of the population and 




The theme of productivity and youth employment focuses on ensuring that economic growth 
and rural development are supported by suitable skills and dynamic employment prospects, 
specifically for the growing youth population. With reference to accountable governance, the 
ultimate goal is to ensure that citizens are involved in in-service delivery and decision-
making at a highest level in the public and private sectors, and that the population participates 
fully in decision-making. 
Furthermore, the four thematic areas are expanded into 16 strategic sectors at national level, 
with each sector called upon to identify private sector partners that will commit to investment 
targeted at identified challenges and aligned priorities. Thus, the second generation EDPRS 
aims to establish a strong partnership with the private sector in order to increase investment 
in priority sectors and accelerate economic growth and hence create employment. 
 
2.3 Components and development of the Financial Sector 
 
Previous section presented an overview of the Rwandan economy and some policies aiming 
at establishing a vibrant partnership with private sector. This section discusses the 
components and development of the financial sector and highlights its regulation at national 
level, as well as at the international level. According to  Fraser, Gup and Kolari  (2005), the 
financial sector is an infrastructure framework for the transfer of funds from units in surplus 
(savers) to units that are in need (borrowers), mainly for investment purposes. Lynch (1996) 
states that financial sector development involves collecting savers’ deposits at the lowest cost 
possible and transferring them to banks’ loan applicants, with a reasonably low probability of 
default. For Rajan and Zingales (2003), financial sector development is a facility that 
provides funds to a borrower with a sound project. It also concerns investors’ degree of 
confidence in reaping acceptable returns from their investment in this sector. Put differently, 
financial sector development refers to easing the borrowing-lending process and the 
soundness of the sector vis-à-vis its stakeholders. Development of the sector facilitates the 
entrance of new firms, hence increasing competition. It is argued that the more countries 
develop economically, the more they rely on financial markets relative to banks (Rajan and 
Zingales, 2003). 
The institutions involved in this easing of access to funds include deposit taking financial 




banking financial institutions (NBFIs); and financial markets (Cecchetti, Schoenholtz et 
Fackler, 2011). However, government regulatory agencies and central banks are required to 
ensure that these institutions operate smoothly. The financial sector thus comprises of DTIs, 
NDIs, financial markets, and government regulatory agencies.  
Prior to 1994, there were two types of financial institutions in Rwanda: banking financial 
institutions and non-bank financial institutions (Coldmark, 1987). In common with other 
economic sectors, today, the Rwandan financial sector is being reconstituted in the wake of 
the devastating genocide of 1994. Alongside the young and growing capital market 
established in 2008, and the Central Bank, the National Bank of Rwanda, the Rwandan 
financial sector comprises the banking sector that dominates this sector, a small microfinance 
sector and a number of NBFIs. NBFIs comprise insurance companies, pension funds, and 
insurance intermediaries. The Monetary Policy and Financial Statement of 18 February 2016 
indicates that as at 31 December 2015, the banking sector in the country comprised of 12 
commercial banks, three microfinance banks, one development bank and cooperative bank, 
respectively (BNR, 2014). The banking sector held 67 percent of total assets in the financial 
sector, while pension funds and insurance companies had 17.1 percent and 9.3 percent, 
respectively. Even though the microfinance sector has many institutions, it has the smallest 
proportion of the financial sector’s assets, estimated at 6.6 percent. NBFIs consist of 14 
insurances companies, with 12 private and two public institutions. In terms of pension 
management companies, there is only one public social security fund in Rwanda managed by 
the Rwanda Social Security Board (RSSB), and 57 private pension schemes under the 
management of insurance companies. Insurance intermediaries comprise of 15 insurance 
brokers, 365 insurance agents, and 12 lost adjusters. 
 
2.3.1 Deposit Taking Financial Institutions 
 
2.3.1.1 Banking Sector 
 
The term bank is derived from both a Greek word trapeze and from the Italian word banco 
meaning money changing (Freixas and Rochet, 2008). Historically, the first activity of banks 
was money changing. Trapeza designates the balance used by moneychangers to weigh coins 
with the objective of determining the exact quantity of precious metal the coins contained. In 




which moneychangers placed their precious coins. However, over time, coins became heavy 
and difficult to handle in large transactions. This led to the use of paper money that first 
appeared in England in the seventeenth century. The owner of gold (silver) deposited it for 
safekeeping with the goldsmiths of the time, thereby reducing the risk of loss or robbery. In 
exchange, they received certificates of deposit that were transferrable to other people to pay 
for goods and services. The certificate of deposit covered the full value of the metal it 
represented. Initially, these deposits had a negative return because they were kept in vaults 
against the payment of fees, instead of investing them in productive activities. The next step 
was the replacement of paper money fully backed by a commodity such as gold, by notes, 
and later only partially covered by a commodity. The gold standard that applied in most 
countries up until the 1930s functioned under partial coverage of gold. 
In contrast, the modern banknote has no relationship with any commodity. Its value is solely 
based on confidence in the government or monetary authority’s ability to control the supply 
of notes in such a way that their purchasing power will not fall substantially. Such confidence 
is based on the fact, that, the law declares the notes and coins issued by the central bank as 
legal tender. In terms of the means of payment, cheque accounts were introduced later 
followed by credit and debit cards and various forms of electronic payment due to 
technological innovation in the financial sector. 
While the term bank historically referred to a commercial bank, in the current context, it 
displays the behavior of all other deposit-taking institutions. This research study adopts 
Cecchetti et al.'s (2011) conception of a bank , which  states that in the daily financial world 
the word bank describes what people call a financial intermediary that takes deposits and 
grants loans in the course of day-to-day business. 
In terms of their function of safekeeping, over time banks embarked on lending activities, and 
other complex operations. Because the withdrawal of gold (silver) deposited for safekeeping 
purposes with the goldsmiths left some quantity of gold in the vaults at the end of the day, the 
goldsmiths devised alternative ways of conducting business with it while continuing to 
receive new deposits. They started lending gold (silver) for set fees. This is the origin of 
lending in the banking sector (Mohr and Fourie, 2004; Cecchetti et al., 2011). Later, 





Today, people deposit precious assets for safekeeping with banks. However, modern banks 
offer services beyond safekeeping and access to payments systems. They now engage in more 
complex operations that take advantage of their economies of scale. The modern banking era 
is also known as the universal banking model. From the 1990s, especially in the US and other 
developed countries, banking activities expanded to all aspects of financial service activities, 
namely, securities operations, insurance, pensions, leasing and so on (Casu et al., 2015). 
Table 2-3 below summarizes the key differences between traditional and modern banking. 
Table 2- 3: Differences between traditional and modern banking 
Traditional banking Modern banking 








 Securities/investment banking 
 Pensions 
 Other financial services 
Income sources: 
Net interest income 
Income sources: 
 Net interest income 






Assets size and growth 
Strategic focus: 
 Returns to shareholders 
 Creating shareholder value  
 (generating return-on-equity, 




 Demand led 
 Creating value for customers 
Source: Casu et al. (2015) 
As noted above, traditionally banks offered consumers limited financial services. The major 
transactions were collecting deposits and granting loans. Income was generated from interest 
charged. Banks’ operations were highly regulated and competition was somewhat restricted. 
However, the large banks that emerged offer services ranging from personal banking services 
to corporate banking that targets large companies. Personal banking services include  current 
accounts with cheques facilities, credit transfers, standing orders, direct debits and plastic 
cards, savings, loans, mortgages, insurance, pensions and other services. Large banks target 
large companies and sometimes offer syndicated loans where two or more banks finance a 




arrangement, the borrower is able to borrow more funds and more favorable credit terms than 
would be offered by many small lenders (Fraser et al., 2005). From the lender’s perspective, 
a syndicated loan can pool savings across national boundaries, hence diversifying risk and 
facilitating  their ability to collect information on potential borrowers (Cecchetti et al., 2011).  
Particular types of banks in some countries include private banking, Islamic banking, and 
investment banking. Private banking provides services to wealthy clients, mainly individuals 
and their families. They focus on adapting their services to individual clients’ requirements, 
while maintaining personal contact and long-term relationships. 
Islamic banking is based on Shariah law that prohibits the payment of riba or interest while 
encouraging entrepreneurial activity. These banks do not charge interest but offer various 
profit-sharing products where depositors share the risk of the bank’s lending and the return 
(Casu et al., 2015). Depositors earn a return (instead of interest) and borrowers repay loans 
based on the profits generated from the project undertaken. 
An investment bank is a financial institution that assists in the initial sale of securities in the 
primary market. It is a channel through which firms raise funds in the capital market 
(Cecchetti et al., 2011). It does so by underwriting securities. For instance, it guarantees a 
price for a corporation’s securities and, in turn, sells them to investors at a relatively higher 
price (Mishkin, 2007). The investment bank profits from the difference between the purchase 
price that it guarantees to the issuing corporate and the selling price of the securities on the 
financial market. Investment bankers also bring together investors and government that need 
funds and investors with surplus funds. They also offer advice on mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As), guaranteeing a price that the new equity or bond issue will sell for, and trading and 
investing in securities on behalf of different clients. 
In terms of banking activities, banks offer customers a range of financial services, including 
payments, deposits and lending, investments, pension and insurance services, E-banking, 
financial advisory services, safekeeping facilities and foreign exchange services (Casu et al., 
2015). Payments services include paper-based systems using banknotes or cheques or 
electronic debit or credit cards. On the deposits side, banks provide their customers with 
cheque or current accounts that are in some instances, not interest earning while in others, 
they attract very low interest rates. They also offer saving and time deposit accounts that 




grant loans to their customers ranging from consumer loans to investment loans for the 
production of goods or services.  
Modern banks also engage in activities such as investment in securities, and insurance and 
pensions services that were initially offered by non-deposit financial institutions (Casu et al., 
2015). Likewise, in countries like the US, non-deposit financial institutions perform some 
activities that used to be exclusive to banks (MacDonald and Koch, 2006). It is argued that 
this is the result of advanced technology that allows banks to handle complex operations 
including electronic banking services through internet banking and Automated Teller 
Machines (ATMs). These developments have enabled banks to lower the cost of financial 
transactions by having customers interact with an electronic banking facility without face-to-
face interaction with the banks’ employees. Similarly, the availability of a 24-hour service 
helps to reduce queues in the banks’ branches tellers and is more convenient for customers. 
Technological innovation has contributed to the expansion of banking activities because 
customers want cheap or free access to their money (MacDonald and Koch, 2006). 
The main source of funding for banks is customers’ deposits while their major income is 
interest income, which is mainly composed of interest paid by borrowers on loans. On the 
financing side, banks can also raise funds by issuing bonds and equity (shares) or commercial 
paper. They can also borrow from other financial institutions including fellow banks or as a 
last resort from the Central Bank, or use retained earnings from previous profits that were not 
distributed. Modern banks have also expanded their off-balance sheet activities for which 
they earn fees and commission, which make up non-interest income. Off-balance sheet 
activities such as credit lines, guarantees, letters of credit, standby letters of credit, and 
commercial letters of credit do not have any impact on balance sheet reporting but they may 
represent an important source of the bank’s profits (MacDonald and Koch, 2006; Cecchetti et 
al., 2011). In many countries, the Central bank regulates and supervises financial institutions 
and does not establish accounting and auditing procedures. These procedures are put in place 
by the industry itself, and financial institutions are required to adhere to internationally 
accepted standards of accounting and auditing in presenting their balance sheets and 
statement on profit/loss to facilitate monitoring and supervision (Mehran, 1998). 
Bringing together the two important components of a bank’s balance sheet (assets and 
liabilities) the bank produces a report reflecting its financial position in a report titled, 




Reporting Standards (IFRS). Table 2-4 provides a prototype Statement of the financial 
position of a bank following the KPMG (KPMG, 2013). 
Table 2- 4: Consolidated Statement of Financial Position of the bank: bank name 
                                                                                             For the year ended 31 
December 
 In millions of (i.e. euro)                                                       Year t                       Year t-1 
Assets 
Cash and cash equivalent 
Pledged trading assets 
Non-pledged trading assets 
Derivative assets held for risk management 
Loans and advances to banks 
Loans and advances to customers 
Investment securities 
Current tax assets 
Property Plant Equipment 
Intangible assets 





Derivative liabilities held for risk management 
Deposits from banks 
Deposits from customers 
Debt securities issued 
Subordinated liabilities 
Provisions 








Total equity attributable to equity holders of the bank 
Non-controlling interests 
Total Equity 
Total Liabilities and Equity 
Year t: is the current year 
Year t-1: is the previous year 
 
The balance sheet goes hand in hand with the statement of profit or loss (see Appendix 1) that  




the main components of banking income and expenses are provided in Chapter four, 
Subsection 4.3.3. 
In Rwanda, banking financial institutions include commercial banks and specialized banks 
such as development banks, microfinance banks and cooperative banks (BNR, 2013). From 
1963 to 1975, the Rwandan banking sector consisted of two commercial banks, the Banque 
Commerciale du Rwanda (the current I & M Bank) established in 1963 and the Banque de 
Kigali (Bank of Kigali) established in 1966. From 1975, a few financial institutions that work 
like cooperatives, the “banque populaires” were established; the first Banque Populaire was 
inaugurated at NKAMBA in 1975. 
In 1983, the first private bank, the Banque Continentale Africaine au Rwanda (BACAR), 
thecurrent GT-Bank was registered. In 1986, all existing Banques Populaires were grouped 
into a federation called “Union des Banques Populaires du Rwanda (UBPR). In 2008, the 
UBPR became a commercial bank, the Banque Populaire du Rwanda (BPR). It signed a 
partnership with Rabobank in The Netherlands that bought 35 percent of BPR’s shares (BNR, 
2008).  
Apart from these institutions, there was a type of national savings and loan institution called 
Caisse d’Epargne du Rwanda (that later went bankrupt) and other NFBIs. Non-bank financial 
institutions included the Banque Rwandaise de Development (BRD) established in 1967 and 
the Caisse Hypothecaire du Rwanda (CHR) established in 1975. These two financial 
institutions were owned by the government, and at their inception were not regulated by the 
Central Bank (Coldmark, 1987). The BRD provided loans for development purposes 
targeting larger agricultural and industrial projects in rural areas. The CHR was a mortgage 
bank. In 2004, the Central Bank provisionally granted CHR a license to operate as a housing 
bank “Banque de l’Habitat du Rwanda, BHR”. In 2005, its shareholders decided to change 
that name to the “Housing Bank of Rwanda”. However, the new structure did not last long 
and it was acquired by BRD in 2011 (BNR, 2012). 
From 1995, the government of Rwanda launched reforms aimed at promoting a sound 
financial sector. Regulatory reforms included strengthening the powers of the Central Bank to 
regulate and supervise the sector. The second pillar of reforms involved liberalizing interest 
rates and the banking sector itself as well as the introduction of new financial instruments. 
From 1995-2000, three more privates banks emerged, the Banque de Commerce, de 




Banque a la Confiance d’Or (BANCOR), the ACCESS BANK set up in 1995, and 
Compagnie Generale des Banques (COGEBANQUE) established in 1999. 
Following the internationalization of banking in the 1990s, foreign banks started to penetrate 
the Rwandan financial sector from 2004. In 2004, FINA BANK, a Kenyan commercial bank 
acquired BACAR, which was acquired by Guaranty Trust Bank, a Nigerian financial services 
conglomerate in 2013 to form Guaranty Trust Bank (Rwanda) Ltd or GT-Bank Rwanda Ltd. 
During the same period, a takeover occurred at the Banque Commerciale du Rwanda (BCR) 
owned solely by the government of Rwanda. In 2004, Actis Capital, a private equity 
investment firm in the UK bought 80 percent of BCR’s shares. In 2012, Actis Capital sold its 
shares to a consortium consisting of Kenya’s I & M Bank Group, PROPARCO from France 
and a German investment corporation. The current brand name of the bank is I & M Bank 
Rwanda Ltd. Similarly, in 2007, a Pan African banking conglomerate, ECOBANK, 
headquartered in Lome (Togo) acquired BCDI and BANCOR was taken over by ACCESS 
BANK, a Nigerian multinational commercial bank owned by the Access Bank Group that 
acquired 75 percent of its shares (BNR, 2008). 
In 2009, 2011, and 2013, the National Bank of Rwanda licensed three regional banks to 
operate in Rwanda, the Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) and Equity Bank (both from Kenya) 
and Crane Bank Ltd from Uganda. Recently in October 2015, the Central Bank granted a 
license to the Bank of Africa Rwanda Ltd to operate in the country. That newly licensed bank 
immediately acquired AGASEKE Microfinance Bank, purchasing 90 percent of its shares. 
AGASEKE Microfinance Bank Ltd was an upgrade of Agaseke IMF S.A in 2011 along with 
Unguka IMF S.A that also upgraded to become a microfinance bank. In the same year, 
ZIGAMA CSS, a financial cooperative exclusively for the national army and police, also 
upgraded to become a cooperative bank. 
Following regulation no 03/2008 on the licensing conditions of banks that appeared in the 
Official Gazette No 51 of 20/12/2010 (BNR, 2010), minimum capital is required for each 
category of bank. The minimum capital required for a commercial bank is five billion 
Rwandan Francs (Rwf 5,000,000,000, about US$ 6,250,000). For a development bank, the 
minimum capital required is three billion Rwandan Francs (Rwf 3,000,000,000, around US$ 
3,750,000), and for a microfinance bank the minimum capital required is one billion five 





2.3.1.2 Microfinance Sector 
 
Microfinance institutions are a growing segment of the financial sector. The concept of 
microfinance can be traced back to the creation of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh by 
Muhammed Yunus in the 1980s with the objective of serving poor people who were 
classically unbanked (Ledgerwood and White, 2006). Thus, the microfinance industry is a set 
of financial institutions that provide a range of financial products and services to people 
excluded from the formal classical banking system. 
However, today, many microfinance institutions have extended their services to other clients 
while retaining their original customer base. In some cases, they have upgraded to 
microfinance banks, which are financial intermediaries that offer microfinance services as 
well as commercial bank products and services. While microfinance institutions are 
historically associated with microcredit, today they offer a variety of financial products and 
services, including consumer loans, savings accounts, time deposits, micro insurance and 
international money transfers. 
The microfinance industry in Rwanda comprises of 493 institutions of which 13 are limited 
companies and 480 are savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs). Sixty-four of these are 
non-UMURENGE SACCOs and 416 are UMURENGE SACCOs. SACCOs are financial 
institutions that offer deposit and lending facilities, mainly to their members. The 
establishment of 416 UMURENGE SACCOs in 2009 extended financial services to many 
that were formerly excluded from the sector (BNR, 2014).   
Microfinance institutions and banks not only differ in terms of licensing conditions, but target 
a different market. Regulation no. 02/2009 of 27/05/2009 on the Organization of 
Microfinance Activity (BNR, 2009) states, that an institution that seeks a license as a 
microfinance company, requires minimum capital of three hundred thousand million 
Rwandan francs (Rwf 300,000,000 or US$ 375,000). In terms of customers, banks serve 
customers with medium to high-level transactions including individuals, corporate or other 
non-government organisations, and government institutions, as well as embassies. 
Technological advancement and the internationalization of business have rendered their 
operations even more complex. Microfinance institutions are involved in far more diversified 




2.3.2 Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
 
Non-Bank Financial Institutions comprise of insurance companies, pension funds, investment 
funds, mutual funds, finance companies, stockbrokers and dealers (Mishkin, 2007; Cecchetti 
et al., 2011). As highlighted earlier, in Rwanda, NBFIs include only one public pension 
institution and insurance companies (with insurance intermediaries such as insurance brokers 
and agents, and lost adjusters). A summary description of each is given below. 
 
2.3.2.1 Insurance Companies  
 
Insurance is a product that transfers risk from an individual or firm to an insurance company 
through prepayment of a premium in exchange for insurance policies payable when a 
contingency event such as death, illness, or an accident occurs (Madura, 2014). It thus 
manages risk for individuals and companies. Insurance companies help to stabilize business 
because individuals and firms no longer have to focus on ensuring the availability of 
contingency reserves. Instead, they concentrate on their core activities that yield returns (Oke, 
2012). There are two groups of insurance companies: life insurance and nonlife insurance 
consisting of property and casualty insurance, health insurance, automobile insurance, and in 
some countries reinsurance (Fraser et al., 2005; Cecchetti et al., 2011). 
Life insurance is a policy that pays a benefit if the insured person dies while the contract is in 
force. Thus, life insurance companies insure people against financial hazards following a 
death (Mishkin, 2007). In the banking sector, this type of insurance is called credit life 
insurance. It helps all the parties involved in the contract if the borrower dies. The bank 
recovers the outstanding amount from the insurance company while the borrower’s family is 
no longer held responsible by the bank for the outstanding amount of the loan. Nonlife 
insurance such as property insurance provides financial protection against loss or damage to 
the insured’s property due to fire, theft, or another type of accident described in the policy 
governing the contract. Insurance companies intervene in case of the occurrence of a disaster. 
They play an important role in the lending-borrowing contract because, when such 
unforeseen events occur, the insurance company steps in by indemnifying the property 
damaged or lost. To reduce their exposure to risk, insurance companies opt for reassurance 





In addition, it is worth noting that insurance companies not only offer cover for risk and 
indemnification, but are also investors that invest the funds they collect in premium with 
banks or on capital markets (Njegomir and Stojić, 2010). Adams, Andersson et al.'s (2009) 
study on the linkages between commercial banking, insurance and economic growth in 
Sweden between 1830 and 1998 found that there was a linkage between banking and 
insurance to foster economic growth. Insurance influenced both bank lending and economic 
growth. Generally, insurance companies offer supportive, complementary infrastructure to 
the banking sector due to their commitment to cover unforeseen losses due to fire or theft in 
relation to assets pledged as collateral for loans, or the death of a borrower. 
Rwanda initially had two insurance companies, namely, Societé Nationale d’Assurance du 
Rwanda (SONORWA) that commenced operations in 1975 and Societé Rwandaise 
d’Assurances (SORAS) that was established in 1984. The private insurance sector has been 
growing since the year 2000, with the creation of new companies offering diverse products 
and services that did not previously exist. Alongside the twelve private insurance companies 
of which ten were established after 2000, three public medical insurance firms were created, 
namely, the Military Medical Insurance (MMI), La Rwandaise d’Assurance Maladie 
(RAMA) and the Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI) known as “Mutuelle de Santé” 
(BNR, 2016). RAMA and the CBHI are currently managed by the Rwandan Social Security 
Board (RSSB). RAMA and MMI dominate the insurance sector, accounting for more than 60 
percent of total assets. 
 
2.3.2.2 Pension Sector 
 
State and private pension funds’ income accrues from regular contributions from employees 
and employers that subscribe to the pension plan (Madura, 2014). Employers can deduct 
employees’ contributions from their salaries or employees can pay them. Pension funds 
invest their income in long-term securities until they are withdrawn upon retirement by the 
employees. In the US, pension funds are vibrant investors in financial markets (Pilbeam, 
2010). Demand for pension products has expanded with higher life expectancy and economic 
prosperity. Furthermore, in countries such as the UK, pension fund products are free from 




In Rwanda, the pension sector is the largest component of the financial sector after the 
banking sector. As at 31 December 2015, it held 17.1 percent of the financial sector’s total 
assets (BNR, 2016). It is composed of only one public social security fund, the Rwandan 
Social Security Board, the former Caisse Sociale du Rwanda established in 1962. 
 
2.3.3 Credit Information System in Rwanda 
 
In order to gather quality credit information, in 2011, the private Credit Reference Bureau 
(CRB Africa) replaced the reference bureau managed by BNR. It aims to reduce moral 
hazard and adverse credit guarantees. All financial institutions, banks, MFIs, and NBFIs are 
obliged to report to the CRB (BNR, 2015). However, some companies such as MTN and 
TIGO as well as the two public utility companies supplying energy (Rwanda Energy Group 
Ltd) and water (Water and Sanitation Corporation Ltd), and the former Energy and Water 
Sanitation Agency (EWSA) have voluntary integrated the credit information system. The 
CRB only provides information on NPLs borrowers’ outstanding loans, which is an important 
contribution in assessing new loan applicants. However, there is a need for an independent 
company or body to assess customers’ rating when lending institutions evaluate loan 
applications. 
 
2.3.4 Financial Markets 
 
A financial market is a platform on which investors purchase or sell assets like stocks and 
bonds. Participants include households and businesses as well as financial institutions and 
government that can sell or purchase financial assets. The financial market comprises two 
groups. The first is those that facilitate the trading of short-term funds with a maturity of one 
year or less, the “money market.” The second group is those that accommodate the flow of 
long-term funds, also called “capital markets”. The market with newly issued securities is the 
“primary market” whereas the “secondary market” facilitates the purchase and sale (trading) 
of existing securities (Madura, 2014). Financial markets can be a source of long-term funds 
and become more important in comparison to banks as the financial system develops (Lynch, 




lending principle. These countries have witnessed extensive development of equity and bonds 
markets as sources of nonbank finance. 
For the purpose of hedging or speculation, investors make use of derivative securities traded 
in financial markets. Derivative securities derive from the values of underlying assets such as 
debt or equity securities. However, in order to function efficiently, derivatives require stable 
and efficient markets in their underlying assets and increase significantly as the primary 
markets develop to meeting the expected criteria (Lynch, 1996). 
The Rwanda Stock Exchange (RSE) was established in 2008 under the coordination of the 
Capital Market Advisory Council (CMAC) that was replaced by the Capital Market Authority 
(CMA). It reports to MINECOFIN. Only seven companies trade their equities at the RSE. 
Some are only registered on the RSE; these companies include BRALIRWA Ltd, Bank of 
Kigali Ltd, Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd, and Crystal Telecom Ltd. Others such as the 
Nation Media Group Ltd, Ucumi Supermarket Ltd, and Equity Group Holding Ltd are 
primarily registered on Nairobi Stock Exchange and also on the RSE. Equity Group Holding 
Ltd and Crystal Telecom Ltd registered on the RSE in February 2015 and May 2015, 
respectively (BNR, 2016). The capital market in Rwanda still underdeveloped in terms of 
both registered companies and the volume of shares traded. For example in 2010, the 
outstanding amount of shares traded as a percentage of GDP was 0.03 percent, which is far 
lower than in EAC members countries at 0.26 percent for Tanzania, 0.29 percent for Uganda, 
and 2.4 percent for Kenya (MINECOFIN, 2013) .   
With the objective of promoting the Rwandan capital market by making more marketable 
financial instruments available, since 2014, BNR and MINECOFIN have decided to issue 
Government Treasury Bonds on quarterly basis. This strategy aims to offer more savings 
opportunities to firms and households. The benchmark Bond is for three, five, seven, and 10 
years. In addition, developments in the capital market have resulted in transactions in debt 
securities. The International Finance Corporation (IFC)’s Pan African Bond issued the 
UMUGANDA Bond worth $US 22 million over a five-year period. This bond has increased 
international investors’ confidence in the Rwandan capital market and is an additional 






2.3.5 Regulation and Supervision of the financial sector 
 
Any analysis of the financial sector would be incomplete if it ignored the regulatory 
framework in which financial institutions operate (Pilbeam, 2010). The main objective of 
financial sector regulation or banking regulation is creating a safe financial sector in general 
and banking industry in particular. Not only are regulation and supervision of financial 
institutions relevant to the operations of such institutions, but they facilitate adaption to the 
changing environment in relation to new financial instruments, technological advances and 
occasionally financial crises. In addition, regulation and supervision convey the confidence 
and stability of the financial sector to the public. This sub-section discusses the Central 
Bank’s rationale for regulation and supervision of the financial sector to control the 
circulation of money and ensure the stability of the sector. 
 
2.3.5.1 Justification for regulation and supervision of the financial sector 
 
The nature of business in the financial sector in general, and specifically in the banking sector 
calls for regulation (Matthews and Thompson, 2008). The oligopolistic or monopoly structure 
of the banking sector could be used to exploit customers who are powerless in such a market 
structure. Individual consumers or customers are unable to significantly influence banks’ 
behavior due to limited information about how they operate. In turn, banks use their 
informational advantage to exploit clients in the pricing of financial products and services, 
and in ensuring that loan contracts protect them, sometimes at the cost of borrowers. 
Therefore, consumers need protection against the potential unilateral influence of banks. A 
lack of regulation can also be damaging for banks themselves as bank panics could destroy 
the sector (Heffernan, 2005; Matthews and Thompson, 2008). 
As a case in point, due to its decentralized regulation, until 1934, the US recorded recurrent 
bank runs, bank panics, and bank failures (Freixas and Rochet, 2008). Similar phenomena 
affected England as well as other European countries before the establishment of a Central 
Bank that acts as Lender of Last Resort. Without regulation, bank runs and bank panics are 
integral to the nature of the banking system. Bank runs are a phenomenon where depositors 
make large panic withdrawals from their bank fearing its bankruptcy; if excessive, they 
generate a liquidity shortage increasing the probability of the bank’s failure. Once there is a 




sector as a whole experiences a bank panic that can generate a financial crisis. To prevent 
such contagion, the Central Bank steps in by lending liquidity to the bank experiencing the 
problem, stabilizing the banking industry, and indirectly the economy. 
However, in order to reduce the risk of large-scale failures that can affect the level of 
economic activity in a country, the regulator has to pay more attention to banks (Fraser et al., 
2005). Through regulatory institutions, the government sets specific rules that bank managers 
have to follow. At the same time, the regulator has general oversight using onsite and offsite 
inspections of financial intermediaries in order to ensure that the managers of these 
institutions comply fully with regulations in relation to the safety and the soundness of the 
banking sector. Therefore, prudential regulations are essential to banks, insurance companies, 
and other financial intermediaries. They aim to protect depositors from the risk of the failure 
of the financial institutions where they keep their assets. Specifically, they target banks 
because their failures generate severe negative externalities for their customers (depositors) 
and shareholders. The negative consequences spread at extraordinary speed to the sector and 
to the economy as a whole. 
In many countries, the Central Bank regulates and supervises the financial sector. It sets 
monetary policy and rules that financial institutions have to abide by in order to promote 
financial stability (Pilbeam, 2010). However, in countries like the US, UK, Japan, and South 
Africa, other bodies also oversee the functioning of the financial sector. In the US for 
example, three separate and important federal agencies, alongside each state’s banking 
department, perform this function (MacDonald and Koch, 2006). These are the Federal 
Reserve Bank (FED), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The FED, which is in charge of monetary policy, 
regulates and supervises banks and financial institutions in order to safeguard the safety and 
reliability of the financial sector while protecting consumers’ rights, and overseeing the 
payments system in the country. The OCC is an independent bureau within the US 
Department of Treasury that charters, regulates, and supervises national banks and thrift 
institutions as well as the federal branches and agencies of foreign banks operating in the 
country. Insured state banks that choose not to be members of the Federal System are under 
the FDIC’s regulation and supervision. Although the responsibilities of different regulatory 
agencies may overlap, they generally coordinate policies and decisions. The FDIC insures 
customer deposits up to $U.S.100,000 per account in both commercial banks and savings 




Since 1997, supervision and all aspects of financial regulation in the UK have been vested in 
a single state regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) (Heffernan, 2005). The 
Central Bank, the Bank of England that sets monetary policy, is still in charge of 
safeguarding financial sector stability as a lender of last resort. Similarly, in 2001, the 
Japanese Government established the Japanese Financial Services Authority (JFSA) with a 
mandate to formulate policies and regulate the financial sector. In South Africa, three bodies 
regulate the financial sector: the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) created in 1921, the 
Financial Services Board (FSB), established in 1993, and the National Credit Regulator 
(NCR), created in 2005 ( Zyl, Botha and Skerritt, 2003; The Presidency of Republic of South 
Africa, Act No 34 of 2005). The SARB has performed all the responsibilities of a Central 
Bank since 1987. Previously, the Department of Finance (National Treasury) performed such 
functions. The FSB regulates and supervises non-banking financial institutions. These NBFIs 
include capital markets, collective investment schemes, financial services providers, insurers, 
re-insurers, and retirement funds. Finally, the NCR regulates and supervises the credit 
industry. Its duties include research and education, policy development, registration of credit 
providers and debt counselors, and investigating complaints. 
In Rwanda, the financial sector is regulated and supervised by the Central Bank and the 
Capital Market Authority (CMA). The Central Bank regulates and supervises the banking 
sector, microfinance sector and NBFIs, while the CMA regulates and supervises the RSE. 
 
National Bank of Rwanda 
Established in 1964, the Central Bank of Rwanda is called “Banque Nationale du Rwanda”, 
(BNR) or National Bank of Rwanda (NBR). Historically, it was located in the capital city of 
Kigali, but branches have recently been established in Rwamagana (Eastern Province), 
Musanze (Northern Province), and Rusizi (Western Province). In order to strengthen 
supervision of the banking sector, it conducts offsite surveillance and onsite inspections. 
Furthermore, it holds regular quarterly meetings with top banks’ management and some 
Board members. During these meetings, the Central Bank shares the outcomes of offsite 
surveillance and onsite inspections, which provides opportunities to discuss the problems that 
face a given bank and propose a way forward. 
In order to promote the stability of the financial sector BNR established the Financial 




the committee identifies the risks associated with the sector, and publishes its findings, as 
well as closely monitoring the sector and taking corrective measures when necessary. 
Equally, BNR ensures that the pension sector manages the funds at its disposal 
professionally, and that the insurance sector is performing well. 
 
Capital Market Authority 
In May 2014, the CMA issued guidelines for bonds issuance in Rwanda and a regulation on 
the book building process (BNR, 2015). In order to match the legal framework of EAC 
partners, it consulted the seven directives issued by the EAC Secretariat (BNR, 2015). These 
include the EAC Directives on Public Offers (Equity); Public Offers (Debt); Collective 
Investment Schemes; Public Assets Backed Securities; Corporate Governance for Securities 
Intermediaries; and on Listing.  
While regulation promotes the safety and dependability of the banking sector, there is no 
consensus among economists on its relevance. Some argue that regulation is important to 
maintain the stability of the banking sector (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; Bhattacharya, 
Boot et Thakor, 1998) while others (Smith Vera, 1990; Benston and Kaufman, 1996; 
Llewellyn, 1999), advocate for “free banking”. The latter group posit that free trade and free 
competition promote economic growth and well-being (Matthews and Thompson, 2008). 
Good banks would strive to conduct their business in a way that shows observable differences 
with bad banks. They would build their financial position to attract customers that are losing 
confidence in their bad banks. In so doing, they would increase their market share, and 
potentially their profitability. Accordingly, managers would be convinced that the success 
and survival of their banks hinge on their ability to retain customers’ confidence and loyalty. 
Smith Vera (1990) claims, that, the creation of a Central Bank that regulates the banking 
sector is more politically motivated than business oriented. Likewise, Llewellyn (1999) states 
that regulation discredits and strangles innovation, thus placing a limit on the growth of the 
economy. For Benston and Kaufman (1996), the stability of monetary policy is more 






2.3.5.2 Instruments of banking regulation 
 
Since the central objective of banks and other deposit taking institutions is to make profits 
from the lending-borrowing arrangement, they gain from interest rate differentials. As the 
drivers of credit, these institutions, also known as monetary financial institutions (MFIs) 
contribute to the increase in money supply in the economy (Sexton, 2008; Casu et al., 2015). 
For example, an expansion of loans results in an increase in the stock of money circulating in 
an economy through the credit multiplier. To prevent banks from running short of liquidity, 
they are obliged to keep a fraction of total deposits with the Central Bank in the form of 
reserves to cope with possible withdrawals. They use the remaining proportion to grant loans 
to borrowers. In the past, this was one of the justifications for more stringent regulation and 
supervision of deposit taking institutions than non-depository institutions such as insurance 
companies, pension funds, investments companies, and finance houses, to name but a few. 
Accordingly, the ultimate objective of banking regulation is to ensure that the interests of 
stakeholders in the banking sector are safeguarded and to promote sound investment policies 
for banks (Freixas and Rochet, 2008). In order to achieve this objective, Central Banks 
develop regulatory instruments. While they may vary from country to country, they have 
some common basic features such as capital requirements, reserves requirements, and, in 
some countries, deposit insurance. 
Capital requirements 
Since monitoring banks’ assets is not an easy task, the regulator uses capital requirements to 
limit excessive risk taking by banks. Following the Basel Accord of 1988, many countries 
require minimum capital adequacy ratio of 8 percent. Central Banks can increase this 
minimum level depending on banks’ capitalization standards and credit rating score. For 
instance, with effect from 1 October 2001, the minimum capital requirement for local banks 
in South Africa is 10 percent (Zyl et al., 2003). This level is common in developed 
economies. A well-capitalized bank is one that has a total risk-capital asset ratio greater than 
or equal to 10 percent where the tier-1 capital asset ratio is greater or equal to 6 percent 
(Matthews and Thompson, 2008). In Rwanda, minimum capital adequacy is 15 percent of 
which a minimum of 10 percent represent the core capital (BNR, 2014). This is above the 






In most countries, the monetary authorities require banks to hold a defined proportion of their 
deposits at their Central Banks. This is known as the “reserve ratio”. The higher the required 
reserve ratio, the lower the amount of funds available to the banks to use to grant loans to 
borrowers and vice versa. Central banks use the reserve ratio as one of the mechanisms to 
control bank lending, and in this manner to control the money supply or money creation. 
These reserves vary across countries and some Central Banks pay interest on them while 
others do not (Matthews and Thompson, 2008). In the UK, banks are compelled to maintain 
deposits at the Bank of England equal to 0.15 percent of eligible liabilities (roughly 
approximated by deposits). These reserves bear interest provided they remain within the 
agreed amount with the Bank of England that in turn invests them in interest bearing 
securities. Likewise, in the European Union, banks have to keep 2 percent of specified short-
term liabilities in reserve at the European Central Bank (ECB) on average over a one-month 
maintenance period. They earn interest on these compulsory balances at a rate equal to the 
average rate of the weekly tenders over the maintenance period. In contrast, in the US, 
reserves with the Central Bank vary between 0 and 10 percent of deposits depending on the 
bank’s nature and size and these balances are non-interest bearing. Similarly, in Japan and 
Switzerland, banks are required to keep reserves equal to between 0.05 and 1.3 percent, 
respectively and the balances do not bear interest. In South Africa, banks are required to keep 
a minimum of 5 percent of their average daily total deposits in reserve, of which 2.5 percent 
is kept with the SARB ( Zyl et al., 2003), with no interest paid. 
In Rwanda, the “required reserve ratio” is fixed at 20 percent of banks’ total deposits or 
liabilities and off-balance sheet commitments held in both Rwandan francs and foreign 
currencies (BNR, 2012). These reserves are held in current accounts with the Central Bank 
and bear no interest. The required reserves ratio in Rwanda is relatively low compared to 
SSA Countries (Mehran, 1998). In Angola, the reserve requirements ratio is 40 percent, while 
in Ghana it is 35 percent.  
Along with the reserves requirements in Rwanda, through regulation no 06/2008 of 
30/11/2007 on Corporate Governance of Banks, BNR has fixed the maximum level of loans 
that can be granted to shareholders, directors, and staff. This regulation aims to limit the 
misuse of a bank’s funds (that mainly accrue from public deposits) (BNR, 2008). The 




percent of total core capital, while directors, executive officers and general management 
employees can only borrow up to a maximum of 5 percent of total capital. 
Deposit insurance 
In order to avoid bank panics that can have significant social and economic costs, some 
governments have established deposit insurance schemes. Under such schemes, a bank pays a 
premium to an insurance company to insure clients’ deposits up to a fixed limit in the case of 
bank failure (Freixas and Rochet, 2008). While deposit insurance can provide a solution in 
the case of bank runs, it can be also a source of moral hazard behavior. Matthews and 
Thompson (2008) claim that moral hazard generated by deposit insurance can drive even 
sound and well-performing banks to decide to fund higher risk projects when faced with 
competition from bad banks. A case in point is the global financial crisis of 2007 – 2009. 
Prior to the crisis, many investors as well as government officials responsible for overseeing 
financial intermediaries were free riders (Cecchetti et al., 2011). Rather than undertaking 
their own costly screening efforts, they presumed that rating agencies’ assessments were 
truthful. Implicitly, the participants in the process acted as if the ultimate collateral value of 
houses would always be adequate to contain the damage from adverse selection. Had housing 
prices increased indefinitely, as many appeared to assume they would, the collateral would 
have protected investors against any damage. However, when housing prices and the value of 
collateral started to fall, the effects of adverse selection threatened the financial system as a 
whole. 
Other tools used by the Central Bank to control money creation 
Because the Central Bank determines a country’s monetary policy, and banks are to some 
extent involved in money creation through issuance of credit, the Central Bank uses other 
conventional tools such as the discount rate and intervention in open market operations to 
keep money creation at the desired level (Mankiw, 2011). The discount rate allows banks to 
borrow money from the Central Bank when they have a shortage of liquidity to meet short-
term obligations or to serve successful pending loan applications. The higher the discount 
rate, the lower the amount of funds those banks will decide to borrow. Put simply, banks are 
discouraged from borrowing. Conversely, if the discount rate is lower, banks have an 
opportunity to borrow more funds that they can lend to businesses. 
The Central Bank can also vary the quantity of reserves in the banking system through the 




market operations. When the Central Bank buys government securities, the sellers of these 
securities deposit the amount received in banks, thus, increasing bank reserves that give 
banks room to grant new loans. Equally, when the Central Bank sells government securities, 
bank reserves fall, reducing their ability to issue new loans. 
The Central Bank can also apply other non-conventional market-oriented approaches such as 
credit ceilings and deposit rate controls as well as moral suasion to influence the quantity of 
money circulating within the economy (Casu et al., 2015). These instruments operate through 
the monetary authorities’ influence on the functioning of banks, and in some cases, are not in 
line with banks’ commercial interests. The monetary authorities can exercise some control 
over interest on deposits, may limit the level of credit banks are able to offer or may simply 
direct banks to grant loans to a specific category of customers or to a given sector. With 
moral suasion, authorities engage bankers in a bid to establish lending priorities without 
imposing a limit on credit, as is the case with credit ceilings. 
As in other countries, in Rwanda, BNR uses other tools such as the discount rate and open 
market operations (especially in the money market where Treasury bills and Treasury bonds 
dominate). Government issues Treasury bills to finance the government budget or to absorb 
surplus liquidity. Using the discount window facility, the BNR allows commercial banks to 
borrow its funds after assessing the real need for liquidity in the financial system. Since 
September 2012, the discount window is connected to the Key Repo Rate (BNR, 2015). The 
actual policy rate equals the Key Repo Rate (KRR) + 4 percent. To access these funds, 
commercial banks have to offer Treasury bills and promissory notes as collateral. 
In terms of open market operations, BNR uses daily liquidity absorption repos with maturities 
of seven days and weekly auctions of Treasury bills with maturities of (28, 91, 182 and 364) 
days while Treasury bonds are issued on a quarterly basis (BNR, 2015). Repos with shorter 
maturities are issued at any time based on the forecast of banking sector liquidity. Repo 
tenders are generally publicized on the Friday after the Monetary Policy Committee’s 
meeting. On any other working day, banks have the opportunity to bid for 1-day repo around 
2:00 p.m. The minimum bid acceptable is Rwf 50 million or a multiple of this amount (BNR, 
2008). 
Turning to supervision, the Central Bank uses Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, 
Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to risk (CAMELS) rating criteria to assess the soundness 




Cecchetti et al., 2011). The rating is on a scale of one to five, where a composite rating of one 
indicates that the bank is performing well while one of five indicates that it is in a dire 
situation. A bank whose rating is five is close to failure. Based on these ratings, the Central 
Bank advises banks on relevant action to take and, in extreme cases, can close a bank that 
appears to be performing poorly and displaying signs of insolvency. The capital adequacy (C) 
criterion indicates an institution’s ability to respond to all external risks identified, measured, 
monitored and controlled by management. Asset quality (A) reveals the volume of prevailing 
credit risk in relation to loans and the investment portfolio, as well as off-balance sheet 
activities. The management category (M) reflects the competence of the key organs running 
the bank, which are the board of directors and senior management committee. It further 
assesses the existence and use of procedures in place to identify, measure, monitor, and 
control risks within the targets set by the bank in conformity with regulations. With reference 
to Earnings (E), regulators are more interested in the sustainability or quality of earnings. 
They do not limit their analysis to the magnitude of and movement in earnings, but also 
assess elements that may disturb the bank’s earnings. Liquidity (L) reflects the sufficiency of 
the institution’s position with regard to existing and potential sources of liquidity and funds. 
It also examines the institution’s strategies to manage liquidity risk. Finally, sensitivity to 
market risk (S) reveals the extent to which the bank’s earnings or economic capital are 
exposed to price or market risk resulting in changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, 
and commodity prices, as well as bond and equity prices. 
In stabilizing and promoting the economy, the Central Bank does not only focus on the 
stability of financial markets and institutions. It also works towards other specific objectives, 
including the stability of prices, interest rates and exchange rates, and higher and stable real 
growth of the economy that goes hand in hand with higher employment levels (Cecchetti et 
al., 2011; Mankiw, 2011). The stability of interest rates and exchange rates is argued to be 
secondary because they serve as a means to achieving low inflation, stability in real output 
growth and financial sector stability, which are central to achieving the ultimate goal of 
stability of the entire economic system. Instability in the inflation rate, interest rate, exchange 
rate or real economic growth poses a threat to the whole economy. Thus, the task of the 
Central Bank is to work towards improving each of these specific macroeconomic objectives, 
though some may work in diametrically opposed directions. For example, in the short run, an 
expansionary monetary policy that lowers interest rates raises economic growth, employment, 




expense of an increase of inflation rate. When the exchange rate is stable, it is easier to 
predict the level of imports as well as exports, implying stability in the balance of payments. 
While the exchange rate is not a serious matter for the US and the European Union, it is of 
concern in emerging markets and LDCs because of the structure of their economies that rely 
on improving exports while controlling for imports. In addition, price stability, which is one 
of the criteria for an economy to run efficiently, boosts households and investors’ confidence 
in their decisions as well as the efficient working of financial markets (Mankiw, 2011). 
Consumer decisions are stable, investors are able to distinguish successful firms from those 
that are performing poorly and markets can efficiently allocate resources to their best use. 
Furthermore, stability in real output growth boosts confidence in the future, reducing 
speculation in businesses activities which in turn leads to sustained economic growth, and 
stable employment. 
 
2.4 New Developments in the Banking Sector 
 
Section 2.3 discussed the components and development of the financial sector. This section 
discusses developments in the banking sector that brought changes in products, competition 
as well as regulation.  
While it was historically one of the most closely regulated of all industries, the banking 
industry witnessed gradual deregulation in the 1980s, giving this sector an opportunity to 
cross even geographic boundaries. The dramatic shift in the products and services offered by 
this industry emanates from technological advances. Thus, the operational and regulatory 
environment coupled with the forces that brought about change, such as market-driven 
competition, product innovation and deregulation/reregulation, securitization, globalization, 
and technological advances have significantly altered the banking landscape (MacDonald and 
Koch, 2006; Casu et al., 2015). 
 
2.4.1 Structural and conduct deregulation 
 
Many analysts ascribe change in the financial service industry to deregulation (MacDonald 
and Koch, 2006). Financial deregulation involves removing controls and rules, which 




geographical location, branch restrictions, restrictions on products and services on offer, and 
credit ceilings, among others. Deregulation was a response to intense competition across 
deposit taking and non-deposit taking institutions. Structural deregulation refers to the 
opening up of new market horizons by liberalizing financial markets to allow institutions to 
compete more freely. If, as proponents of deregulation assume, efficiency increases, 
improved resource allocation will benefit the whole society due to price reduction and/or 
service expansion for consumers. Deregulation aims to improve the performance of the 
deregulated industry. For example, the widespread liberalization and harmonization processes 
in the European Union since the 1980s have contributed to the creation of a business 
environment where operational efficiency and technology play key roles in influencing 
banks’ strategies (Casu et al., 2015). 
While the deregulation process appeared to be unique for each country, there is a common 
pattern in most developed countries from 1970s (Matthews and Thompson, 2008). In the UK, 
it started with the removal of strict controls on bank assets and ceilings on interest rates on 
deposits, and a gradual removal of credit restrictions. In the US, deregulation kicked off with 
the suppression of regulation Q 1982 that set a ceiling on the interest rates that banks could 
pay on savers’ deposits. Early in the 1980s, some advanced countries eliminated credit 
controls as well as exchange rate control. The European Union relaxed its heavy controls on 
banks’ balance sheets. By the end of 1980s, Western Europe and Japan had effectively 
eliminated capital controls (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Following reduction of the 
specialization restriction in business between banks and other financial intermediaries, 
intense competition emerged in different markets at domestic or international level. This 
resulted from trade and free movement of capital at international scale, triggering the 
modernization of the financial sector. The influence of the state decreased and the industrial 
and banking sectors were privatized. 
 
2.4.2 Financial innovation and the adoption of new technologies 
 
Like innovation in other business sectors, financial innovation is an ongoing process where 
banks and financial institutions seek to develop new products and services to meet customers’ 
needs (MacDonald and Koch, 2006; Casu et al., 2015). It involves the creation of new 




the preferences of customers, and at the same time generate more income for financial 
institutions (Cecchetti et al., 2011). Innovations include new credit, deposit, insurance, 
leasing, hire purchase, derivatives and other financial products. These innovations have the 
ultimate objective of better responding to changes that align market demand in order to 
improve efficient regulation of the financial sector. Once achieved, this leads to gradual 
changes in the economy. They can also target the establishment of new types of financial 
intermediaries. In some circumstances, financial innovation has allowed financial institutions 
to circumvent the existing legal and supervisory framework (MacDonald and Koch, 2006).  
Innovation has also facilitated the extensive adoption of new financial instruments such as 
derivative products introduced with the objective of reducing risk through hedging. Examples 
of derivatives include swaps, options and futures contracts. In addition, technology has 
allowed banks to adopt various market segmentation strategies following the profitability 80-
20 rule. Following this rule, the top 20 percent slice of profitable customers who contribute 
about 80 percent of overall profits are given a wider range of products which move them to a 
more profitable position for themselves and for the bank, and the less profitable 80 percent of 
customers are moved towards lower-cost banking services. 
With the development of the financial sector, market fragmentation is reduced, and more 
complex financial products flow into the market as a result of the advanced financial 
infrastructure in place and reduced information asymmetry that allow for a more accurate 
evaluation of the financial risks associated with these products (Lynch, 1996). Advanced 
computers and software have contributed significantly to the reduced costs of information 
management related to collection, storage, processing and transmission, as well as containing 
information asymmetries in financial transactions. 
However, extensive use of technology is not risk free. Banks face the risk of investing in 
Information Technology (IT) infrastructure that could rapidly become obsolete or suffer theft, 
and legal and operational risk. Legal risk relates to uncertainty surrounding the applicable 
laws and regulations on a number of aspects relating to technology such as the legal status of 
remote banking, validity and proof of transactions, and strict respect for a customer’s privacy. 
It also concerns the risk of loss resulting from the fact that a contract cannot be enforced 
simply because the borrower did not have the right to enter into it or because the terms of the 
contract are not in force in case of bankruptcy of the bank (Matthews and Thompson, 2008). 




associated with non-upgrade of the banking IT infrastructure (leading to data corruption and 
programming errors, among others). In addition, internal control could fail to cope with the 
new operational environment and employees might make unintentional or willful mistakes. It 
can also result from errors in instructing and processing payments or settling transactions 
within the bank, across banks in the country or in international transfers (Matthews and 
Thompson, 2008). Despite such shortcomings, rapid innovation that undeniably benefited 
from technological advances has contributed to the dynamic efficiency of the financial sector, 




Globalization has also impacted the development of the financial sector as geographic 
confines no longer restrict financial transactions (MacDonald and Koch, 2006). Many nations 
have removed regulatory barriers to international banking. In turn, the removal of geographic 
barriers intensifies interconnections and integration between financial markets and financial 
institutions worldwide. Investors with surplus funds are to move wherever there are new 
investment opportunities. Funds can freely flow between countries due to efficient money 
and capital markets as well as currency exchange. 
In most financial centers, banks have the capacity and expertise to enable customers to access 
capital in any denominated currency in the form of either debt or equity (MacDonald and 
Koch, 2006). While there has been product innovation and the acquisition of domestic firms 
by foreign ones has led to substantial removal of the physical boundaries that previously 
separated firms internationally the process has been made a reality by technology, especially 
the commercialization of the Internet. Consumers and producers search beyond their local 
market in pursuit of price, quality and availability of goods, services and capital, despite 
being separated by long distances. 
This growth in the international activities and trade of multinational corporations has 
increased demand for services from financial institutions that operate across borders 
(Cecchetti et al., 2011). Such institutions finance trade, facilitate foreign exchange and offer 
wholesale (large) short-term Eurocurrency loans and deposits to both residents and non-
residents. The question that needs further investigation is, what factors were at the center of 




Casu et al. (2015) concur with Fraser  et al. (2005) that the main driving forces for banks and 
other multinational companies’ overseas expansion include price differential and trade 
barriers; arbitrage and the cost of capital; ownership advantages; and efficient use of excess 
managerial capacity. International banking and other multinationals seek to expand their 
business overseas with the aim of serving their customers who are involved in export and 
import of goods and services, and to maximize profits by taking advantage of prices 
differences in the factors of production and products. Some banks or multinationals target the 
less developed world, where labor is cheaper, and final products are affordable to the broad 
market because of reduced transport costs.  
These institutions also seek to overcome the barriers associated with restrictive laws in some 
countries. In terms of arbitrage and the cost of capital, banks in developed countries have the 
advantage of borrowing cheaply on the domestic market in strong currency markets and 
investing in overseas markets where currencies may be weak. Conversely, they can acquire 
domestic banks at a relatively cheap price, thus, giving them the opportunity to diversify and 
increase their earnings. 
Owing to comparative advantages in advanced technology, marketing expertise, production 
efficiency, managerial expertise, and innovative products, such banks have the confidence to 
enter foreign markets to make profit. Furthermore, banks as well as other companies can 
expand their operations in new markets overseas in order to more efficiently exploit their 
managerial skills and comparative and competitive advantage on a larger scale in order to 
make more profit from investment in their human capital (Casu et al., 2015). 
A country’s decision to allow the flow of capital across borders is determined by global 
conditions rather than domestic, specifically political, considerations. Openness has a 
significant influence on the development of the financial sector. Easy access to international 
capital markets offers domestic firms an opportunity to raise funds in foreign markets (Rajan 
and Zingales, 2003). For example, in the 1980s, reputable Japanese export firms raised 
finance on the Euromarkets. This served a lesson to Japanese banks to change their practices. 
Conversely, foreign financial firms’ entry into domestic markets has made a significant 
contribution to financial sector development. Openness to the rest of the world makes it 





Depending on the laws of domestic and host countries, a bank can enter the foreign market 
either in the form of a correspondent bank, representative office, branch office, agency or 
a subsidiary (Heffernan, 2005; Casu et al., 2015). The services offered via a correspondent 
banking relationship consist of payments and other transactions as well as various trade credit 
facilities performed by a bank located in the host country, where the parent bank is not 
initially present physically in exchange for fees paid to the local bank. A representative office 
cannot provide banking services that involve taking deposits and making loans. Instead, it 
acts as a marketing agency for the parent bank. In contrast, a branch is an integral part of the 
parent bank. It can legally perform all banking functions allowed by the banking regulator in 
the host country. An agency functions like a branch in that it is an integral part of the parent 
bank; but in countries like the US, it performs fewer operations than branches. A subsidiary is 
a separate legal entity from the parent bank. It has its own capital and is regulated by the 
financial regulatory agency of the host country. The parent bank only provides support when 




Securitization refers to the process where loans and other financial assets which are illiquid in 
nature such as mortgages, are combined together into financial instruments called “mortgage-
backed securities” and sold as securities to investors (MacDonald and Koch, 2006). It 
transforms illiquid assets into marketable securities. The pools include, mortgage loans, credit 
card loans, car loans, and other different loans to business. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the 
Federal Housing Administration were the first mortgage securities to issue mortgage-backed 
securities in the US (Cecchetti et al., 2011). Because the bank no longer has to allocate loan-
loss reserves against non-performing assets, its capital requirement declines proportionately. 
Securitization helps the bank to eliminate the interest rate risk associated with financing the 
underlying assets. In turn, borrowers enjoy lower costs of funding because lenders are in a 
position to sell the assets more easily.  
However, the purchasing of these securities by investors, mainly banks and insurance 
companies, without full appreciation of the risk was a major cause of the global financial 
crisis of 2007 – 2009. Investors did not fully document borrowers’ income and assets and this 




to 2006, and hence the root cause of the financial crisis of 2007 – 2009 (Cecchetti et al., 
2011). For example, from 2000 through 2006, national home prices increased by 88.7 
percent, far more than incomes (Mankiw, 2011). The housing market boom, which proved 
unsustainable, became the trigger for the financial crisis. Nationwide, housing prices 
decreased by about 30 percent, followed by a series of mortgage borrowers’ defaults and 
home foreclosures (Mankiw, 2011). The increase in homes sold prompted a price decrease 
and financial institutions that owned mortgage-backed securities experienced enormous 
losses. This lead to the collapse of the housing industry, and the bankruptcy of many financial 
institutions such as the Lehman Brothers Bank in the US in September 2008 and Northern 
Rock Bank in the UK in September 2007 (Cecchetti et al., 2011). As financial institutions 
were weak during the crisis, the world experienced a severe economic recession. 





One consequence of the process of deregulation has been the increased perceived riskiness of 
the banking business. Sexton (2008) argues that deregulation, coupled with deposit insurance, 
was the driver of the moral hazard behavior of bank managers in the US prior to the 2007 – 
2009 financial crisis. On the one hand, banks directed savings into loans to high-risk real 
estate projects and other risky schemes. On the other, depositors were careless about the 
health of their banks, meaning that they had little incentive to monitor how their banks were 
performing based on the assurance of protection by deposit insurance. In the new 
environment, banks took the opportunity to expand their activities outside the traditional 
banking regulatory framework in order to maximize their earnings (Rose, 2002).  Over the 
years, banks have tried to move towards replacing interest income with fee income. 
In the spirit of diversifying sources of income, in the 1980s, competition from financial 
markets created a move to more value-added products, which were better adapted to 
customers’ needs (Freixas and Rochet, 2008). Banks expanded into nontraditional areas and 
products such as investment banking activities, encouraging off-balance sheet activities, such 
as standby letters of credit, commitments and guaranties, commitments related to interest rate 




enhancement products. Under such circumstances, the big challenge to bankers was to 
provide services that met customers’ demand, while still controlling their risk implications 
(Fraser et al., 2005). In order to strengthen their position in providing more services to 
customers in the liberalized and competitive financial environment, banks increased their size 
through Mergers and Acquisitions ( M & As) (Matthews and Thompson, 2008; Cecchetti et 
al., 2011; Casu et al., 2015).  
The justification for M & As is that poorly-managed firms can do better if merged or 
acquired by well-managed ones or the assumption that two are more powerful that one on its 
own (Casu et al., 2015). It is expected that the new structure will yield better results for the 
shareholders of the two or more institutions coming together. Other reasons for M & As are 
exploiting economies of scale and economies of scope, thus, reducing inefficiencies. On the 
one hand, economies of scale resulting from the larger structure lead to lower unit costs of 
providing financial services to the benefit of consumers of banking services while 
maximizing their financial position. On the other, benefits arise from economies of scope as a 
result of consolidating some departments and /or improving channels of delivery in the new 
structure. Put differently, cost savings result from jointly delivering services through the new 
organization instead of the isolated old ones. They can also accrue by making proper links 
between production and marketing departments or externally through joint consumption 
channels. It is argued that M & As, are likely to eliminate inefficiencies by exploiting 
previously unexplored opportunities, leading to cost cutting and increased products and 
services, and hence, overall earnings. Equally, M & As can enhance the new entity’s 
bargaining power, diversify its product lines and improve marketing and distribution. All 
these factors promote higher margins and improved profitability, and hence, the value of the 
newly formed institution resulting in increased efficiency that reducing agency incentives and 
increases market power. 
Consumers/customers might also benefit by being able to access a package of products or 
services at the same place, thus reducing transactions and information costs. For example, 
when the same institution supplies banking and insurance products, a situation called 
bancassurance, economies of scope are possible (Matthews and Thompson, 2008; Cecchetti 
et al., 2011; Casu et al., 2015).  Zyl et al. (2003) argue that in the South African banking 
sector, bancassurance groups have emerged in recent years where banks also provide 
insurance services. Thus, banks supply both loans and insurance to depositors and borrowers. 




companies. Products like home insurance and credit insurance are complementary to loans 
offered by banks. 
In such a context, even strongly market-oriented systems needed to strengthen supervision. 
This was a key element in improving the safety and soundness of the overall financial sector 
or reregulating the financial sector. Re-regulation is the process of implementing new rules, 
restrictions and controls in response to market participants’ efforts to escape existing 
regulations (MacDonald and Koch, 2006). Alternatively, it is a way to minimising any 
potential adverse effects that may be associated with excessive competition brought by 
deregulation. 
 
2.4.6 International Regulation of the Banking Sector 
 
With internationalization of the banking sector alongside the increasing sophistication of 
financial markets, there has been support for international regulation of the firms involved. 
The need to regulate and supervise this development led to the adoption of the Basel Accord 
in 1988 by members of the Basel Committee composed of senior Central Bank officials for 
the G-10 countries that are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Sweden, the UK, and the US, plus Luxembourg and Switzerland (Casu et al., 2015). Its 
mandate was to ensure the soundness and stability of the globalized banking system 
(Heffernan, 2005).  
The Basel Accord set a minimum capital adequacy ratio of 8 percent made up of tier 1 (at 
least 4 percent) and tier 2 capital divided by weighted risk assets (assets plus credit risk 
equivalents) where assets are weighted by credit type and credit risk equivalents are weighted 
by counterparty type. Tier 1 or core capital comprises paid-up capital, retained earnings and 
disclosed reserves (which are provisions to cover unexpected risks). Tier 2 or supplementary 
capital consists of other elements of capital divided into upper tier 2 and lower tier 2 
(Heffernan, 2005; Pilbeam, 2010). The upper tier 2 captures capital such as cumulative 
perpetual preferred stock, loan loss allowances, undisclosed or hidden reserves, revaluation 
reserves (discounted by 55 percent) such as equity or property where the value changes, 
general loan loss reserves, and hybrid debt instruments such as convertible bonds or 
cumulative preference shares. The lower tier 2 contains subordinated debts. Indeed, Tier 2 




and Thompson, 2008). While the Basel Accord of 1988 provided a foundation to regulate the 
international banking sector, it was criticized on the following grounds (Matthews and 
Thompson, 2008): 
1. Differences in taxation systems and accounting rules caused the measurement of capital to 
vary broadly across countries. 
2. The Accord only focused on credit risk and ignored other types of risk that also cause 
disturbances in the banking sector. These include interest rate risk, liquidity risk, currency 
risk and operating risk. 
3. Banks that strived to reduce their risk portfolio were not rewarded because there risk 
diversification was not taken into account in calculating capital requirements. 
4. By asking all banks to conform to the same capital-asset ratio in order to mitigate risk, the 
Accord ignored the fact that banks conduct different financial operations. 
5. In terms of foreign exchange and interest rates contracts, the Accord did not reflect on the 
expected market value of banks’ assets. It thus created the problem of market value lagging 
behind when calculating capital adequacy. 
Basel II of 2004 and Basel III in 2010 aimed to address the deficiencies of the Basel Accord 
of 1988. The most important improvement in Basel II is to permit banks to use internally 
developed risk assessments as inputs for capital calculations. Basel II aimed to preserve the 
key principles of Basel I, while encouraging innovations in risk management, thereby firming 
up the stability and reliability of the financial system. Three reinforcing pillars achieve this 
objective. 
Pillar 1 includes the calculation of minimum capital requirements to cover credit risk. It 
includes operational risk and market risk on the banks’ trading book. Subsequent to 
developments in banks’ operations, it sets three approaches to evaluate credit risk, the 
standardized approach, internal rating-based approach and securitization approach 
framework. Firstly, the standardized approach, which is an extension of the Basel I approach, 
allocates risk weights to specific assets and integrates the risk weights provided by external 
rating agencies. Secondly, regulatory authorities allow banks that have deep, sophisticated 
control of risk-taking operations to apply their internal ratings standards. These internal rating 
models determine capital requirements, which are subject to specified, rigorous evidence and 




credit risk ensures that banks hold regulatory capital for securitization transactions in order to 
limit some of the damaging effects of these operations. Banks are free to choose the 
standardized approach or the use of internal models. 
The second pillar provides room for national regulatory authorities to modify regulatory 
capital levels. Depending on the targeted levels, they can impose higher capital charges than 
those required in pillar 1. The second pillar also requires banks to develop internal methods to 
assess their overall required capital adequacy ratio. 
The third pillar obliges banks to make greater disclosure of their operations to financial 
markets as well as to the public with the ultimate objective of firming up market discipline 
and making their risk management practices more responsible and transparent. Figure 2-3 
summarizes the structure of the Basel II process and the three pillars. 













Source: Matthews and Thompson (2008) 
During the implementation of Basel II Agreement, banks made use of sophisticated risk-
modelling techniques. The new requirements appeared to be cumbersome as they were 
voluminous (2000 pages) and prescriptive. In addition, the capital requirements laid down in 
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Basel I and Basel II were inadequate to contain the credit crash that culminated in the global 
financial crisis of 2007 – 2009 (Rose and Hudgins, 2013). Banks found ways to circumvent 
the rules by holding both insufficient total capital and a fragile mix of different kinds of 
capital. Furthermore, they lacked sufficient financial assets to deal with the devastating 
problems resulting from credit growth. Moreover, while the largest international banks 
seemed to be functioning under fairly stable and uniform rules in Basel I and II, in many 
countries small domestic banks did not enjoy the same standards, unfairly benefitting some 
big banks and disadvantaging other small ones (Matthews and Thompson, 2008). Following 
the failure of Basel II to limit the credit catastrophe, banking regulators around the world met 
to reexamine the capital that banks need to hold in order to deal with severe financial 
difficulties.  Basel III sets greater total capitalization (a higher percentage of capital relative 
to assets) and clearly designates what is or is not a component of a bank’s capital. Another 
serious concern was the volume and mix of capital of high-risk mortgage-backed securities 
and derivatives that the leading banks in the world were maintaining in order to prevent 
potential banking and financial crises. 
During its Seoul Summit in November 2010, the G20 approved Basel Accord III. It addressed 
new economic risks and the changing structure of the banking sector. The Basel Accord III 
promoted the construction of a capital buffer for periods of financial and economic difficulty. 
It also enforced a leverage ratio greater than the existing risk-weighted capital requirements 
of previous Basel Accords in order to discourage excessive credit growth (Cecchetti et al., 
2011). This third version of the Basel Agreement, took into consideration additional risk 
exposure such as business cycles and systemic risk that banks deal with on a daily basis 
(Rose and Hudgins, 2013). The Accord is a set of reform measures proposed in order to 
strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management of the banking industry. The 
reforms are both micro prudential and macro prudential. The micro prudential reforms focus 
on the individual bank and aim to help banking firms to absorb economic and financial 
shocks to the sector, whether the source is internal or external. They also aim to improve 
banking risk management while strengthening transparency and disclosure. On the other 
hand, the macro prudential reforms seek to improve compliance with market discipline by 
addressing the problem of systemic risks leading banks to common exposure or to pro-
cyclicality phenomena. Furthermore, to ensure that individual banks are well capitalized, 




Tier 2 capital) of 8 percent of risk-weighted assets plus 2.5 percent of capital as a 
safeguarding buffer (Bank of Internatioan Settlements [BIS], 2010). 
 
2.5 Measuring Financial Sector Development 
 
While the financial sector has many components, they can be compartmentalized into 
financial institutions and financial markets. An important question is how to measure 
financial sector development. Čihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen and Levine's (2012) study on 
benchmarking financial systems around the world proposes a ‘4x2-matrix framework for 
financial sector development’, summarized into four dimensions, namely, depth, access, 
efficiency and stability. Table 2-5 illustrates this classification. 
Table 2- 5:The World Bank’s ‘4x2 matrix of financial system characteristics’ 





 Private sector credit to GDP 
ratio 
 Financial institutions’ assets to 
GDP ratio 
 M2 to GDP ratio 
 Deposits to GDP ratio 
 Stock market capitalisation plus 
outstanding private debt securities 
to GDP ratio 
 Private debt securities to GDP 
ratio 
 Public debt securities to GDP ratio 
 Stock market capitalisation to 
GDP ratio 





 Accounts per thousand adults 
(commercial banks) 
 Branches per 100,000 adults 
(commercial banks) 
 % of people with a bank 
account 
 % of firms with lines of credit 
(all firms) 
 % of firms with lines of credit 
(small firms) 
 % of market capitalisation outside 
of top 10 largest companies 
 % of value traded outside of top 
10 traded companies 
 Government bond yield (three 
months and 10 years) 
 Domestic securities to total debt 
securities ratio 
 Private securities to total debt 
securities ratio 













 Net interest margin 
 Non-interest income to total 
income ratio 
 Overhead costs (% of total 
assets) 
 Profitability (ROA, ROE) 
 Concentration indicator 
 Competition indicators (Boone 
Indicator, H-Statistics 
 Turnover ratio 
(turnover/capitalisation) for stock 
market 
 Price synchronicity 
 Private information trading 
 Price impact 
 Quoted bid-ask spread 
 for government bonds 
 Turnover of bonds (private, 
public) 
on securities exchange 








 Z-score (or distance to default) 
 Capital adequacy ratio 
 Asset quality ratios 
 Liquidity ratio 
 Other ratios (net foreign 
position to capita, etc.) 
 Volatility 
 (standard deviation/average) of 
stock price index, sovereign bond 
index 
 Skewness of the index 
 Vulnerability to 
 earnings manipulation 
 Price to earnings (P/E) ratio 
 Duration 
 Short-term bonds to total bonds 
(domestic, international) ratio 
 Correlation with major bond 
returns (US, EU) 




The depth of the financial sector implies its size. The size of financial institutions and 
markets expresses the degree to which the financial sector is bank-based or financial market-
based. For financial institutions, it is captured through proxies such as private sector credit to 
GDP ratio; financial institutions’ assets to GDP ratio; M2 to GDP ratio; deposits to GDP 
ratio; and gross value added of financial sector to GDP ratio. The ratio of private sector credit 
to GDP relates to domestic bank lending to the private sector as a percentage of GDP. The 
ratio of financial institutions’ assets to GDP refers to the sum of banks’ assets and those of 
non-bank financial institutions divided by GDP. The ratio of deposits to GDP is the sum of 
cash mobilized from depositors as current account deposit and/or savings and term deposit 
accounts over GDP. This ratio expresses the total amount available within the banking system 
from which banks can lend, and is equivalent to M2/GDP. The ratio of gross value added of 




contribute to the overall output of the economy. Section 3.3 in chapter three uses some of 
these variables such as private sector credit to GDP ratio and M2 to GDP ratio highlighted 
here as measures of financial sector development to assess the link between financial 
intermediation and economic growth in Rwanda. 
Regarding financial markets, the most commonly used indicator is the sum of stock market 
capitalization and outstanding domestic debt securities to GDP ratio. In addition, the 
individual private debt securities to GDP ratio, public securities to GDP ratio, international 
debt securities to GDP ratio, stock market capitalization to GDP ratio, and stocks traded to 





Access as a feature of financial sector development relates to how the adult population or 
companies are accessing financial services, mainly banking services within the economy. 
This measure records the number of adult persons out of 1,000 that have commercial bank 
accounts, the number of banking branches serving 100,000 customers and the percentage of 
people with a bank account in a country. In relation to companies, access relates to the 
percentage of all companies with access to a credit line in general and in particular the 
percentage of small firms with access to a credit line. 
For the financial market, access relates to firms’ access to market-based finance using market 
concentration measures. It records the percentage of market capitalization outside the top 10 
largest corporations, the percentage of value of securities traded outside of the top 10 traded 
corporates, and trading in the market of government bonds yields over three months and 10 
years. To assess access to finance in financial markets, one can use the ratio of bonds issued 
by domestic firms compared to total debt securities, the ratio of domestic bonds issued by 
private firms to total domestic debt securities, and the ratio of new corporate debt securities 
issued to GDP. A higher concentration index implies that new or small firms that aim to issue 







Efficiency as a benchmark indicator of financial sector development for financial institutions 
points to elements such as profitability measures including interest rate margin; the lending-
deposits spread; the ratio of non-interest income to total income; total operating expenses as a 
percentage of total assets, and other factors. According to MacDonald and Koch (2006), the 
net interest margin (NIM) is a ratio of net interest return on income generating assets to 
average earning assets. In other words, the ratio is interest income less interest expenses 
divided by average earnings assets. The lending-deposits spread is the difference between the 
interest rates at which banks lend funds and interest rates that banks pay to depositors. A low 
lending-deposits spread suggests the existence of competition which is argued to be an 
indicator of efficiency in the banking sector (Casu et al., 2015). The percentage of noninterest 
income to total income indicates the weight of income from other sources beyond the interest 
income that derives from the loans portfolio. It is argued that when the financial sector 
matures, there is a large set of diversified income to the bank other than interest income, so 
that the ratio becomes higher (Cecchetti et al., 2011). The total operating expenses divided by 
total costs reflect the proportion of such noninterest expenses to total costs. Total overhead 
expenses or noninterest expenses or simply total operating expenses are compared to total 
assets in order to allow comparison across different sized banks (MacDonald and Koch, 
2006). They indicate where banks achieve cost efficiencies or where a given bank has a 
comparative disadvantage. 
Other profitability measures include return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE); and 
banking-market concentration measured by the Boone indicator, Herfindahl index or H-
statistic or cointegration such in Chirwa's (2003) study. However, return on assets and return 
on equity are not straightforward indicators of efficiency because they relate directly to other 
factors related to pricing and the market environment. Nevertheless, they provide information 
about the banking sector’s level of performance and to some extent its efficiency. The market 
concentration measures portray efficiency once they are closer to zero. 
Furthermore, the economic literature proposes diverse frontier approaches to measure 
efficiency. Berger and Humphrey (1997) present a detailed summary of these. Among the 
non-parametric approaches are Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Free Disposal Hull 
(FDH). Parametric approaches include Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), and the 




In terms of the non-parametric approaches, the DEA procedure involves constructing an 
envelope of outputs related to inputs using a linear programing technique (Matthews and 
Thompson, 2008). The linear programming produces a series of points of best-practice 
observations, and the efficient frontier is derived as a series of a set of linear combinations of 
these points (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The FDH is an improved version of the DEA that 
allows the free disposability of inputs and outputs to construct the frontier line which has a 
stepwise shape (Fried and Lovell, 1994). In this approach,  efficiency is evaluated on the 
firm’s ability to supply as many services as possible with the same resources at its disposal in 
a given operating environment (Fried, Knox Lovell and Eeckaut, 1993). This means, ceteris 
paribus, that firm A is more efficient than firm B if firm A provides more services using the 
same resources as those used by firm B. If the two firms are using one resource to produce 
one output, on the efficiency frontier, firm A appears on the left side west of firm B on the 
quadrant comprising firms A and B. If the two firms are using more than one resource to 
produce for example two set of outputs, on the efficiency frontier, firm A appears on the right 
side east of firm B in the quadrant comprising firms A and B. In that case, firm A is said to be 
dominant or undominated while firm B is dominated by firm A. Fried and Lovell (1994) 
argue that inefficiency for firm B can be related to an operating environment that is not 
favourable to firm B. The overall efficiency of the industry corresponds to the region 
constructed from the positions of undominated firms. 
 
The DFA is a specific functional form of the objective function, but does not make any 
assumption about the distribution of random errors (Berger and Humphrey, 1991; Berger, 
Hunter and Timme, 1993; Matthews and Thompson, 2008; Ncube, 2009). It assumes that 
there are no random fluctuations. Consequently, all deviations from the estimated frontier 
signify inefficiency. Put another way, random errors are zero on average, suggesting that 
random errors tend to cancel each other out in the course of time. Therefore, the efficiency of 
each firm is stable over time. The inefficiency measure is the difference between the average 
residual of an individual firm and the average residual for the firm on the frontier. Some 
researchers use the DFA technique when panel data is available. For the TFA, a specific 
functional form of the major function is stated to determine the frontier based on the 
performance of the best firms (Matthews and Thompson, 2008). This technique assumes that 
deviations from the major function with the lowest average quartile of firms in a size class 
represent a random error, while deviations in the predicted function between the highest and 




and Humphrey, 1991; Ncube, 2009). Applying the TFA requires a relatively large subclass of 
firms to outline the frontier (Ncube, 2009). It should be noted, that this technique only 
provides the efficiency score of the industry as a whole and not that of an individual firm 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Finally, SFA is a parametric approach to evaluate efficiency 
that counts for a composite error term. This error term comprises of technical inefficiency 
resulting from factor inputs that are overused such as hiring more employees beyond the 
acceptable level and on other hand, allocative inefficiency arising from not efficiently 
allocating factor inputs due to either careless management, or other external unforeseen 
events (Battese and Coelli, 1992;1995; Heffernan, 2005; Matthews and Thompson, 2008). 
 
While all these techniques are widely used, the literature reports extensive use of DEA and 
SFA in frontier studies. For example, Berger and Humphrey (1997), found that, of 129 
frontier studies, 62 of the 69 non-parametric applications used DEA while the SFA was 
applied by 24 of 60 parametric applications, with the remaining techniques thus used by a 
total of 36 studies. Subsection 4.2.1.2 of chapter four discusses this in more detail. 
 
Regarding financial market indicators of efficiency, the basic measure is the stock market 
turnover ratio, which relates to the value of securities traded as a percentage of GDP. The 
larger the volume of securities traded, the better the market flow and thus its efficiency. Other 
indicators of the level of efficiency of the sector are price synchronicity displaying co-
movement, private information trading, the price impact, the ratio of liquidity to transaction 
costs, the quoted bid-ask spread for government bonds, the turnover of private and public 




Stability is measured much by the Z-score that is the distance to default. It reflects the extent 
to which a bank’s profitability is stable. Higher Z-scores imply greater stability of the system 
(Casu et al., 2015). Capital adequacy ratios, asset quality ratios, and liquidity ratios as well as 
other measures like net foreign exchange position to capital are also used to assess the 





On the side of financial markets, the indicator most often used to express stability is the 
volatility of the stock price index, which is the standard deviation of the sovereign bond index 
over the annual average of that index (Čihák et al., 2012). The stock price index provides 
information on how much the value of an average stock has increased or decreased. Simply 
put, this index informs financial market participants how much total wealth has gone up or 
down, thus affecting the average return to a holder of a portfolio of a particular share of each 
stock (Cecchetti et al., 2011). The more volatile this ratio is, the lesser stable the market, and 
hence the financial sector. In contrast, when stock prices are stable, reflecting fundamental 
values, financial markets work efficiently, and allocate resources efficiently. This suggests 
that investments flow to their best normally useful usage. Other measures of the financial 
market’s stability include the proportion of price to earnings ratio, the duration, the ratio of 
short-term domestic and international bonds to total bonds, the correlation with major bond 
returns (Germany, US) and vulnerability to earnings manipulation as well as the skewness of 
the index of stock prices and sovereign bonds. 
 
2.6 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter discussed financial sector development in general, focusing on Rwanda’s 
financial sector. It described the important features of financial sector forces as well as some 
reactions to the changes that have led to the transformation of the financial sector, especially 
the banking sector. These include deregulation/reregulation, financial innovation, 
securitization, globalization and advances in technology. These changes have enabled firms 
to offer new products and services and opened up new geographical markets using new 
financial instruments that speed up transactions and offer opportunities to adjust their risk 
profile. They have also led to increased competition that has enabled consumers and 
companies to benefit from lower interest rates and capital availability. 
The chapter emphasized that the Rwandan banking sector dominates the financial sector 
because it accounts for more than two-thirds of its total assets, which implies that the banking 
sector is set to contribute more to the intermediation process in the Rwandan economy. 
Chapter three investigates the relationship between this sector and economic growth in 




factors that influence NPLs in Rwanda that can limit the normal working of the sector forms 

























FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: 




Economic theory postulates some interaction between financial sector and economic growth 
via investment (Benhabib and Spiegel, 2000; Mishkin, 2007; Kargbo11 and Adamu, 2009). 
Financial intermediaries that make an important component of the financial sector collect 
funds from economic agents who have a surplus and lend them to those who have prospective 
projects but are short on funds (Pagano, 1993). However, as highlighted in chapter one, 
Section 1.1, existing empirical evidence suggests that there is no consensus on the nature of 
the causal relationship between financial sector development and economic growth. Thus, it 
is not clear how people react in the presence of the development of financial sector, 
especially banks. This study aims to investigate the directional causality between financial 
sector development and economic growth in Rwanda, as no study has established this 
relationship despite its importance for investment purposes as well as policy decisions. 
Financial intermediaries offer a wide range of financial services, namely, payment services, 
deposit and lending services, investments, pensions and insurance services, E-banking, 
internet banking, financial advisory services, safe-keeping facilities, foreign exchange 
services, and money transfers (Casu et al., 2015). This suggests that the presence of financial 
intermediaries enables individuals and firms to save their liquid assets in a place considered 
safe, that is, the bank. Once accumulated, these institutions can lend the funds to individuals 
or other economic agents for different purposes. To succeed in this exercise of pooling 
people’s savings that at the end, are transformed into loans, financial intermediaries have to 
attract many and important savers, which is the core of indirect finance (Cecchetti et al., 
2011). Therefore, they have to convince savers of the safety of keeping their assets with such 
institutions. Financial intermediaries make profits on interest rate differentials and different 
fees for the services they provide.  
Indeed, financial intermediaries are in good position to reduce transaction costs, mobilize 




work in a committed and disciplined way. They contribute to the reduction of transaction 
costs by exploiting their economies of scale and scope because they possess superior 
information that is the core of all financial transactions and contracts. However, because 
information is not a free good, information asymmetries with customers can generate adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems, which can affect the banks’ earnings. Moral hazard 
arises when the borrower knows if he or she is truthful, while lenders/banks do not have such 
information. Thus, the central pivot in conducting banking business hangs on the strategies 
that banks put in place to limit and manage such kinds of risk. They screen loan applicants to 
guarantee that they are creditworthy and monitor loan recipients to ensure that they use funds 
for the purpose for which they were borrowed (Cecchetti et al., 2011). 
Financial intermediaries also help to mobilise short-term or long-term savings and transform 
them into short-term or long-term loans with the aim of making profits. They collect small 
deposits from savers and repackage them into larger loans due to their ability to exploit 
economies of scale. Following the experience of the goldsmiths of the 16
th
 century that led to 
the creation of the first bank, as highlighted in chapter two, depositors do not claim their 
deposits concomitantly. Banks are thus able to lend long, for example on a residential 
mortgage, that can take about 20 years or more from demand deposits which are generally for 
short periods and can be withdrawn without prior notice. Because banks are borrowing short 
and lending long, there is a ‘mismatch’ between their assets (funds lent to borrowers) and 
their liabilities (funds collected from savers) which can create problems in terms of liquidity 
risk. Banks deal with this risk by diversifying their investments. Due to the pooling of risk 
inherent in financial intermediation, the improved risk assessment that financial 
intermediaries are able to undertake is easy. This helps investors or households to achieve 
portfolio diversification due to better ways of spreading investments across different financial 
instruments like bonds and stocks that reduce risk without decreasing the expected return. 
Besides the ancient role of safekeeping individuals’ assets, banks provide accounting services 
to their customers and serve as channels of payments at national and international levels. In 
their role of accounting services providers, banks help customers to manage their finances. 
With the modernization of deposits, and transfer of funds and other payment procedures that 
are complex in nature, banks assist their customers to save time by providing a framework to 
carry out all these operations. These include purchasing groceries, buying fuel for cars, 




local and international transfer of funds. It is also through the banking system that most 
employees are paid their wages and salaries. 
These institutions specialize in mobilizing savings, evaluating projects and their risks, and 
monitoring borrowers-cum-investors (Pagano, 1993). Therefore, they are able to contain 
asymmetric information, and help to reduce transaction costs, leading to efficient investments 
that yield a positive return to the economy (Becsi and Wang, 1997). Financial intermediaries 
examine the economic condition of the individuals and businesses that apply for financing to 
identify those that present the best prospects that can bring positive returns. Accordingly, 
they ease liquidity limitations on enterprises by providing them with long-term investments 
and reducing credit constraints on investors. They direct funds to individuals with better 
investment opportunities, which in turn promote economic growth. By doing so, they 
facilitate affordable exchanges between borrowers and lenders in a world of imperfect 
information (Khan and Semlali, 2000). 
Since there is a likelihood that borrowers will default, monitoring credit risk is costly on the 
part of savers. As depositors would find it costly to undertake monitoring, they delegate 
responsibility to specialized agents such as financial intermediaries because these institutions 
have the expertise and economies of scale to collect and analyze information on risky 
borrowers. Financial intermediaries obtain such information upon their employees’ initial 
contact with borrowers when filling in application for loans.  They can also gather it over 
time through repeated dealings with the borrower. In addition, financial intermediaries such 
as banks can collect information related to the borrower that goes beyond that provided in the 
loan application or credit report through good relationships with customers (Pilbeam, 2010; 
Cecchetti et al., 2011). 
Lending institutions invest in information technology that allows them to screen applications 
for loans, and monitor the projects financed, thus limiting the moral hazard behavior of the 
borrower by making sure that he/she adheres strictly to the terms of contract. Due to such 
information advantage, depositors are willing to keep their funds with financial 
intermediaries that are able to direct them to appropriate borrowers without the former having 
to incur information and monitoring costs. Likewise, financial intermediaries are able to 
acquire information on investment opportunities available to borrowers, thus, reducing 





Financial intermediaries also contribute to liquidity transformation. Deposits that are on the 
liabilities side of financial intermediaries’ balance sheets are liquid and low risk. Loans, 
which are on the assets side, are relatively illiquid and high risks assets. Thus, financial 
intermediaries transform liquid assets that expose them to liquidity risk because the demand 
for withdrawal is the demand for liquidity, implying that there is a probability of default on 
meeting depositors’ withdrawals (Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee, and Manova, 2010). In order 
to avoid such risk, they keep different liquidity features on both sides of their balance sheet 
through diversification of their portfolios, thus lowering risk (Pilbeam, 2010). 
Because financial intermediaries finance loans (illiquid assets) with demand deposits that can 
be withdrawn at any time and any quantity without notice, these institutions commit 
themselves at two levels. On the one hand, bankers or managers of financial intermediaries 
have to behave prudently by ensuring that they hold sufficient liquidity and capital resources 
to meet demand withdrawals while continuing to grant loans (Casu et al., 2015). On the other 
hand, bankers/managers have to build strong relationships with customers that will allow 
them to acquire relevant information about their investments projections, stimulate borrowers 
to pay back their loans, and take due remedial action on time in case the borrower faces 
repayment problems. 
Moreover, financial intermediaries mitigate the impact of shocks affecting consumption. 
Economic agents, specifically consumers, have uncertain preferences about their expenditure 
and create demand for liquid assets. In response to such demand, studies have reported that 
financial intermediaries, especially banks and related institutions enable economic agents to 
smooth their consumption. They achieve this by offering insurance against shocks to a 
consumer’s consumption path via lending which in turn; helps smooth individuals’ 
consumption patterns. In doing so, they perform the function of consumption smoothening 
(Allen and Gale, 1994; Freixas and Rochet, 2008). Merton (1993) states that in the presence 
of a well-developed and well-functioning financial system, the banking sector impacts on the 
efficient life-cycle allocation of household consumption by facilitating efficient allocation of 
physical capital to its most productive use. 
However, a review of the literature to date shows that there is no published research on the 
relationship between finance and economic growth in Rwanda. In less developed countries 
(LDCs) evidence on the nature of this relationship is deficient, mainly at country level where 




and Adamu, 2009), Uganda (Kilimani, 2007), and Tanzania (Odhiambo, 2005), among 
others. This calls for empirical research at country level, given the policy implication benefits 
that LDCs would derive from these findings. Rwanda is a case in point and this study is thus 
among pioneering research in this area in the country. 
This study applies a co-integrated structural autoregressive model to investigate the plausible 
links between the financial sector and economic growth in Rwanda for the period 1996 to 
2010. The use of this model is based on the advantages of using an autoregressive framework  
identified by  Shan, Morris and Sun (2001). They stressed that this is the best model to apply 
in any multi-variate relation analysis for three reasons. Firstly, it allows for testing of 
causality using a Wald statistic that has an asymptotic chi-square distribution that does not 
influence the order of integration between variables as it is in time-series model. Secondly, 
the autoregressive model does not need any functional form. Finally, it reduces the 
probability of simultaneous bias that can take place in time-series single-equation models. 
Furthermore, the adoption of the co-integrated structural autoregressive model in this study 
relates to its power to determine the dynamic response of the variables of interest to various 
disturbances within the system.  
A good understanding of the channels, through which the relationship between financial 
intermediaries and economic growth works is essential vis-à-vis the government of Rwanda’s 
belief, that, the financial sector can boost economic growth in the country. In addition to 
contributing to the body of knowledge on the relationship between financial intermediaries 
and economic growth, the findings will also shed light on investment decisions and 
policymaking. The findings of the study suggest that domestic private sector credit shocks 
contribute the most to variations in the rate of economic growth, while the shock to potential 
liquidity comes second. Therefore, the findings of this study support the supply-leading 
hypothesis in the intermediation link between the financial sector and economic growth in 
Rwanda. The ratio to GDP of domestic credit to private sector and potential liquidity 
available that this study makes use of are among the depth measures of financial sector 
development discussed in chapter two, sub-section 2.5.1. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature on the 
relationship between finance and economic growth. This section discusses the theories and 
empirical evidence on the relationship between financial sector development and economic 




roadmap for the study. Section 3.4 presents and discusses the results by contrasting them with 
previous findings whilst Section 3.5 provides summary and concluding remarks. 
 
3.2 Interaction between Financial Intermediation and Economic Growth 
 
The primary purpose of this section is to provide a theoretical understanding of how financial 
sector development relates to economic growth. Schumpeter (1934) argued that financial 
intermediaries contribute to economic growth by identifying and directing funds to more 
innovative projects, which otherwise would not have access to capital. However, due to 
imperfect information in the lending-borrowing process, savers cannot identify a trustworthy 
investor to whom they can lend their funds. To overcome this barrier, financial intermediaries 
that specialize in scrutiny and monitoring and have access to superior information, bring 
together lenders and borrowers-cum-investors, and the process eventually benefits all parties 
involved with spillover effects to the economy. The lender is to some extent confident that 
the funds will be directed to the right borrower while the borrower obtains funds for the 
project undertaken. Financial intermediaries are paid for their services and the whole 
economy benefits from the availability of goods and/or services produced by the investor, job 
creation, and purchase of inputs. The question remains however, how do investors access 
funds? 
The literature on the theories of financial intermediation points to two channels through 
which the private sector can access financial resources: direct finance from capital markets  
through the issuance of stocks or bonds, or from private individuals or non-bank lenders; and 
indirect finance from financial intermediaries, in the form of loans (Casu et al., 2015). 
Financial intermediation is the process that takes place when economic agents with surplus 
funds invest their funds using either financial intermediaries or financial markets. It is also a 
process by which economic agents that are short of funds obtain financing (Fraser et al., 
2005). In direct finance, savers and borrowers do not need any intermediary to perform the 
transactions in which they are involved. Borrowers obtain funds directly from lenders and 
this involves an agreement between the two parties. In contrast, in indirect finance, financial 
intermediaries facilitate the transfer and acquisition of funds between savers and borrowers. 
Savers/lenders are economic agents and include individuals, firms and government wishing to 
keep their funds with the ultimate objective of making returns in the future that they can use 




(Pilbeam, 2010). Borrowers/spenders are economic agents that include individuals, firms and 
government and are driven by the need for income and investment. Some economic agents 
also borrow to finance expenditure like buying a car or a house that they cannot afford with 
their present income. Figure 3-1 presents the flow of funds between savers and borrowers 
through the two types of financing, direct and indirect finance. 





















Source: Adapted from Cecchetti et al. (2011) and Mishkin (2007) 
 
In indirect finance, financial intermediaries like banks stand between savers and borrowers. 
They borrow from savers (depositors) and lend funds to borrowers. In order to raise more 
funds, banks along with other financial intermediaries such as insurance firms, brokers, 
pension funds, other companies, and government, issue financial instruments called financial 
securities ( Zyl et al., 2003). Those issued by financial intermediaries are generally known as 
“indirect securities” and include loan contracts, negotiable certificates of deposit (NCDs) or 
Central Banks’ debentures. An NCD is a financial instrument issued by banks, to confirm the 
deposit of a given amount for a precise period of time and at a set interest rate. Bank 



























with the objective of enabling banks to invest any surplus short-term funds. The government 
issues short-term securities and long-term securities such as treasury bills and treasury bonds. 
Securities from the private sector include bankers’ acceptances and commercial paper. 
Bankers’ acceptances are issued by private companies seeking a commitment from the bank 
to serve bills drawn by that specific company. A banker’s acceptance indicates that a bank 
accepts the responsibility to pay the amount that appears on the draft to the bearer at maturity 
(MacDonald and Koch, 2006; Madura, 2014). In international trade, an importer makes use 
of a banker’s acceptance to the benefit of the exporter. For example, an exporter sending 
goods to an importer whose credit rating is unknown will often prefer that a bank acts as a 
guarantor. A letter of credit specifying the terms of agreement of all parties involved in the 
transaction establishes a bankers’ acceptance. The drawer endorses the draft in blank and the 
bank stamps it with the words “accepted” across the document, which obligates the bank to 
pay at a specified maturity date. In turn, when the banker’s acceptance matures, the importer 
pays the bank the amount that he/she owes the exporter along with a fee to the bank for 
having guaranteed the payment to the exporter. The instrument becomes payable to the 
bearer, which means that it can be traded on the secondary market. The maturity period for a 
bankers’ acceptance varies from one to six months (MacDonald and Koch, 2006). 
Commercial paper is a debt instrument issued by a company in order to obtain finance for its 
accounts receivables, inventories or simply to meet short-term financial obligations. 
On the side of direct finance, borrowers sell securities such as equities (shares) and debt 
instruments like bonds or treasury bills directly to the lender in the financial markets. These 
securities are “primitive securities”. With the development of efficient allocation of resources 
in the real economy, has come the advent of “derivatives financial instruments” that are based 
on the behavior of the underlying primitive securities (Cecchetti et al., 2011). The most 
prominent derivative instruments are futures and option contracts mainly used in hedging or 
transferring the risk from one part to another. A futures contract prescribes the price at which 
the transaction will take place while options contracts give the holder the right, but not the 
obligation to buy or purchase the underlying asset (call option) or to sell  the underlying asset 
(put option) at a fixed price at or before the maturity period. Financial market participants 
consider securities including bonds and companies’ shares, as well as derivatives products to 
be good indicators of financial sector development (Lynch, 1996). Direct finance can also 




The main barriers to the direct financing process involving individual borrowers and lenders 
outside the financial market are the difficult and expensive procedure involved in matching 
the complex needs and requirements of individual borrowers and lenders (Casu et al., 2015). 
Indeed, lenders’ requirements differ from those of borrowers. The lender that fears the risk of 
default from the borrower, willfully or otherwise, would wish to minimize the cost of 
transactions. Given lack of knowledge of future events, lenders prefer short-term lending to 
long-term lending as well as assets that are more easily convertible into cash. The borrower 
on the other hand, would prefer to obtain cash in the shortest period possible, at the lowest 
cost, preferably for long-term maturity. Therefore, financial intermediaries step in to bridge 
the gap between borrowers and lenders’ desires and reconcile their incompatible needs and 
requirements. It is in bridging that gap that financial intermediaries play a central role. 
The benefits of financial intermediation accrue to ultimate lenders, to ultimate borrowers and 
society as a whole (Casu et al., 2015). The benefits to lenders with surplus funds position 
include lending to a financial intermediary rather than directly to an ultimate borrower. They 
achieve greater liquidity with less risk. The lending decision is quick, since there are fewer 
lending opportunities to financial intermediaries than to ultimate borrowers. This process 
reduces the transaction costs associated with lending, especially where straightforward 
deposit facilities are used. Finally, in a situation where there is a possibility of selling the 
certificate of deposit in a market, instead of waiting until maturity of the securities, depositors 
or lenders may sell these securities to regain cash. Generally, borrowers are able to obtain 
larger loans for a longer time-period from financial intermediaries at lower transaction costs 
than from ultimate lenders. The interest rate will generally be lower when borrowing from 
financial intermediaries. Furthermore, the possibility of obtaining loans at the required time is 
higher. 
For the community or society as a whole using financial intermediaries improves evaluation 
of lending opportunities. There is also more efficient utilization of funds in the economy. 
Moreover, there will be a higher level of borrowing and lending due to the lower risks and 
costs associated with lending at a financial intermediary’s level. Because financial 
intermediaries are able to absorb the risk of default by borrowers through interest earned on 
other loans and at a larger scale, their presence into the economy can lead to improved 
availability of funds for higher-risk ventures. Such ventures are widely considered important 




Many profitable investments require long-term commitment of capital, whereas, savers are 
sometimes reluctant to keep their savings for long periods. Raising funds from individual 
lenders is costly, and has been proven to be inefficient (Schiller, 2011). Furthermore, many 
LDCs like Rwanda have underdeveloped capital markets. Accordingly, most borrowers like 
small-scale firms and consumers that do not have access to equity or debt markets, are served 
by banks and other deposit taking institutions. Given the underdeveloped nature of the 
country’s capital market (discussed in sub-section 2.3.4), and the fact that, private individuals 
as well as non-bank lenders, which are the channel to direct finance, do not have adequate 
financial resources for the envisaged investments; this study concentrates on indirect finance. 
Several empirical studies have tested the relationship between financial intermediation and 
economic growth (see Gurley and Shaw, 1955; King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997; Levine 
et al., 2000; Odhiambo, 2005; Muchai, 2013). Some have observed that finance may 
influence growth; the supply-leading hypothesis (see Khan and Semlali, 2000; Levine et al., 
2000; Habibullah and Eng, 2011). Others have found that growth drives finance; the demand 
following hypothesis (see Ghirmay, 2004; Zang and Kim, 2007). In addition, there is a 
possibility of bidirectional causality (see Akinboade, 1998; Odhiambo, 2005), unimportant 
influence or simply independence between finance and economic growth (Stern, 1989; Tuck, 
2003; Cevik and Rahmati, 2013). 
 
3.2.1 Supply-leading hypothesis 
 
This approach, also known as “finance-led growth”, postulates that development of the 
financial sector leads to economic growth. By promoting the financial sector, financial 
intermediaries are able to collect savings and grant loans to investors involved in establishing 
businesses that produce products or services and improve the conduct of existing ones. This 
view is in agreement with the findings of many studies (Goldsmith, 1969; King and Levine, 
1993; Levine, 1997; Neusser and Kugler, 1998; Khan and Semlali, 2000; Levine et al., 2000; 
Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2005; Jean-Claude, 2006; Apergis et al., 2007) on pooled countries’ 
time series. It states that financial sector development and economic growth go hand-in-hand. 
Countries with better-developed financial systems tend to enjoy a sustained period of growth 
and studies confirm the causal link where the financial sector drives economic growth (see 




conclusion was reached by studies conducted in developing countries, either pooled together 
(Odedokun, 1996; Ndikumana, 2000; Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004; Ndebbio, 2004; 
Habibullah and Eng, 2011), or considered  individually, such as Kilimani's (2007) and 
Kargbo11 and Adamu's (2009) research in Uganda and Sierra Leone, respectively. Similarly, 
Seetanah's (2008) investigation of the dynamic relationship between financial sector 
development and economic growth in Mauritius for the period 1952 to 2004 concluded that 
financial sector development drives economic growth. The German Imperial Government’s 
decision to develop a banking system called the “German banks of affairs” or “capitalisation 
banks” that extended bank credit to industry in the late eighteenth century is a successful case 
that supports this hypothesis (Bowen, 1950). Foreign borrowing to finance industrial activity 
was avoided by creating a domestic source of financing. This contributed to the rapid 
expansion of German industry.  
Levine and Zervos (1998) examined whether the banking sector and capital markets, as the 
main sources of indirect and direct finance, respectively, contribute more to economic 
growth. The study found that both the banking sector and stock market liquidity have 
independent positive and significant effects on economic growth. Arestis, Demetriades et al. 
(2001), Shan et al. (2001) and Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2008) explored the relationship 
between financial sector development and economic growth, using a bank-based model and 
concluded  that  financial sector development is a catalyst for economic growth. Expressed 
differently, banks perform scrutiny and monitoring tasks on behalf of investors. They 
mitigate the underlying risks, by capitalizing on information acquired, which reduces 
uncertainty and enables funds to flow to the most profitable projects. In such a situation, the 
spillover effects of efficient investment lead to economic growth (Levine, 2005). Employing 
a neoclassical framework to analyze the linkage between finance and growth from a 
European perspective, Papaioannou (2007) found evidence that financial development 
promotes economic growth in developing and emerging countries by lowering the cost of 
capital while for advanced economies it works through raising total factor productivity. 
Similarly Habibullah and Eng (2011) noted that a strong network of financial institutions that 






3.2.2 Demand-following hypothesis: Economic growth creates demand for financial services 
 
The demand-following hypothesis, also known as growth-led finance, states that when the 
economy grows, it creates additional demand for financial services in response to demand 
from investors and other economic agents (Shan et al., 2001). This relationship stems from 
the understanding that when an economy experiences real growth, private businesses are 
most likely to plan investments that increase their demand for financial services (Robinson, 
1952; Gurley and Shaw, 1955; Ghirmay, 2004; Zang and Kim, 2007). Improved firm 
performance implies an increase in the need for financial capital for expansion, meaning that 
financial sector development responds positively to higher rates of economic growth. Private 
investors are interested in exploiting available opportunities, and borrow more from financial 
intermediaries to make investments. In addition, financial intermediaries respond to the needs 
of the economy by availing new financial instruments such as bonds and other commercial 
papers. 
Odhiambo's (2008) research on the link between financial development and economic growth 
in Kenya found a causal relationship flowing from economic growth to financial sector 
development. Likewise, Quartey and Prah (2008) found evidence to support the demand-
following hypothesis in a study in Ghana using the growth of broad money to GDP ratio as a 
measure of financial sector development. Along the same lines,  Hassan, Sanchez and Yu 
(2011) assessed the relationship between financial sector development and economic growth 
for selected low-and middle-income countries over the period 1980 – 2007 and concluded 
that the causal relationship runs from growth to finance in the SSA, East Asia & Pacific 
regions, hence supporting the demand-following hypothesis. 
 
3.2.3 Reciprocal influence between finance and economic growth 
 
The bidirectional influence between financial sector development and economic growth 
refers to the mutual influence of these variables. This indicates that financial sector 
development inluences economic growth and vice-versa. Patrick (1966) argued that the 
directional causality between financial sector development and economic growth changes 
with the stage of development. In the early stage of development, the economy needs the 
financial sector to provide funds for innovation and investment. Later, when the economy 




borrowing, in order to further invest in new projects. Akinboade (1998)and Odhiambo (2005) 
established the existence of a bi-directional causality between financial development and 
economic growth in Botswana and Tanzania, respectively. Both studies found that financial 
sector development and economic growth are complementary. The same conclusion was 
reached by Luintel and Khan (1999) in a study of the finance-economic growth relationship 
in ten LDCs. Similarly, Calderón and Liu (2003) and Bangake and Eggoh (2011) found a 
mutual causal relationship between financial development and economic growth. This 
indicates that financial sector development and economic growth are in reciprocal influence. 
However, Bangake and Eggoh (2011) stressed that output growth had more influence on 
financial development than did financial development on economic growth. They added that 
this link appears to be more pronounced in low-income countries than in high-income 
countries. 
 
3.2.4 Independence between finance and economic growth 
 
The absence of any relationship between finance and economic growth presents an exception 
to the previous hypothesis. It indicates that financial sector development and growth in output 
in an economy do not influence each other. Furthermore, no unidirectional relationship is 
plausible between financial sector development and output growth on the one hand or 
between output growth and financial sector development on the other. Muchai (2013) and 
Cevik and Rahmati (2013) found no relationship between finance and economic growth in 
Kenya and Libya, respectively. Using VAR analysis for the period 1972 to 2008, Muchai’s 
(2013) empirical study of the finance-growth channel in Kenya found that savings mobilized 
by financial institutions did not influence capital formation and hence did not lead to 
economic growth. Cevik and Rahmati's (2013) research on Libya for the period 1970 to 2010 
found no long-run relationship between financial intermediation and non-hydrocarbon output 
growth. Similarly, in revisiting the long- and short-run relationships between bank lending (as 
a proxy for the financial sector) and economic growth in Malaysia for the period 1960 to 
1998, Tuck (2003) found no relationship between the volume of bank loans and real output 
growth. A plausible explanation is possibly funds diversion to non-productive activities, due 




It is clear that studies of the same nature have reached different conclusions. While some 
found that, the relationship between financial sector development and economic growth 
resulted in financial supply leading economic growth (Goldsmith, 1969; Odedokun, 1996; 
Jean-Claude, 2006; Kargbo11 and Adamu, 2009), other found the reverse. This suggests that 
economic growth drives the development of the financial sector (Robinson, 1952; Quartey 
and Prah, 2008). Other studies found that relationship to be bi-directional (Patrick, 1966; 
Luintel and Khan, 1999), and a few established no relationship (Cevik and Rahmati, 2013; 
Muchai, 2013). In seeking to provide an explanation for these differences, Demetriades and 
Hussein (1996) show that the directional causality depends on the variables used. They argue 
that each country exhibits different results, depending on its individual characteristics. Lucas 
(1988) questioned the relationship between financial sector development and economic 
growth and concluded that, this relationship is “over-stressed”. Levine (2002) and Tadesse 
(2004) suggest that the type of financial system is of secondary importance in the 
development path. What is important for growth is the existence of liquid and efficient 




This section discusses the methods used to analyze the link between financial sector 
development and output growth using selected variables. It sets the model, the structural 
VAR for estimating the relationship under investigation based on previous theoretical and 
empirical studies. It defines the variables included in the model, and tests their stationarity 
and the plausible existence of a cointegrating relationship, and the determination of lag-
length. 
 
3.3.1 Definition of Variables 
 
Previous empirical studies have used a range of variables to express financial sector 
development such as monetary aggregates (M1, M2, and M3 as percentages of GDP), 
domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP and control variables such as human 
capital, geography and population (see King and Levine, 1993; Kilimani, 2007; Kargbo11 




characteristics (Levine et al., 2000; Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2005; Apergis et al., 2007), 
whilst others focused on individual countries (Akinboade, 1998; Odhiambo, 2005; Cevik and 
Rahmati, 2013). In this study, this relationship is investigated using five variables, namely, 
potential liquidity available (PLA) (proxied by the ratio of M2 to GDP), real interest rates 
(INT), domestic credit to the private sector as a ratio of GDP (DCP), gross fixed capital 
formation as a ratio of GDP (GFCF), and the rate of economic growth (Y). Among these five 
variables, in this study, proxies for financial sector development are PLA and DCP. 
Financial sector development expresses the degree of supply of financial assets within an 
economy and increases with its monetization (Muchai 2013). The ratio of M2 to GDP 
comprises the sum of funds held by financial intermediaries from demand deposits, and time 
and saving deposits as well as foreign reserves deposits ( Ritter, Silber, Udell and Fan, 2004). 
Given that money offers opportunities of saving and payment services, the higher the 
available liquidity with financial intermediaries, the greater the capacity of these institutions 
to grant credit to more borrowers, and hence a potential increase in output (Lynch, 1996; 
Muchai, 2013). Ngalawa and Viegi (2011) argue that a decline in available bank credit 
adversely affects investment and output. 
Real interest rates (INT) reflect the real cost of funds to investors and real return to savers. 
Lynch (1996) states that there is a positive relationship between the real interest rate spread 
and savings. A positive real interest rate spread attracts savings that, in the end, help increase 
investments. In addition, when the real interest rate is low, investors-cum-borrowers take 
advantage and increase their applications for loans with financial intermediaries. Once 
granted these funds are put to productive use that in turn lead to increases in the level of 
output. Domestic credit to the private sector (DCP) expresses more accurately the role of 
financial intermediaries in channeling funds to private businesses (see Khan and Semlali, 
2000; Demetriades and Law, 2004). Khan and Semlali (2000) and Demetriades and Law 
(2004) consider the amount of bank credit to the private sector, to be a good indicator of the 
general level of interaction between the banking sector and the productive economic sector. A 
probable reason for such positive interaction is that private investors are in good position to 
identify projects that have good prospects. Failure by financial intermediaries to transform 
deposits at their disposal to lending to the private sector implies a loss of opportunities for the 
economy. It also indicates the level of development of the financial sector itself. For example, 
studies report that the financial sector in the SSA region is underdeveloped compared to other 




behind compared to other regions in transforming deposits into loans to the private sector. 
The study found that between 1980 and 2002, the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector 
to GDP in SSA was about 14.6 percent, while it was 31.8 percent for Latin America and 29 
percent for Asia.  
The stock of capital, represented by gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), establishes a basis 
for economic activities. The standard prediction of the neoclassical growth model is that 
growth rates will be higher with enhanced capital accumulation (Papaioannou, 2007). 
 
3.3.2 Analysis Tests 
 
In order to avoid spurious results when estimating relationships between variables, one of the 
conditions is to have data that are stationary (Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004). In the 
literature, the diagnosis of the properties of data uses tests for unit root and cointegration. 
 
3.3.2.1 Unit Root Test 
 
The analysis for stationarity of the variables series is usually conducted using graphical plots, 
descriptive statistics, and correlogram. Stationary series have to display a tendency of a 
reverting mean and a constant variance (Gujarati, 2003). If variables series are non-
stationary, this indicates that they have unit root. If they are used as regressors, one may get 
spurious results that can mislead in decision making or policy formulation (Davidson and 
MacKinnon, 2004). Therefore, before making any kind of estimation, one has to make a test 
for unit root for the time series. If the time series has unit root, what follows is the 
transformation of that non-stationary time series into one that is stationary. One way of 
inducing stationarity in non-stationary series I(d), is to be differenced of order d before 
getting to I(0) or simply to say the series becomes stationary. However, even though 
differenced series may graphically look stationary, this is not sufficient; it requires formal 
unit root tests. 
The many alternatives for testing for unit root include Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests and 
Phillips-Perron (PP), among others. The ADF tests assume that error terms follow an 
autoregressive (AR) process of a known order while the PP presents advantages when time 




MacKinnon (2004) and Greene (2008) among others, argue that the most widely used 
approach to testing for unit root are the ADF tests. To this end, this study uses the ADF 
procedure to test for unit root to verify if variables are stationary, as the test assumes that 
error terms follow an autoregressive (AR) process which lines up with the structural VAR 
that is used in this study.  
 
3.3.2.2 Cointegration Test 
 
Once the unit root tests have been performed, the next step is to carry out the cointegration 
tests. A co-integration is a phenomenon related to a situation where two or more series having 
unit roots drift upward together (Greene, 2008). The series having a kind of co-movement are 
said to be integrated, meaning that they have a type of common trend. However, visual 
observation of this kind of movement is not sufficient to analyze these series; it requires a test 
for co-integration. Consequently, the purpose of a co-integration test is to confirm the 
existence of any long-run relationship(s) or analyze any short-run deviations from the long 
run between a set of non-stationary time series (Johansen, 1988; Phillips and Perron, 1988; 
Johansen and Juselius, 1990). The literature presents two approaches that are widely used to 
test for co-integration, namely, the Engle and Granger (1987) technique and Johansen and 
Juselius’ (1988, 1990) technique. The Engle and Granger (1987) approach is essentially 
based on evaluating whether errors appear to be stationary in single-equation estimates of the 
equilibrium relationship. On the other hand, the Johansen and Juselius’ (1988, 1990) 
technique focuses on the vector autoregressive (VAR) approach. As this study uses an 
SVAR, the test for cointegration is performed using Johansen and Juselius (1990). This test 
has two approaches: the trace statistic (𝜆 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒(𝑟)) and the maximal-eigenvalue statistic 
(𝜆 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟, 𝑟 + 1)) given by equation 3.1 and equation 3.2 respectively. r denotes the number 
of independent equilibrium relationships or co-integrating vectors and ?̂?𝑖 is the estimated 
value of the i
th
 ordered eigenvalue of matrix A (matrix of coefficients of variables of the 
model). 
𝜆 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒(𝑟) = −𝑇 ∑ 𝑙𝑛 (1 − ?̂?𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=𝑟+1 …………………………………………………… (3.1) 
The trace statistic tests the null hypothesis that there are r co-integrating vectors or 𝑟 = 𝑟1 
against the alternative that 𝑟 = 𝑟2, for 𝑟1 < 𝑟2 ≤ 𝑔 where g is the rank of the covariance 




statistic (see equation 3.2) tests the null hypothesis that there are r co-integrating vectors 
against the alternative that there are 𝑟 + 1 co-integrating vectors. 
𝜆 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟, 𝑟 + 1) = −𝑇𝑙𝑛 (1 − ?̂?𝑟+1)…………………………………………………… (3.2) 
The test for co-integration concludes that there is a long-run relationship if the trace statistic 
(𝜆 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒(𝑟)) and/or the maximal-eigenvalue statistic 𝜆 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟, 𝑟 + 1) are greater than the 
critical value from Johansen and Juselius' (1990) critical values. In this study, the test consists 
of assessing the existence of potential long-run relationship(s) between financial sector 
development and economic growth in the reduced form of an SVAR specified model in 
equation (3.5). 
 
3.3.3 Lag-Length Determination 
 
In conjunction with unit root tests, and prior to estimating the VAR, the selection of an 
appropriate lag-length is of great importance as inference on the VAR model is dependent on 
this choice (Canova, 2007). An appropriate lag-length assumes that residuals are Gaussian, 
meaning they do not suffer from autocorrelation, non-normality and heteroscedasticity. 
However, Hatemi-J and S. Hacker (2009) argue that the determination of criteria for choosing 
a lag order is not based on any conventional criteria. In many cases, the number of lagged 
values to be included in each equation, is determined by using Akaike Information Criteria 
(AIC), Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC), and Hannan and Quinn Criteria (HQC).  The 
lower the value of criteria statistics, the better the model Gujarati (2003). 
 
3.3.4 Econometric Model 
 
According to Stock and Watson (2001), a VAR is an econometric model in which each 
variable is explained by its own lagged variables, current and past values of other endogenous 
variables and some exogenous variables. Hatemi-J and S. Hacker (2009) argued that even 
though the VAR model is atheoretical, it is dynamic and is in accord with economic theory. 
Stock and Watson (2001) and Lütkepohl (2011) consider VAR models to be powerful tools to 
describe the dynamic behavior of economic and financial data and to generate reliable 




According to Stock and Watson (2001), these variants are a reduced form VAR, a recursive 
VAR and a structural VAR. In the reduced form, each variable is a linear function of its own 
lags and that of other variables with serial uncorrelated error terms. To estimate parameters, 
each equation uses ordinary least square regression. However, one of the shortcomings of this 
reduced form VAR is the possibility of having some variables in the model that are 
correlated, as it is observed for many macroeconomic variables. In such circumstances, any 
estimation may lead to biased estimates because error terms are correlated across equations. 
For the recursive VAR, the model is built in a way that error terms across equations are 
uncorrelated. As a result, residuals are uncorrelated across equations. While this recursive 
VAR overcomes the problem of correlation among error terms, it suffers from the use of an 
arbitrary mechanical technique based on Choleski decomposition of the variance-covariance 
matrix to model contemporaneous correlation among variables (Cooley and LeRoy, 1985; 
Keating, 1992). This indicates that any change in the order of variables in VAR equations 
ends up changing the parameters estimated. Criticism of the Choleski decomposition led to 
the development of a structural VAR that uses economic theory to identify the 
contemporaneous relationships between variables (Bernanke, 1986; Blanchard and Watson, 
1986; Sims, 1986). This technique consists of the transformation of the reduced form VAR in 
a model of structural equations based on economic theory. The SVAR is thus considered as a 
superior alternative to the  above-mentioned VAR models in the recent economic literature 
(Canova, 2007). Structural VAR also has the advantage of flexibility in setting restrictions on 
data. Berkelmans (2005) argues that the SVAR does not impose too many restrictions on the 
data used when capturing the endogenous relationships among variables in the system. Pagan 
(1987) notes that another strength of the SVAR is that, it is developed and estimated in a way 
that ensures the model is consistent with a coherent theoretical view of long-run relationships 
between variables while also taking into account the short-run dynamics. Equally, SVAR has 
the advantage of being carried in levels to avoid the loss of information that makes the 
analysis of impulse responses functions meaningful (Ramaswamy and Sloek, 1998). The 
authors state that the impulse response functions from the SVAR in levels enable 
determination of whether or not the impact of shocks is persistently permanent. Along the 
same lines, Phillips and Perron (1988) stressed that impulse response analysis, based on the 
unrestricted VAR containing unit roots, is inconsistent. This suggest that policy based on 




To illustrate the SVAR, assume that the structural form of the VAR is given by equation (3.3) 
below: 
𝐴𝑦𝑡 = 𝐶0 + 𝐷1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐷2𝑦𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝐷𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝐵𝑢𝑡 ………………………………………(3.3) 
where A is an invertible matrix(𝑘𝑥𝑘) of the coefficients on the ithvariable in the ith equation. 
This invertible matrix describes the contemporaneous relations among variables. 𝐶0 is a 
(𝑘𝑥1)vector of constants or intercepts, 𝑦𝑡 is a 𝑘𝑥1 vector of endogenous variables. 𝐷𝑖 for all     
𝑖 = 1, 2 , … , 𝑝 is a vector of coefficients, B  is a (𝑘𝑥𝑘) matrix whose non-zero off-diagonal 
elements allow for direct effects of some shocks on more than one endogenous variable in the 
system, and  𝑢𝑡  is a (𝑘𝑥1) vector of error terms that may be contemporaneously correlated, 
but are uncorrelated with their own lagged values. 
The system of equations (3.3) cannot be easily estimated because the variables have 
contemporaneous effects on one another. This problem is solved by rewriting the VAR in a 
reduced form, which is obtained by pre-multiplying equation (3.3) by the inverse of 









−1𝐷2 = 𝛾2  and 𝐴
−1𝐷𝑝= 𝛾𝑖for all 𝑖 = 1, 2 ,3, … , 𝑝 and 
𝐴−1𝐵 𝑢𝑡=𝑒𝑡, equation (3.4) can be rewritten as: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛾0 + ∑𝛾𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑒𝑡 …………………………………………………………………… . . (3.5) 
The result in equation (3.5) can be easily estimated because no variable has a direct 
contemporaneous effect on other variables in the VAR (Greene, 2003; Ngalawa and Viegi, 
2011). In this reduced form, the occurrence of one structural shock on one variable can 
potentially be transmitted to other variables, due to the fact that the error terms in the VAR 
are composites of 𝑒𝑡=𝐴
−1B𝑢𝑡. The vector 𝑒𝑡 holds the following properties: 
E(𝑒𝑡é𝑡) = ∑ where A∑𝐴
′ =𝐵𝐵′ …………………………………………………………(3.6) 
The structural economic shocks are separated from the estimated reduced form residuals by 
imposing restrictions on the parameters of matrices A and B as presented in equation (3.6) 








derive practical economic structures (Giannini, Lanzarotti and Seghelini, 1995). To impose 
these restrictions, this study makes use of structural factorization, an approach commonly 
applied in the recent literature (Ngalawa and Viegi, 2011; Amisano and Giannini, 2012). The 






























1 0 0 0 𝑎15
𝑎21 1 𝑎23 0 0
𝑎31 𝑎32 1 𝑎34 𝑎35
0 0 𝑎43 1 0











𝑏11 0 0 0 0
0 𝑏22 0 0 0
0 0 𝑏33 0 0
0 0 0 𝑏44 0
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1 0 0 0 𝑎15
𝑎21 1 𝑎23 0 0
𝑎31 𝑎32 1 𝑎34 𝑎35
0 0 𝑎43 1 0











𝑏11 0 0 0 0
0 𝑏22 0 0 0
0 0 𝑏33 0 0
0 0 0 𝑏44 0







Therefore, to make the system of equations (3.7) just identified, 35 constraints have to be 
imposed on the two matrices A and B. Matrix B has 20 coefficients that are equal to zero, and 
the main diagonal of matrix A provides another five restrictions because each structural 
equation is normalized to a given specific endogenous variable. In addition to the five 
restrictions on the main diagonal, matrix A also provides 10 more restrictions and 10 free 
parameters to be estimated. The five structural innovations “𝑢𝑠” essentially represent shocks 
to potential liquidity available, real interest rate, domestic credit to the private sector, gross 
fixed capital formation and output. They are considered as a source of fluctuations in the 
observable variables. The non-zero coefficients “𝑎𝑖𝑗” indicate that variable j affects variable i 
instantaneously.   
In the system (3.7), equation one implies that potential liquidity available responds only 
contemporaneously to a shock from output (Ngalawa and Viegi, 2011). In order to adjust 
instantaneous potential liquidity available in response to any adverse shock in the level of 
output (being either a decrease or an increase above the level of potential level of output), the 





Equation two suggests that only real interest rate responds contemporaneously to shock in 
potential liquidity available and to shock from domestic credit to the private sector 
(Berkelmans, 2005; Mankiw, 2011). An expansionary monetary policy increases the amount 
available from financial intermediaries for loans, which in this study is called potential 
liquidity available (PLA). The increase in liquidity available put downward pressure on 
interest rates (i). Following a decline in the interest rate, private investors as well as 
households tend to increase their borrowing as expressed in equation three. Financial 
intermediaries tend to raise the interest rate in response to increased demand for credit by the 
private sector. If the interest rate increase is far above the Central Bank’s discount rate, the 
Central Bank can react by increasing money supply in order to correct such disturbance 
(Cecchetti et al., 2011). In contrast, when demand for credit falls drastically below the 
Central Bank’s discount rate, to encourage borrowings, the response of the Central Bank is in 
the opposite direction. In such circumstances, it can act by decreasing the discount rate that 
offers financial intermediaries opportunities to borrow from the Central Bank as the cost of 
borrowing has decreased. In turn, they have the possibility of extending more credit to the 
economy. 
Equation three postulates that domestic credit to the private sector is contemporaneously 
affected by all variables in the system. The interaction of domestic credit to the private sector 
with other variables in that equation are in accordance with Berkelmans (2005) and Ngalawa 
and Viegi's (2011) argument that credit responds contemporaneously to money supply shock, 
interest rate shock and output shock. The response to interest rate shock is in relation to the 
behavior of households and investors relative to the interest rate being a cost of borrowing. 
The response to output shock is justified by the fact that people borrow in response to current 
activity, but also taking into consideration expectations about future activity. In this equation, 
the feedback is an opportunity that lines up with the possibility of increasing investment by 
businesses or consumption by households in acquiring homes or durable goods such as 
vehicles, refrigerators or furniture (Berkelmans, 2005; Mankiw, 2011). Conversely, if the 
shock leads to a fall in potential liquidity available, the interest rate increases. As the cost of 
funds is expensive, this discourages borrowers from increasing their borrowings, hence 
limiting investment or consumption that also affect the country’s output. 
Equation four indicates that capital formation is directly influenced only by changes in credit 
to private sector. Capital formation is one of the options for the use of borrowed funds for 




responds instantaneously to shocks in potential liquidity available, and domestic credit to the 
private sector as well as to capital formation. The response of output to innovation in 
potential liquidity available is consistent with the effect of an expansionary monetary policy 
in the short-run (Mankiw, 2011).  
Prior to analyzing the transmission of shocks on the VAR system, a stability test is carried 
out. A VAR is stable if all the eigenvalues of matrix A of coefficients of the lagged variables 
have modulus less than one (Hatemi-J, 2004). That means that none of the inverse roots of 
the characteristic autoregressive polynomial lies outside the complex unit circle.                       
The study employs impulse responses and variance decomposition to analyze the results. 
Introduced in VAR modeling by Sims (1980), impulse response functions provide an answer 
to the question of how a change in one variable, affects the system in the future. It traces the 
time path response of the current and future values of each variable to a one unit increase, in 
the current value of one of the VAR errors, assuming that this error returns to zero in 
subsequent periods and that all other errors are equal to zero (Stock and Watson, 2001; 
Enders, 2004; Amisano and Giannini, 2012). It provides a quantitative measure of the 
reaction of each variable to shocks in the different equations of the system (Bernanke and 
Mihov, 1997). Variance decomposition, on the other hand, indicates the extent to which the 
forecast error variance of each variable can be explained by shocks to the remaining 
variables. It provides information on the proportion of the movements in a sequence, due to 
the variable’s own shock and other identified shocks (Enders, 2004), separating the variation 
in endogenous variables into the component shocks of the VAR. 
 
3.3.5 Data and variables 
 
The VAR used in this study contains five variables, namely, financial development, proxied 
by PLA (potential liquidity available is measured by the ratio of M2 to GDP) and domestic 
credit to the private sector (DCP), real interest rates (INT), gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF), and the rate of economic growth (Y). These variables are quarterly time series from 
World Development Indicators and span the period 1996:1 – 2010:4 (World Bank, 2014). 
The initial intention was to cover a period of about three decades, but because the economy 
of Rwanda was totally destroyed during the 1994 genocide, the starting point is moved 




data is not available for many variables thereafter. In addition, the variables are initially 
available in annual frequency, but are converted to quarterly series using the Quadratic-match 
average approach. Except for real interest rate, and GDP growth rate, each series used is in 
natural logarithm form. While data interpolation has the advantage of increasing degrees of 
freedom, it has some shortfalls related to “seasonal factors” that may arise in quarterly data. 
However, according to Marwah (1997), this problem is not as serious in quarterly data as it 
might be in higher-frequency data (e.g., monthly, weekly or daily data). If the time series 
consists of weekly or daily data, this may require adjustment of such data to remove the 
seasonality aspect that can lead to unstable relations (Chow, 1984). 
 
3.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
The long-run relationship between financial sector development and economic growth is 
estimated using the cointegration technique of Johansen and Juselius (1990), and using the 
computer software E-Views 7. However, prior to undertaking the estimation, the data is 
tested for stationarity, in order to understand its properties (Harris, 1995). While the test for 
stationarity is very useful, it is not sufficient. The selection of an appropriate lag-length and 
test for stability of the system are also very important. 
 
3.4.1 Stationarity Tests 
 
As pointed out earlier, stationary series have to display a reverting mean and a constant 
variance (Gujarati, 2003). Using graphical plots as displayed in Figure 3-2, visual 
examination reveals that none of the variables is stationary, as none of the graphs fluctuates 









Figure 3- 2: Graphical plots of variables series 
 
PLA: Potential Liquidity Available, INT: Real Interest Rate, DCP: Domestic Credit to 
Private Sector, GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Y: GDP growth. 
 
From the graphical plot, none of the variables appears to be stationary. Therefore, the study 
uses the ADF test to determine the order of integration of the variables in the model. The 
results report that all series are I(0) at first difference (see Table 3-1 for results). 









Order of  
integration 
Potential liquidity available (PLA) 0.201789 - 2.198665** I(1) 
Real interest rates (INT) - 0.604608 - 2.499218** I(1) 
Domestic credit to private sector (DCP) 0.975554 - 2.378643** I(1) 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) 0.788542 - 4.140875*** I(1) 
GDP growth (Y) - 0.795077 - 3.050678*** I(1) 















































3.4.2 Lag length selection 
 
As indicated previously the appropriate lag length to consider is the one associated with the 
lowest values of the criteria statistics given by any of Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), 
Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC), or Hannan and Quinn Criteria (HQC). For this study, the 
lag length of two in each equation as shown on Table 3-2 was determined concomitantly by 
AIC, SIC, and HQC, as well as the sequential modified Likelihood Ratio test statistic (LR) 
and final prediction error (FPE). 
Table 3- 2: Lag length selection 
Sample: 1996Q1 2010Q4     
Included observations: 57     
       
       















       
       0 -188.3027 NA   0.000607  6.782552  6.961767  6.852201 
1  194.4109  684.8559  2.16e-09 -5.768802 -4.693512 -5.350908 
2  255.2483   98.19374*   6.26e-10*  -7.026256*  -5.054890*  -6.260116* 
3  268.0201  18.37352  1.01e-09 -6.597197 -3.729757 -5.482812 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% 
level)   
 
3.4.3 Cointegration Tests 
 
Once the unit root tests are performed and all variables are identified as I(1), the next step is 
to carry out cointegration tests using the Johansen and Juselius (1990) procedure. Co-
integration of the variables in our model, if established, suggests that there is a long-run 
relationship between the variables (Gujarati, 2003). The Johansen and Juselius (1990) 
cointegration test has two variants: the Trace test (𝜆 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒(𝑟)) and the Maximum 
Eigenvalues test (𝜆 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟, 𝑟 + 1)). The procedure starts with the selection of the correct lag- 
length. All information criteria confirm the number of lagged values to include in each 
equation identified to be two (see Table 3-2). Thereafter an analysis of the SVAR’s stability 
follows in order to establish the stability of the model and assurance of meaningful impulse 




roots of the characteristic polynomial are less than one (see Table 3-3), meaning that they are 
all inside the unit circle. 
Table 3- 3: Roots of characteristic polynomial 
Endogenous variables: Potential Liquidity Available,  Real Interest Rate, Domestic 
Credit to Private Sector, Gross Fixed Capital Formation, and GDP growth 
Lag specification: 1 2 
  
       Root Modulus 
  
   0.948477  0.948477 
 0.854568  0.854568 
 0.809860 - 0.242636i  0.845426 
 0.809860 + 0.242636i  0.845426 
 0.696161 - 0.401135i  0.803461 
 0.696161 + 0.401135i  0.803461 
 0.747230  0.747230 
 0.472239 - 0.413446i  0.627652 
 0.472239 + 0.413446i  0.627652 
 0.402696  0.402696 
  
   No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
 
Given the conclusiveness of the above tests, a formal test for cointegration is performed and 
the results are presented in Table 3-4. 
Table 3- 4: Results of cointegration tests 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
      
      Hypothesized  Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.422972  83.56607  69.81889  0.0027  
At most 1 *  0.363729  52.22381  47.85613  0.0184  
At most 2  0.247481  26.45240  29.79707  0.1158  
At most 3  0.156853  10.24563  15.49471  0.2623  
At most 4  0.009092  0.520626  3.841466  0.4706  
      
       * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   








      
      Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None  0.422972  31.34226  33.87687  0.0974  
At most 1  0.363729  25.77141  27.58434  0.0838  
At most 2  0.247481  16.20677  21.13162  0.2130  
At most 3  0.156853  9.725009  14.26460  0.2306  
At most 4  0.009092  0.520626  3.841466  0.4706  
      
       * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
 
The trace test indicates the existence of two cointegrating relationships because from trace 
test statistic 52.22 that is greater than the critical value 47.86, the null hypothesis that there is 
at most one co-integrating vector is rejected in favour of two co-integrating vectors or 
relationships. The maximum eigenvalue test suggests no cointegrating relationship because 
none of the maximal-eigenvalue statistic is greater than the critical value. This study adopts 
the results of the trace test, as it has been established that it is superior, since it appears to be 
more robust to skewness and excess kurtosis in the residuals than the maximum eigenvalue 
test (Sjö, 2008). Following the confirmation of the existence of cointegrating relationships, 
and satisfaction of the necessary and sufficient condition for stability of the system, it can 
safely be concluded that the model’s impulse response functions and forecast-error variance 
have meaningful interpretations. Therefore, an analysis of short-run dynamics can be carried 
out using impulse response functions and variance decomposition among the variables 
employed in the study. 
 
3.4.4 Impulse responses and variance decomposition analysis 
 
3.4.4.1 Impulse Responses Analysis 
 
Impulse response functions provide responses on how a change in one variable, affects the 
system in the future. In this study, impulse response functions show reaction of the five 
variables, namely, potential liquidity available, real interest rate, domestic credit to the 
private sector, gross fixed capital formation and output to a shock coming from any of these 




Figure 3-3 summarizes the responses to a structural shock on PLA. It shows that an increase 
of 1 percent in PLA in the first quarter, leads to a decrease in real interest rate by 0.9 percent, 
a slight increase in gross fixed capital formation of about 0.1percent below the baseline and a 
small increase in economic growth of 0.4 percent (see Figure 3-3). The small increase in 
capital formation following a shock in PLA for loans is probably in relation to the high level 
of consumption observed in the Rwandan context that represents a larger proportion of GDP. 
From 1996 to 2013, the ratio of final consumption expenditure to GDP in Rwanda is almost 
above 90 percent (World Bank, 2016). All three responses quickly become insignificant by 
the second quarter. The significant output response to a potential liquidity shock, nonetheless, 
supports the supply-leading hypothesis on the relationship between financial sector 
development and GDP growth. Domestic credit to the private sector, however, does not 
respond significantly to the PLA shock. Thus, PLA appears to have little impact on real 
output. This finding is not surprising due to the imperfect structure of the financial sector in 
Rwanda and the level of use of banking services by its citizens. For example, the number of 
borrowers from commercial banks (per 1,000 adults) increased from 0.38 in 2004 to 10 in 
2013 while those making deposits with commercial banks (per 1,000 adults) changed from 
7.5 in 2004 to 234 in 2013 (World Bank, 2016). 
Figure 3- 3: Impulse Responses to a potential liquidity available (PLA) Shock 
 
 
PLA: Potential Liquidity Available; INT: Real Interest Rate; DCP: Domestic Credit to 
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Figure 3-4 presents the impulse responses of the selected variables to an interest rate shock. It 
shows that following the shock, domestic credit to the private sector increases, reaching a 
maximum of 1.1 percent in the second quarter before returning to equilibrium by the end of 
the third quarter. Real GDP growth increases up to a maximum of 12 percent in the second 
quarter. This response becomes insignificant by the fourth quarter. The increase in domestic 
credit to the private sector following a positive interest rate shock may appear inconsistent 
with the conventional theory. However, it reveals that in Rwanda, domestic private borrowers 
may not be primarily constrained by how high interest rates are, but rather by the availability 
of domestic credit. An increase in interest rates makes lending more profitable for financial 
intermediaries. Thus, financial intermediaries may reshuffle their asset portfolio in the wake 
of increasing interest rates, in the process increasing the share of loans and advances in total 
assets. 
Figure 3- 4: Impulse Responses to an interest rate Shock 
 
PLA: Potential Liquidity Available; INT: Real Interest Rate; DCP: Domestic Credit to 
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Figure 3-5 presents the impulse responses of the selected variables to a shock on domestic 
credit to the private sector. It shows that following the shock, real output growth increases 
significantly reaching a maximum of 15 percent in the second quarter, and thereafter 
declining to equilibrium in the fourth quarter. Interest rates also respond to the shock with an 
initial increase of 1.5 percent and 2 percent in the second quarter before declining to 
equilibrium. This shows that an increase in domestic credit to the private sector raises interest 
rates, probably due to financial intermediaries’ declining ability to convert other assets into 
loans and advances. This was pointed out by Kablan (2010) as among the features 
characterizing the level of intermediation in LDCs where the financial sector is less 
developed. 
Figure 3- 5: Impulse Responses to a DCP Shock 
 
PLA: Potential Liquidity Available; INT: Real Interest Rate; DCP: Domestic Credit to 
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Figure 3-6 presents the impulse responses of selected variables to a capital formation shock. 
It shows that following the shock, PLA reacts to the shock by decreasing slightly below the 
baseline in the first quarter and quickly becoming insignificant. 
Figure 3- 6: Impulse Response to a GFCF Shock 
 
PLA: Potential Liquidity Available; INT: Real Interest Rate; DCP: Domestic Credit to 
Private Sector; GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation; Y: GDP growth. 
 
The impulse responses of a real output growth shock are presented in Figure 3-7. Potential 
liquidity available increases instantaneously following the output growth shock, probably to 
accommodate the increase in economic activity arising from the shock. The increase in 
potential liquidity is, however, marginally significant and it becomes clearly insignificant by 
the beginning of the second quarter. Interest rates respond to the shock by increasing initially, 
peaking at about 3.5 percent after two quarters before taking a downturn and reverting to 
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following the shock, peaking after about two quarters. The instantaneous rise in domestic 
credit and interest rates in the first period is a direct consequence of the real output growth 
shock. The higher output growth in the first period requires an increase in investment and 
hence financial resources, consequently putting upward pressure on domestic credit to the 
private sector and interest rates. 
Figure 3- 7: Impulse Responses to Y shock 
 
PLA: Potential Liquidity Available; INT: Real Interest Rate; DCP: Domestic Credit to 
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3.4.4.2 Variance Decomposition 
 
The proportion of fluctuations in a given variable due to different innovations to each 
variable is provided in the variance decomposition for every variable in the model. 
Specifically, the relationship between the innovations of financial expansion through 
potential liquidity available (PLA), the domestic credit to the private sector (DCP), gross 
fixed capital formation (GFCF), and real interest rate (INT) vis-à-vis economic growth (Y) is 
analyzed. The results from the decomposition method clarify how the forecast error variance 
of the variables under examination can be broken into components, which in turn can be in 
relation to each of the variables in the SVAR. The forecast variance decomposition of our 
SVAR uses estimates over a sixty quarters period and Table 3-5 provides details of the first 
20 quarters.  
Table 3- 5: Variance Decomposition 



















       
        1  0.102904  98.16707  0.811298  1.001603  0.010016  0.010016 
 4  0.208081  86.75151  0.426327  10.80246  1.894881  0.124819 
 8  0.241641  70.42638  0.922944  13.13260  15.38921  0.128870 
 12  0.278422  65.70520  1.389530  12.40430  20.37316  0.127814 
 16  0.300620  59.78121  1.575537  18.94573  19.47881  0.218716 
 20  0.321929  52.50907  1.595011  28.13855  17.41929  0.338078 
 



















       
        1  0.101446  1.010097  98.97939  0.010306  0.000103  0.000103 
 4  11.06761  36.77586  2.028087  58.20867  2.417382  0.570005 
 8  22.47933  58.91776  2.099122  37.86261  0.750057  0.370450 
 12  24.09669  59.35421  2.051549  37.27811  0.915345  0.400787 
 16  25.51548  57.16956  1.843743  38.29669  2.258709  0.431300 



























       
        1  0.103725  0.816358  0.630925  96.62031  0.966203  0.966203 
 4  0.358962  0.204617  0.885275  97.60482  0.192745  1.112545 
 8  0.559954  0.225447  1.041497  97.34989  0.188986  1.194181 
 12  0.686182  0.152823  1.029952  97.47244  0.137686  1.207097 
 16  0.761438  0.176633  1.056490  97.41222  0.148837  1.205818 
 20  0.803503  0.262408  1.085794  97.26335  0.183203  1.205240 
 



















       
        1  0.101999  0.036802  0.825754  1.019449  98.10780  0.010194 
 4  0.305433  5.416843  2.068113  13.82021  78.52100  0.173843 
 8  0.556188  9.058138  2.494076  44.48185  43.42561  0.540329 
 12  0.782913  9.014226  2.403478  61.02456  26.80723  0.750507 
 16  0.958580  7.608585  2.234900  70.01186  19.27519  0.869462 
 20  1.088503  6.325636  2.086295  75.26516  15.38466  0.938253 
 

















 GDP    
Growth 
       
        1  0.100000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  100.0000 
 4  2.275768  33.45622  0.252584  36.27915  28.29763  1.714417 
 8  6.139682  27.72303  0.082826  54.46856  16.95636  0.769218 
 12  6.548727  24.99927  0.130086  58.72731  15.35340  0.789938 
 16  6.567449  24.95289  0.135523  58.80016  15.31874  0.792693 
 20  6.583714  24.88875  0.134865  58.82772  15.35624  0.792421 
 
Table 3-5 shows that variations in domestic credit to the private sector and gross fixed capital 
formation better explain the fluctuations in potential liquidity available. The contribution of 
domestic credit to the private sector (DCP) to variations in potential liquidity available 
(PLA), increases from 10.80 percent after four quarters to 12.40 percent after 12 quarters, and 
28.14 percent after 20 quarters. The contribution of gross fixed capital formation to 
fluctuations in potential liquidity available also increases from 1.89 percent after four 




contribution of real output growth to fluctuations in  potential liquidity available is very 
small, and remains less than 0.5 percent each quarter over 20 quarters. 
It is further observed in Table 3-5 that domestic credit to the private sector accounts for the 
largest proportion of fluctuations in real output growth, followed by potential liquidity 
available, indicating that the relationship between financial intermediation and economic 
growth in Rwanda may be supply leading. Domestic credit to the private sector accounts for 
36.28 percent of the fluctuations in real output growth in the first four quarters, and increases 
to 54.47 percent after eight quarters and 58.83 percent after 20 quarters. The contribution of 
potential liquidity available to variations in real output growth is somewhat smaller albeit still 
large relative to other variables. Potential liquidity available accounts for 33.46 percent of the 
variations in real output growth after four quarters, but drops to 27.72 percent after eight 
quarters and 24.89 percent after 20 quarters. This corroborates the earlier observation from 
the impulse response functions connoting that financial sector development leads economic 
growth (supply-leading hypothesis). 
Gross fixed capital formation also accounts for a relatively large proportion of the 
fluctuations in GDP growth. Table 3-5 further shows that gross fixed capital formation 
explains about 28.29 percent of the fluctuations in GDP growth after four quarters. The 
contribution of gross fixed capital formation in GDP growth variations declines to 15.35 
percent after 12 quarters and remains more or less the same at 15.36 percent after 20 quarters. 
The largest proportion of the fluctuations in domestic credit to the private sector is explained 
by domestic credit to the private sector itself (96.62 percent in the first quarter, 97.47 percent 
after 12 quarters and 97.26 percent after 20 quarters). This is probably explained by the 
imitating behavior inherent in Rwanda, in conducting business with limited entrepreneurial 
spirit and less diversification. In addition, it reconfirms that domestic credit to the private 
sector does not necessarily line up with interest rates in Rwanda. Rather, with more credit, 
additional productive capacity take place through increased gross fixed capital formation and 
GDP growth, which again requires more domestic credit to the private sector. This explains 
why besides its own contribution; GDP growth contributes the most to fluctuations in 
domestic credit to the private sector. GDP growth accounts for 1 percent of the variations in 
domestic credit to the private sector after the first quarter, increases to 1.2 percent after 12 





3.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter investigated the link between financial intermediation and economic growth in 
Rwanda for the period 1996:1 to 2010:4. The study applied a cointegration procedure and a 
Structural VAR with potential liquidity available and domestic credit to private sector as 
measures of financial sector development. It finds that GDP growth makes a very small 
contribution to fluctuations in potential liquidity available (used as a measure of financial 
development). This indicates that a GDP growth shock leads to a very small increase in 
potential liquidity available, which is marginally significant. On this basis, the study 
concludes that there is no evidence that economic growth leads financial development in 
Rwanda. 
The findings also show that potential liquidity available accounts for a third of the 
fluctuations in GDP in the first four quarters, and drops to about a quarter at the end of five 
years. This suggests that GDP growth increases instantaneously and significantly following a 
shock to potential liquidity available. Likewise, the domestic credit to private sector accounts 
for large proportion of fluctuation in the real output growth ranging from 36.28 percent in the 
first four quarters to 58.83 percent after five years. This provides evidence that the 
relationship between financial sector development and economic growth in Rwanda is in line 
with the supply-leading hypothesis, indicating that development of the financial sector leads 
to economic growth in the country and not vice versa. 
Thus, the financial sector may be acting as a driver of economic growth in Rwanda. These 
findings are in agreement with similar studies on developing countries (Odedokun, 1996; 
Ndikumana, 2000; Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004; Ndebbio, 2004), Kilimani (2007) and 
Kargbo11 and Adamu (2009). The question of how efficient the Rwandan financial sector is 











MEASURING COMMERCIAL BANKS’ EFFICIENCY IN RWANDA: A 




Chapter Three reviewed the relationship between financial intermediation and economic 
growth in Rwanda. The directional causality between financial sector development and 
economic growth was established to be supply-leading meaning that financial sector 
development drives economic growth. The chapter emphasized that Rwanda should 
strengthen incentives to attract businesses to effectively use financial institutions’ services, 
underscoring that domestic credit to the private sector is the main reason for fluctuations in 
real output growth followed by potential liquidity available. However, the literature 
highlights that financial institutions can only have a positive impact on the economy if they 
are efficient (see Berger and DeYoung, 1997; El and Gamal and Inanoglu, 2005; Freixas and 
Rochet, 2008; Chen, 2009). Consequently, this chapter examines how efficient the Rwandan 
financial sector is, based on an analysis of commercial banks which account for the largest 
proportion of total financial assets in Rwanda, i.e., 78.6 percent in 2013 (BNR, 2014). If the 
banking sector is performing at high efficiency levels with existing resources, the sector can 
provide better services and make a larger contribution to economic growth (Freixas and 
Rochet, 2008). In contrast, if the sector performs at a low level of efficiency, any worthwhile 
contribution would be either be greatly diminished or absent. Kablan's (2010) study on bank 
efficiency and financial development in SSA found that SSA banks are less developed and 
have problems in transforming deposits collected into loans to the private sector. According 
to this study, in 2003, the SSA region displayed an intermediation ratio of 51 percent, 
compared to 75 percent for Latin America and 91 percent for Asia. 
 
Many studies have been conducted on bank efficiency in developed economies at regional or 
country level (see Edward Chang, Hasan and Hunter, 1998; Altunbaş, Gardener, Molyneux 
and Moore, 2001; Sathye, 2001; Drake and Hall, 2003; Fang, Hasan and Marton, 2011; 
Aiello and Bonanno, 2013). A comprehensive compilation by Berger and Humphrey (1997) 




including 66 on the US,  14 on Europe, and 1 on Canada. Other studies have focused on 
Asian  countries (Bhattacharyya, Knox Lovell and Sahay, 1997; Chen, 2001; Hardy and 
Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2001; Xiaoqing Maggie and Heffernan, 2007), and Latin America 
(Taylor, Thompson, Thrall and Dharmapala, 1997; Carvallo and Kasman, 2005).  
 
A limited number of studies have covered some African countries (Chaffai, 1997; Agu, 2004; 
Kablan, 2007; Chen, 2009; Ncube, 2009; Muvingi, 2015). Furthermore, very few studies 
have focused on low-income SSA countries (Agu, 2004; Aikaeli, 2006; Onour and Abdalla, 
2010; Lelissa, 2014; Miencha, Murugesan, Vasanth, Lingaraja and Raja, 2015) and very few 
of these have applied a stochastic frontier approach. In addition, only one of the few studies 
conducted on some SSA countries mentioned efficiency in the Rwandan banking sector with 
only 23 observations in a sample of 152 countries (Hasan, Koetter, Lensink and Meesters, 
2009). Despite this small number of observations (23 over a period of eight years), the study 
also aggregated the banking sector at country level which leads to very generalized results. 
To the best knowledge of the author, there is no published study on the efficiency of 
commercial banks operating in Rwanda. This chapter, therefore, contributes to the literature 
by investigating the efficiency of commercial banks operating in Rwanda from 2007 to 2013. 
The efficiency of the banking sector can attract investors to the country either by establishing 
new businesses, or engaging in joint ventures or simply lending funds to banks directly or 
through the purchase of established companies’ bonds. This analysis will assist bank 
management to improve the possibility of their institution’s survival in a globalized and 
integrated, competitive financial market (Isik and Hassan, 2002). 
 
The analysis in this chapter differs from Hasan et al. (2009) in  that it spans a recent period, 
2007 – 2013, counts more observations, 49 compared to 23, and does not generalize the 
financial sector but focuses on commercial banking, which dominates the banking sector in 
Rwanda (BNR, 2014). The study also utilizes a more contemporary approach in analyzing 
efficiency, which is the stochastic frontier approach that yields more consistent estimates than 
other approaches to measure efficiency including accounting, non-parametric or other 
parametric ones.  
 
The findings of the study confirm a mean cost efficiency of 88.56 percent, implying that 
commercial banks in Rwanda jointly wasted about 11.44 percent of available resources to 




in order to enhance their efficiency, banks could reduce their input composition by 11.44 
percent. Furthermore, inefficiencies are statistically significant, decreasing over time with the 
penetration of foreign-owned banks in the Rwandan banking sector, and increasing with the 
rapid replacement of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in office. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized in the following sections. Section 4.2 reviews the 
theoretical and empirical analysis of cost efficiency; Section 4.3 outlines the methodology; 
Section 4.4 reports on the results of the assessment carried out with reference to the 
efficiency of the commercial banking sector in Rwanda; and Section 4.5 presents a summary 
and concluding remarks. 
 
4.2 Banking Cost Efficiency Measurement 
 
Neoclassical theory postulates that firms are rational in maximising profitability. From this 
perspective, firms produce at the frontier. However, there is still inefficiency in the process of 
production either at firm or industry level, limiting the level of profitability. Therefore, an 
analysis that establishes the magnitude of efficiency of a firm as well as at industry level is of 
great significance for different stakeholders. This section presents the theoretical foundations 
of efficiency measurement and its application to the banking sector. 
 
4.2.1 Theoretical Foundations of Efficiency Measurement 
 
In the efficiency measurement literature, two broad approaches have been used, accounting-
based ratios approach and the frontier approach that includes both non-parametric and 
parametric approaches. 
 
4.2.1.1 Accounting-based Ratios 
 
The efficiency ratio is an accounting-based ratio that measures efficiency (MacDonald and 
Koch, 2006). It measures a bank’s ability to control noninterest expenses relative to net 




𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 (𝐸𝐹𝐹) =
𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 (𝑁𝐼𝐼) + 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
………………(4.1) 
Bank managers use this ratio to measure the success of their efforts to contain noninterest 
expenses while adding earnings from increasing fees. It indicates precisely how much a bank 
pays in noninterest expenses for one monetary unit of operating income. For good practice, 
bank analysts advise banks to maintain this ratio below 55 percent per monetary unit of net 
operating income. The smaller the ratio the more profitable the bank, ceteris paribus. 
Accounting-based measures of efficiency are, however, limited due to different accounting 
conventions and differences in the regulatory and risk environments across countries which 
can make international comparison less valid (Matthews and Thompson, 2008). However, 
they can be effective for similar kinds of banks operating in the same geographical, 
regulatory and supervisory conditions. 
 
4.2.1.2 Frontier Approaches 
 
Section 2.5.3 in chapter two discussed a number of non-parametric and parametric techniques 
used to measure financial sector development through efficiency. It underlined that DEA and 
SFA are the frontiers approaches most often used to measure efficiency. 
 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) was developed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes in 1978 
(Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978). It is based on a concept of efficiency that is extensively 
used in engineering and the natural sciences (Yue, 1992). The model corresponds to a 
mathematical programming applied to measure the efficiency of a variety of institutions. In 
engineering, the measure of efficiency of a given machine is the ratio of output produced by 
that machine to the amount of energy that the machine consumed in the process of 
production. Therefore, based on this definition of efficiency, a firm is efficient in comparison 
to another one if it produces the same level of output with fewer inputs or more output using 
the same or lesser inputs. In relation to inefficiency, the DEA assumes that there are no 
random fluctuations in the process of production and attributes all deviations from the 





The extensive application of DEA could be due to the fact that, it does not require 
information on prices or an explicit functional form of the production function to be specified 
prior to estimating efficiency scores. It only requires data inputs and output quantities and 
their selection has fewer limitations than other alternatives such as econometric approaches. 
With regard to the functional relation to be estimated, the DEA is a mathematical 
programming algorithm related to a multi-objective optimisation problem in which all inputs 
are minimised and all outputs are maximised all together (Yue, 1992). In addition, DEA 
efficiency scores do not depend on the units in which inputs and output are measured, as long 
as these units are the same for all firms in the sample. However, the major limitation of the 
DEA approach is related to its assumption of the absence of a random error (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997; Battese, Coelli, Rao and O'Donnell, 2005). This denotes that the 
application of DEA assumes that there is no measurement error when defining the frontier, 
and no eventuality of giving a certain firm a higher or a lower performance. Furthermore, the 
inaccuracies in accounting rules make the measured outputs and inputs deviate from 
economic measures of outputs and inputs. 
 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis is a parametric approach to measure efficiency. Generally it 
assumes that the inefficiency component of the error term follows a truncated normal 
distribution and that the random error term follows a symmetric normal distribution (Ferrier 
and Lovell, 1990; Battese et al., 2005). This approach dates back to Farrell (1957) who made 
use of the work of Debreu (1951) and Koopmans (1951) to design a straightforward measure 
of a firm that could account for many inputs. Debreu (1951) introduced a measure of output-
oriented technical efficiency, which he called a “coefficient of resource utilisation”. Farrell 
(1957) built on this work by demonstrating how to measure input-oriented technical 
efficiency, input allocative efficiency, and cost efficiency (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
Farrell (1957) suggested that the efficiency of a firm consists of a composite of technical 
efficiency and allocative efficiency which is consistent with the neoclassical theory of 
production (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Matthews and Thompson, 2008). Using this 
theory, an application can be drawn from a firm producing a single output (Q) with two 
inputs (𝑥1 and 𝑥2). Figure 4-1 displays technical efficiency and allocative efficiency, and 
hence economic efficiency or cost efficiency. Technical efficiency refers to the aptitude of a 




denotes the aptitude of a firm to use available inputs in an optimal combination, given their 
respective prices and production technology (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
 
Figure 4- 1: Technical Efficiency and Allocative Efficiency 
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      Source: Matthews and Thompson (2008) 
 
Suppose that a firm uses inputs 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 to produce a given level of output Q (see equation 
4.2). The total cost of production is C (see equation 4.3) where 𝑤1and 𝑤2 are respectively 
prices of inputs 𝑥1  and 𝑥2. The isocost ww is given by the ratio of input prices.  
𝑄 = 𝑓 (𝑥1, 𝑥2)…………………………………………………………………………………(4.2) 
𝐶 = 𝑤1𝑥1 + 𝑤2𝑥2 …………………………………………………………………………… . (4.3) 
If the firm produces a level of output at point c, which is to the right of isoquant qq, then the 
firm is technically inefficient because it employs more inputs 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 than needed to 
produce the level of output q on the isoquant. In contrast, if the firm produces a level of 
output given by point a, it is 100 percent technically efficient. Formally, the measure of 
technical efficiency (TE) is given by the ratio of expenditure at point a, to the expenditure at 
point c or the ratio Oa/Oc. In this case, the firm produces the level of output q using the 




optimal. Thus, the firm is technically efficient, but not cost efficient because of a 
misallocation of factors of production in line with their relative prices.  
On the other hand, the ratio of cost efficiency to input-technical efficiency (Ob/Oa) measures 
allocative efficiency (AE). As the firm moves along the isoquant curve from point a, towards 
point e (the minimum cost possible), the gap ab decreases up to zero and allocative efficiency 
AE=100 percent. As a result, this decomposition leads to the relation giving the allocative 
efficiency as AE = CE/TE. 
Combined, the measures of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency provide a measure 
of “economic efficiency” or “cost efficiency”. The concept of economic efficiency is related 
to a state where firms find a mixture that enables them to produce the desired level of output 
at minimum cost (Yue, 1992). The efficient cost-minimising position corresponds to point e, 
where the isocost ww is tangent to the isoquant qq. The ratio of minimum cost represented by 
isocost ww to actual cost represented by isocost 𝑤′′𝑤′′(which passes by c and is parallel to 
ww) measures the cost efficiency. Thus, the cost efficiency (CE) is measured by the ratio of 
expenditure at point e (which is indeed equal to expenditure at point b) to expenditure at point 
c or simply by Ob/Oc. Part of cost inefficiency results in no optimal combination of inputs 
which is represented by the distance ba. Figure 4-1 shows that generally, cost inefficiency is 
different to technical inefficiency as long as the distance ba is different from zero. 
 
As the SFA relates to this type of frontier analysis, its history comprises of two major phases. 
The first can be traced to work of Farrell (1957),  Aigner, Lovell Knox and Schmidt (1977) 
and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977) while the second culminates in Battese and Coelli's 
(1995) paper. In the first phase, there were attempts to improve the model by capturing all 
components of the stochastic frontier model vis-à-vis inclusion of all disturbing factors that 
hinder firms from being on the frontier. These disturbing factors enter the model through the 
error term having two components, one of which captures technical inefficiency while the 
other captures exogenous factors outside the control of producers or managers, while having 
an effect on output (Aigner and Chu, 1968; Timmer, 1971; Schmidt, 1976). In the second 
phase, attempts were made to incorporate the firm’s specific effects that were initially 
invariant, to vary across firms and over time (Kalirajan, 1981; Pitt and Lee, 1981; 
Kumbhakar, Ghosh and McGuckin, 1991; Reifschneider and Stevenson, 1991; Battese and 




The earliest work on the frontier production function that followed Farrell's (1957) 
contribution assumed a deterministic production frontier function of the form of equation 
(4.4). In this function, it is assumed that a certain maximum level of output 𝑦𝑖 is to be attained 
using a set of inputs, 𝑥𝑖.  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖 , 𝛽)…………………………………………………………………………………………… . . (4.4) 
Aigner and Chu (1968) applied the techniques of mathematical programming to a cross-
section of N firms within the industry to estimate the unknown vector of parameters, 𝛽, of a 
production function expressing the maximum output attainable from the inputs combination 
at the existing state of technology. One of the problems of such deterministic models was 
their high sensitivity to outliers, which led to the development of ‘probabilistic’ production 
frontiers by Timmer (1971). In this alternative approach, a deterministic frontier is computed 
using mathematical programming techniques with a sequence of solutions until the computed 
frontier becomes stable. However, the computed deterministic frontier makes hypotheses 
testing impossible, meaning that the mathematical programming techniques lacked known 
statistical properties. In an attempt to provide such frontier models with a statistical basis, 
Schmidt (1976) added a one-side disturbance term to (4.4), which led to the model expressed 
in equation (4.5). 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖, 𝛽) + 𝑖 …………………………………………………………………………… . . (4.5)  
with𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁 (which is the number of firms concerned in the model). 
 
Schmidt (1976) pointed out that the goal of programming models has a statistical 
interpretation if a distributional assumption is imposed on the disturbance term, εi. By adding 
the distribution assumption for the error term, εi, the model can be estimated by maximum 
likelihood techniques. This model specification has solved the problem of noise which 
previous frontier models were unable to account for. In addition, it facilitated hypotheses 
testing. However, such specification ignores the fact that random shocks such as the effects of 
weather, luck, strikes, and damaged material, among others that are not under the control of a 
producer affect output. In this case, there was no room for the possible influence of 
measurement error and other statistical noise on the estimated frontier production function. It 
was assumed that all deviations from the frontier arose from technical inefficiency, and not 
from other exogenous factors. In order to address the problems associated with both the 
deterministic and probabilistic frontier Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck 




allow for the presence of technical inefficiency while acknowledging the fact that exogenous 
factors outside the control of producers can have an effect on output. Consequently, to 
estimate the stochastic frontier production function, one has to keep a mind a separation 
between the impacts on output of shocks due to exogenous factors’ “noise” and the 
contribution of change to inefficiency. The statistical noise is accounted for by adding a 
symmetric error term (𝑣𝑖) to a non-negative error term accounting for inefficiency (𝑢𝑖). From 
this stochastic frontier approach, the estimation of technical efficiency involves two 
conditions. The first consists of the specification of the functional form of the production 
function and the second is specification of the distributional assumption of the composed 
error term. Then, the error term is defined following equation (4.6). 
𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… . (4.6) 
𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁                                                                                                                                                    
 
Equation (4.6) shows that the composite error term, 𝑖 has two components: a symmetric error 
component (𝑣𝑖) capturing the effect of measurement error and other random shocks outside 
the firm’s control. The error term 𝑣𝑖 are assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed i.e,  𝑣𝑖 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2). The one-sided error component (𝑢𝑖) captures the level of 
technical inefficiency from firm specific effects, which are under the firm’s control such as 
carelessness of employees in the production process. The disturbance component (𝑢𝑖) is 
derived from a normal distribution truncated above at zero and has to be distributed 
independently of 𝑣𝑖. However, even though there was improvement in modelling this error 
term, in general, studies that followed that of Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van den 
Broeck (1977) did not incorporate the environment effects as explanatory variables in their 
models to predict technical efficiency. 
 
Authors like Pitt and Lee (1981) and Kalirajan (1981) investigated the relationship between 
environmental variables and predicted technical inefficiencies using a two-stage approach 
(Battese and Coelli, 1995). Firstly, to estimate the main frontier model, they used 
environmental variables previously omitted. Secondly, they regressed the predicted technical 
inefficiencies on the environmental variables. Omission of  environmental variables in the 
frontier function at the first stage generally leads to biased estimators of the parameters of the 
deterministic part of the frontier function, as well as biased predictors of technical 




variables to directly influence the stochastic component of the stochastic frontier function by 
assuming that inefficiency effects in the frontier model have distributions that vary with 
environmental variables. 
 
Kumbhakar et al. (1991), Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) and Huang and Liu (1994) 
proposed models in which the parameters of the stochastic frontier production function and 
the inefficiency model are estimated simultaneously based on appropriate distributional 
assumptions with cross-sectional data of firms in the sample. On the other hand, as an 
improvement, Battese and Coelli (1995) presented an extension of Kumbhakar et al. (1991), 
Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) and Huang and Liu (1994) by introducing estimation of 
technical inefficiency effects in a stochastic frontier production function by applying a panel 
data set. Using panel data provides an alternative way of avoiding either the strong 
distribution assumptions of the data, or equally a strong independence  assumption  made in 
the cross-sectional production frontier literature (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). A process of 
repeated observations in a sample of producers can serve as a stand-in for strong 
distributional assumptions in cross-sectional data. Equally, not all estimations on panel data 
require the independence of the technical inefficiency error component from the explanatory 
variables. In the Battese and Coelli (1995) model, the inefficiency effects are stochastic and 
follow a truncated distribution, and the model allows the estimation of both technical change 
in the stochastic frontier and time-varying technical inefficiencies. In addition, the parameters 
of the model are estimated by applying the method of maximum likelihood which permits the 
separation of the effects of inefficiency and those of technical change (Battese et al., 2005). 
Moreover, in hypotheses testing, to test an individual coefficient, one can use a Z test or a 
likelihood ratio test (LR test). However, if the hypothesis testing concerns more than one 
coefficient, the appropriate test is the LR. 
 
While the SFA has been extensively applied as a measure of efficiency and has recorded 
success, the approach has its drawbacks. Firstly, the stochastic frontier model fails to 
decompose individual residuals into their two components, thus making it impossible to 
estimate technical inefficiency by observation (Førsund, Knox Lovell and Schmidt, 1980). 
Secondly, the derived level of efficiency is susceptible to the functional form of the frontier 
and also to the specification of the component of the error term (Berger et al., 1993). 
Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings, in comparison to other frontiers models, it 




4.2.2 Empirical Measurement of Efficiency in the banking sector 
 
As noted earlier, the assessment of efficiency in this chapter focuses on cost efficiency in the 
banking sector. Efficiency in the banking sector has been the subject of a number of studies 
(see DeYoung, 1997; Resti, 1997; Sathye, 2003; Semih Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007; 
Hughes and Mester, 2008; Hays, De Lurgio and Gilbert, 2009; Tahir, Bakar and Harons, 
2010). Some have focused on cost efficiency (Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel, 2005; Xiaoqing 
Maggie and Heffernan, 2007; Lelissa, 2014) while others dwelt on cost-profit analysis (Isik 
and Hassan, 2002; Ncube, 2009). Given that this study applies a stochastic cost frontier 
analysis to measure commercial banks’ efficiency in Rwanda, the review focuses on cost 
frontier related studies. 
 
Cost efficiency models are based on expenditure to acquire total inputs (total cost) and data 
on their prices, as well as the output quantity produced using acquired inputs (Kumbhakar 
and Lovell, 2000). They do not utilise input quantity data in their estimation because 
researchers presume that banks take present input prices and output quantities as given, and 
then attempt to minimise costs by employing the optimal level of inputs (Isik and Hassan, 
2002). Consequently, cost efficiency is considered as a measure of how far a bank’s cost is 
from best practice bank’s cost setting; if both have to produce the same bundle of output 
under the same environmental conditions. Thus, the cost function specifies the minimum cost 
of producing the output vector, y, given the cost drivers, such as price vector p (labour, Pl; 
capital, Pk and funds, Pf), and some exogenous factors beyond the managers’ control. 
Estimation of cost frontier can be accomplished in situations where producers produce a 
single output or multiple outputs (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
 
The measure of cost efficiency is normally between zero and unity, and attains its upper 
bound if, and only if, a producer uses a cost-minimizing input vector. Cost inefficiency can 
arise depending whether one is employing an excess amount of inputs (technical 
inefficiency), or has a sub-optimal mix of inputs (allocative inefficiency). Xiaoqing Maggie 
and Heffernan (2007) argue that firms become more X-efficient (numerical efficiency 
measure) by lowering costs, through for example, improved management and/or greater 






Empirical studies on the banking sector have been carried out using translog cost functions or 
Cobb-Douglass cost functions, and very few studies have been conducted applying effects 
cost frontier models (Greene, 2005a; 2005b ). Many of these studies have found that banks 
are cost efficient. In a study on the level of efficiency of Ethiopian Banks in the period 2008 
– 2012, using a DEA approach, Lelissa (2014) found that the sector was at the average level 
of cost efficiency of 86.7 percent. Along similar lines, Ncube (2009) applied a translog cost 
frontier model to assess the efficiency of South Africa’s commercial banking sector. He 
found improvements in cost efficiency at eight commercial banks in the country, from an 
average mean of 40.4 percent in 2000 to 66.2 percent in 2005. Using a translog cost frontier 
function to assess bank efficiency in the West African Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU) 
for the period 1993 – 1996, Kablan (2007) found an average cost efficiency of 67 percent. In 
conducting the test of bank efficiency using a translog cost frontier model on a sample of 152 
countries, Hasan, Koetter et al. (2009) found that, except for Ethiopia and Honduras that 
exhibit relatively higher efficiency of 90.6 percent, the mean cost efficiency was between 28 
and 91 percent. Adopting a DEA approach, Hauner and Peiris (2005) also found average 
bank cost efficiency of 92.6 percent in Uganda for the period 1999 – 2004, just after the 
privatisation of the largest state-owned Uganda Commercial Bank. Similarly, Aikaeli (2006) 
found an estimated 8.56 percent X-inefficiency of commercial banks in Tanzania for the 
period 1998 – 2004, using a translog cost frontier function. Using a translog cost frontier on 
data from private Korean banks for the period 1985 – 1995, Hao, Hunter et al. (2001) 
reported an average cost efficiency of 88.97 percent. This indicates that 11.03 percent of cost 
was wasted because banks did not operate at the efficient frontier. 
 
Integrating the bank-specific and industry-specific characteristics as well as macroeconomic 
determinants in the analysis of the efficiency of the banking sector in Tanzania for the period 
2005 – 2008 using the DEA approach, Raphael (2013) found that the level of technical 
inefficiency in the banking sector in the country was 13 percent. This presents a slightly 
worse situation than the 8.56 percent reported by Aikaeli (2006). Banks’ inefficiency may 
have increased as a direct result of the international global financial crisis of 2007–2009. 
 
Some studies have reported weak cost efficiency estimates or even the inverse, denoting an 
overall decrease in cost efficiency and therefore implying an increase in total cost. Applying 
a translog cost frontier model to estimate X-efficiency and scale-efficiencies of the banking 




and Tırtıroğlu (1998) found that new banks were more X-inefficient and more scale-
inefficient while being highly profitable, although the relationship was weak. They reported 
X-efficiency estimates in the range of 54.7 percent to 87.9 percent. The authors argued that 
the performance of older banks relative to new ones might be due to the experience that older 
banks have as well as better levels of managerial efficiency. A relative increase in cost 
inefficiency was also observed by Kiyota (2009) in a study of 29 SSA countries for the period 
2000 – 2007. Applying a translog cost frontier to estimate the efficiency of banks in these 
countries, he found that they had experienced cost inefficiency of 1.05 and 1.06 percent. 
Xiaoqing Maggie and Heffernan (2007) fitted a translog cost frontier to examine the cost X-
efficiency in China’s banking sector for the period 1985–2002. Their findings do not differ 
substantially from the two previously highlighted studies. They show that banks were 
operating at 40 – 60 percent below the X-efficient frontier. Using data from 1988 – 1997, and 
employing a Data Development Analysis (DEA) approach to assess the cost efficiency of 
Taiwanese banks following financial liberalisation in the 1980s, Chen (2001), found that 
banks’ X-efficiency had substantially increased in Taiwan’s deregulated banking market; on 
average, X-inefficiency decreased from 3.9 percent in 1988 to 2.0 percent in 1997. 
 
Other studies have explored the relationship between X-efficiency and the type of bank 
ownership, for example domestic versus foreign, and public versus private. Once more, the 
empirical findings are mixed. In a study analysing the efficiency of Kenyan private banks 
versus public banks, applying a DEA approach, Miencha et al. (2015) report that public 
banks were performing relatively better than their private counterparts. Their public banks’ 
average efficiency score was 0.995492 against 0.995188 for the private ones. In a study on 
the impact of new financial reforms in the banking sector adopted by Hungary in 1998 to 
privatise banks, Hasan and Marton (2003) concluded that bank reform improved X-efficiency 
scores between 1993 and 1998. Banks with higher levels of foreign ownership were 
associated with lower inefficiency, estimated at 20.96 percent compared to 24.84 percent for 
those with no form of foreign involvement. Equally, a study conducted by Kirkpatrick et al. 
(2008) on anglophone SSA, fitting a translog cost and profit function, using DFA and SFA 
found that the penetration of foreign banks in SSA anglophone countries had contributed to 
reducing cost inefficiency by about 39.1 percent. However, these studies contrast with that of 
Tahir et al. (2010) on the efficiency levels of domestic versus foreign banks in Malaysia for 




foreign counterparts. Domestic banks had a ratio cost efficiency of 88.2 percent while foreign 
ones stood at 75.5 percent. 
 
Many of these empirical studies on efficiency in the banking sector have been carried out 
either in a cross-sectional cost frontier model or in panel data cost frontier models using non-
parametric DEA specification or parametric  translog- stochastic frontier specification  (Kraft 
and Tırtıroğlu, 1998; Hasan et al., 2009). Only Greene's (2005)  study is based on effects cost 
frontier analysis. This study aims to fill this gap in the literature while at the same time 





Section 4.2 discussed a variety of techniques related to accounting-based ratios and the 
frontier approach in its different forms as well as the advantages and disadvantages 
associated with each. This section discusses the modern efficiency measurement adopted in 
this chapter, stochastic frontier analysis. It describes the data used, and provides an empirical 
formulation to estimate the cost efficiency frontier based on existing theoretical and empirical 
literature. 
The analysis of the efficiency of the commercial banking sector in Rwanda uses an effect cost 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and the sample period is 2007 to 2013. As noted earlier, 
SFA is classified among the more contemporary and widely used techniques in measuring 
efficiency among parametric approaches (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990; Fu and Heffernan, 2007; 
George Assaf, Matousek and Tsionas, 2013), and non-parametric methods such as  DEA 
(Jackson and Fethi, 2000; Mostafa, 2007; Paradi, Yang and Zhu, 2011). The study adopts the 
SFA approach because among the contemporary frontier techniques in measuring efficiency, 
SFA is the best that fits an institution’s assessment of efficiency, as it accounts for statistical 
noise (Eisenbeis, Ferrier and Kwan, 1999; Maudos, Pastor, Perez and Quesada, 2002; 
Battese, Coelli et al., 2005; Carvallo and Kasman, 2005; Fiorentino, Karmann and Koetter, 
2006; Kao and Liu, 2009). In addition, empirical evidence confirms that efficiency scores 
calculated from a non-parametric technique such as a DEA model provide low estimators of 
the true inefficiencies (Heffernan, 2005).  Berger and Humphrey (1997) have emphasized that 




of 15 percent, lower than the 28 percent for studies that have applied non-parametric 
approaches (Heffernan,  2005). Furthermore, the accounting-based ratio approach is difficult 
to apply in a rapidly changing banking industry (Yue, 1992; Berger et al., 1993; DeYoung, 
1997). DeYoung (1997) argues that the accounting efficiency ratio is not a perfect measure of 
bank cost efficiency because in its equation net revenue is a denominator, suggesting that it is 
sensitive to the structure of interest rates. He further stresses that this efficiency ratio can be 
misleading in comparing the performance of an individual bank to the performance of its 
peers that have the same characteristics (Rose and Hudgins, 2013). A comparison of the cost 
ratios of two banks can be only meaningful if both are nearly the same in terms of product 
mix, size, market conditions, and other characteristics that can affect banks’ expenses. As the 
empirical analysis in this chapter covers more than two banks, it follows that the accounting-
based ratio approach is irrelevant for this study. 
 
Furthermore, the investigation in this study adopts the intermediation approach because it has 
fewer data problems than the production approach (Ncube, 2009; Kablan, 2010; Aiello and 
Bonanno, 2013; Maredza and Ikhide, 2013). The production approach suffers from a basic 
problem related to the determination of output volumes (Freixas and Rochet, 2008). It uses 
the number of accounts opened in a given bank, the number of operations performed on these 
accounts, or the value of amounts transacted on these accounts. In terms of profit efficiency 
analysis and cost efficiency analysis, some studies give preference to cost efficiency because 
managers make an effort to minimize costs (Isik and Hassan, 2002; Maudos et al., 2002; 
Ncube, 2009). They argue that by minimizing the cost, indirectly, the profit is positively 
affected. Ncube (2009) found that South African banks improved their cost efficiency 
between 2000 and 2006 while efficiency gains on their profitability over the stated period 
were not significant. Similarly, Maudos et al.'s (2002) study of European banks reported a 
lower level of profit efficiency relative to cost efficiency. Isik and Hassan (2002) found 
similar results for Turkish banks. The mean profit efficiency was lower than the mean cost 
efficiency. 
 
The intermediation approach considers interest income and non-interest operating income as 
outputs and operating costs (price of labor, price of physical and intangible assets and price of 
interest-bearing deposits) as inputs. In addition, this approach captures real interconnections 
in the banking sector as the bank is an intermediary between savers and lenders, with funds 




and Humphrey, 1997). Moreover, the cost frontier analysis is perceived as a solution to the 
peer group problem because a given individual bank is compared to a hypothetical best 
performing bank that corresponds exactly to the bank’s individual characteristics and serves 
as a benchmark (DeYoung, 1997).  
 
The cost gives the minimum expenditure required to produce a given level of output given 
input prices. A bank is inefficient if its costs exceed the theoretical minimum of the most 
efficient bank using the same input-output combination (Heffernan, 2005; Greene, 2008). 
This signifies that the bank produces less than the maximum expected from the inputs used 
by that bank at the given level of technology. The major concern is in relation to the reaction 
of bank managers. Do bank management respond correctly to relative input prices in 
choosing inputs and outputs, aiming at minimising technical inefficiencies and hence raising 
economic efficiency? Ideally, it is expected that an efficient bank remains efficient from 
period to period, and inefficient ones improve their level of efficiency over time (Battese et 
al., 2005). It is important to note that technical inefficiency or cost inefficiency is the 
consequence of ineptness or failure to effectively utilise the inputs by the producer or employ 
a sub-optimal combination of these inputs to produce a given quantity of output (Isik and 
Hassan, 2002). 
 
Cost efficiency (see Figure 4-1) can be expressed as the ratio between the minimum threshold 
of cost of a potentially efficient bank and the cost level of an actual observed bank (Aiello 
and Bonanno, 2013). Any bank’s efficient cost must lie on or below the frontier. Deviations 
from the frontier reflect both technical inefficiency (𝑢𝑖) and allocative inefficiency (𝑣𝑖). 
Technical inefficiency refers, for example, to the over-use of inputs like expansion of staff; 
and for allocative inefficiency, to resources not allocated efficiently like a bank’s failure to 
react optimally to a vector of input prices. The higher the 𝑢𝑖 observed at a definite time, the 
more costs bank i wastes at time t to produce a given output vector (𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡), and the more 
inefficient the bank (Hassan et al., 2011). 
 
4.3.1 Model specification 
 
In the stochastic frontier model, it is necessary to assume that the bank-specific drivers of 




levels (Battese and Coelli, 1995; Greene, 2005). In these studies, effects vary across cross-
sectional units and exhibit variations over time. This approach circumvents the shortcomings 
of the assumption that inefficiency is time invariant. In reality, to assume that bank specific 
deviations are time invariant is to some extent unrealistic (Greene, 2005). There is no 
persuasive reason to suppose that bank specific deviations are time invariant, because ideally, 
it is expected that an efficient bank remains constantly efficient from period to period, and 
inefficient ones improve their level of efficiency over time (Battese et al., 2005). Bank 
specific inefficiency is thus, measured relative to the best performing bank in the sample. 
 
To estimate the cost efficient frontier, this study adopts the stochastic frontier model 
following (Battese, 1992; Battese and Coelli, 1995; Greene, 2005) which is given by the 
following equation (4.7):  
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 = (𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡) + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ……………………………………………………………………(4.7) 
where: 
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the total cost of a given bank i at period t.  
𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the vector of explanatory variables which comprise output produced by bank i at period 
t, (𝑌𝑖𝑡). These outputs include interest income (𝑦1𝑖𝑡) and non-interest income (𝑦2𝑖𝑡), and input 
prices of a given bank i at period t (𝑃𝑖𝑡) which are price of labor (PL), price of capital (PF), 
and price of funds (PF). The time trend (T) variable is incorporated in the model to account 
for Hicksian neutral technological change (Battese and Coelli, 1995). 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a vector of the banks’ specific characteristics. In this study, these relate to the type of 
ownership (foreign), government intervention either in management or in majority 
shareholding (gov), and instability in top leadership position (mgt). 
𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁 (N is the number of banks involved in the study). 
𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇 (T is the number of years covered by the study). 
𝑣𝑖𝑡 - 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡 ……………………………………………………………………………………………(4.8) 
where:  
𝑢𝑖𝑡 is a non-negative random variable associated with technical inefficiency and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 accounts 
for statistical noise, meaning that it may take any value. 𝑢𝑖𝑡 denotes a rise in the cost of 




running the bank (Isik and Hassan, 2002). In other words, management has a certain level of 
control of such costs leading to inefficiency. 𝑣𝑖𝑡 represents a temporary rise or fall in the 
banks’ cost due to unexpected or uncontrolled random shocks that may halt the smooth 
production process. Such factors include an unusually high number of equipment failures, 
power shortages, bad weather, labor strikes, war, floods, and drought that are beyond 
management’s control. This suggests that deviations from the frontier may not be entirely 
under the full control of bank management. 
We take logarithms of the variables on both sides to allow for the function to be estimated 
using linear regression techniques (Battese et al., 2005). Therefore, equation (4.7) becomes: 
𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝐿𝑛(𝑌𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡) + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ……………………………………………………… . . (4.9) 
In accordance with the assumed constraint of linear homogeneity in input prices, cost (TC), 
price of labor (PL), price of capital (PK) and price of funds (PF) are to be normalized. In this 
case, they are normalized by PL. Replacing 𝑍𝑖𝑡 by the bank’s form of ownership (foreign), 
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+ Ω𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡




 as 𝑡𝑐𝑖𝑡, 
𝑃𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
 as 𝑝𝑛𝑖𝑡, equation (4.10) becomes: 
𝑙𝑛 𝑡𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑦1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑦2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝑝1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑥𝑙𝑛𝑝2𝑖𝑡 + Ω𝑡𝑇 + 𝛿1𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 + 𝛿2𝑔𝑜𝑣 + 𝛿3𝑚𝑔𝑡
+ 𝑖𝑡  ………………………………………………………………………………… . (4.11) 
where β, α, Ω, and δ, are vectors of unknown parameters to be estimated 
ln denotes the natural logarithm, 
𝑖𝑡 is the composite error term that means 𝑖𝑡= 𝑣𝑖𝑡 - 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
In the stochastic frontier model, it is suggested that if bank i in the sample is assessed as 
being fully efficient, indicating that 𝑢𝑖=0, other banks are compared to it and not compared to 
a fixed absolute standard (Greene, 2008). The study uses the method of maximum likelihood 
to estimate parameters with assumptions of a normal truncated distribution for the 
inefficiency term. Individual values of X-inefficiencies are calculated using the following 


















𝜙 (. ) is a standard normal density function. 
 𝛷 (. ) is a standard normal cumulative density function. 




















= 𝑎𝑖𝑡.  Greene (2005) suggests rewriting equation (4.13), as follows:  




where 𝑎𝑖𝑡 = ±
𝜀𝑖𝑡𝜆
𝜎
. The sign (+) is associated with the production frontier function and (-) to 
cost frontier function. 
 
4.3.1.1. Deriving Technical Efficiency and Cost Efficiency 
 
The main or fundamental obstacle to estimating technical efficiency resides in the fact that 
the inefficient component of the model, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is not directly observable. Data and estimates 
provide only 𝑖𝑡= 𝑣𝑖𝑡 - 𝑢𝑖𝑡, through equation (4.8) while the ultimate objective is to estimate 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 that contains the bank specific heterogeneity effects. Instead, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is derived from equation 
(4.13).  
Technical efficiency for bank i at period t is defined by the equation (4.14) 




) which is under management control, attains large values, meaning λ→∞, then the 
inefficiency factor dominates the random factor (𝑣𝑖𝑡) which is beyond management control 
(Aigner, Lovell et al., 1977). In other words, if λ > 0.5, the inefficiency factor (𝑢𝑖𝑡) exceeds 
the random factor (𝑣𝑖𝑡). Similarly, deviations from the frontier can be due to technical 
inefficiency when the value of gamma (γ) that is generated from estimation of equation (4.11) 




much of the variation in the composite error term is associated with the inefficiency 
component. 
Under any of the two cases where deviations from the frontier are due to the inefficiency 
factor, Battese et al. (2005) argue that technical efficiency is closer to cost efficiency. So, a 
measure of cost efficiency for bank i at period t is derived following equation (4.15). 
𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸𝑥𝑝 (−𝑈𝑖𝑡)……………………………………………………………………………………(4.15) 
 
4.3.1.2. Prediction of Inefficiencies 
 
Following Battese and Coelli (1995), inefficiencies are defined using the equation (4.15): 
𝑈𝑖𝑡 = 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛿 + 𝑤𝑖𝑡 ………………………………………………………………………………………(4.16) 
where the random variable 𝑤𝑖𝑡, is  defined by truncation of the normal distribution with zero 
mean and variance, 𝜎2, such that the point of truncation is −𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛿, i.e., 𝑤𝑖𝑡 ≥−𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛿. These 
assumptions are said to be consistent with being a non-negative truncation of the N (𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛿,𝜎
2)-
distribution. 
The inefficiency effects for bank i at period t are defined by the equation (4.17) 
𝑈𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛 + 𝛿2𝑔𝑜𝑣 + 𝛿3𝑚𝑔𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ……………………………………………………(4.17) 
 
4.3.2 Data Description 
 
To measure commercial banks’ efficiency in Rwanda, this study uses data from audited 
financial statements of seven commercial banks that were operating in Rwanda during the 
period 2007 to 2013. These are Bank of Kigali Ltd (BK), I&BM Bank (the former Banque 
Commerciale du Rwanda Ltd, BCR), Banque Populaire du Rwanda Ltd(BPR), ECOBANK 
Ltd (former Banque du Commerce de Developpement et d’Industrie, BCDI), G-T Bank 
(formerFINABANK Ltd, and BACAR), Compagnie Générale des Banques Ltd 
(COGEBANQUE) and Access Bank Ltd (former Banque en la Confiance d’Or, BANCOR). 




As noted in Section 4.1, the study adopts an intermediation approach, which considers 
operating income as outputs and operating costs as inputs. Table 4-1 presents the summary 
statistics of the variables that are in panel settings, where: 
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡, in Rwandan francs (000 Rwf) is the total cost of a given bank i at time period t. The 
total cost is the amount of interest paid on deposits and borrowed funds plus non-interest 
operating costs. 
𝑦1𝑡, in Rwandan francs (000 Rwf), represents the total amount of interest income produced by 
a given bank i at time period t. Generally, interest income comprises interest earned on loans 
and that earned on security investments (Rose and Hudgins, 2013).  
𝑦2𝑡, in Rwandan francs (000 Rwf), represents the total amount of noninterest income 
produced by a given bank i at time period t. Noninterest income is the income that the bank 
obtains from sources other than interest income (Matthews and Thompson, 2008; Rose and 
Hudgins, 2013). These include, for example, fees earned from fiduciary activities (such as 
managing and protecting a customer’s property, managing individual and organizational 
pension and retirement plans, recordkeeping for company security transactions and 
dispensing interest and dividend payments). It also includes fees charged on deposit accounts, 
commission earned from money transfers or exchange, fees earned on loan applications, fees 
for insurance services, and fees earned from security brokerage when banks help firms to 
issue securities directly from the capital market. Equally, they incorporate net servicing fees 
from servicing real estate mortgages, credit cards, and fees from execution of bank 
acceptances letters of credit, and cheque books. MacDonald and Koch (2006) note that 
deposit service fees are the most important noninterest income and represent a stable source 
of income for the bank.  
𝑝1𝑡, is a ratio of price of capital (PK) over the price of labor (PL). The PK is the total amount 
recorded as depreciation of equipment and intangible assets of bank i at period t, divided by 
the amount of its total assets (physical and intangible). It is the cost of maintaining banks’ 
properties (Rose and Hudgins, 2013). The PL is the total expenses to compensate employees 
(wages and salaries as well as other fringe benefits) of bank i at period t, divided by the total 
number of employees. 
𝑝2𝑡, is the ratio of price of funds (PF) over the PL. The PF is the total amount spent as interest 





T: stands for the year of observation, taking values 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. 
Foreign, gov and mgt together represent a vector of observable heterogeneity effects of banks 
that are not in direct relation in the cost function structure, but that capture the banks’ specific 
characteristics. In this study, these relate to the type of ownership (foreign), government 
intervention either in management or in the form of majority shareholding (gov), and 
instability in top leadership positions (mgt). 
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the majority shareholders in bank i at 
period t are foreigners, and 0 otherwise. 
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if government is a major shareholder of 
bank i at period t, or a major government intervention occurred to prevent bankruptcy, or in 
the course of the period under study the bank was supervised directly by the Central Bank, or 
the bank has enjoyed government goodwill, and 0 otherwise. 
𝑚𝑔𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if bank i had a maximum of two Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) in office in the period covered by the study, 2007 – 2013, and 0 
otherwise. 
Table 4- 1: Summary statistics of the key variables used in the cost efficiency analysis of 
commercial banks in Rwanda, 2007 – 2013 
























































4.3.3 Interpretation of results 
 
Parameters of cost frontier as well as efficiency scores were estimated applying the method of 
maximum likelihood with panel data using the computer software Stata 13. The results are 
interpreted using cost efficiency scores which vary between 0 and 1 (Battese et al., 2005). 




efficient is the bank. Therefore, 1 refers to the best performing bank, which is at the frontier, 
while 0 refers to the worst performing bank observed in the sample. 
 
4.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
This section presents and discusses the efficiency results obtained from the frontier cost 
function estimates, the estimates ratios of cost efficiencies as well as estimates parameters of 
factors influencing cost inefficiencies of commercial banks in Rwanda, 2007- 2013 as  
reported respectively in Tables 4-2, 4-3 and 4-4. The parameter estimates of PL do not appear 
in the table because the cost and other input prices were normalised at labor price. Efficiency 
as well as inefficiency is a comparative to the best practice bank among the seven in our 
sample operating under the same conditions, not relative to best practice elsewhere, beyond 
the limits of the sample of this study. 
 
4.4.1 Cost frontier’s estimates of commercial banks in Rwanda, 2007 – 2013 
 
Table 4-2 presents the estimated parameters of the cost frontier of commercial banks in 
Rwanda, 2007 – 2013. It shows that interest income is associated with the highest cost share 
of 76 percent of the total cost compared to noninterest income which is about 10 percent. The 
reasons are related to the structure of the Rwandan banking system in which interest income 
from loans is a very important component of total income. This is common among banking 
systems in developing countries where the development of off-balance sheet operations 
generating noninterest income is still at a lower level (Rose and Hudgins, 2013).  
Input prices show that the most expensive factor of production is capital. This is in 
accordance with the theory that states that higher prices of capital lead to higher costs 
(Kablan, 2010). It is also a typical characteristic of developing countries that are constantly 
improving the working of financial institutions (Isik and Hassan, 2002). It suggests that in 
addition to the routine costs of investment in branches’ expansion, banks increase their 
spending to acquire core-banking software that is able to handle modern sophisticated 
banking operations, and equipment for automated teller machines (ATMs).  Banks also spend 
money to acquire computers, material for communications, equipment and material for new 




funds transportation. The installation of machines and other modern equipment, as well as 
training personnel to adopt such technology requires funds. The more the bank embarks on 
acquiring new technology, the more likely it is that the total cost will rise.  
Foreign owned banks’ penetration of the Rwandan banking market has a negative significant 
influence on total costs. The total cost decreased by 28 percent. This could be related to the 
fact that foreign investors may have access to low cost funds, and may also bring know-how 
in technology and modern financial management techniques as well as new tools to analyse 
banking operations, hence causing total costs to decrease (Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2001). 
Government involvement in banking activities (gov) contributes to a decrease in total cost of 
about 17 percent. This suggests that to some extent, government grants a monopoly to some 
banks to collect important demand deposits that may not even be interest bearing. In doing 
so, these banks gain room to manoeuver to increase their loans, as the ratio of total loans to 
deposits will be relaxed. The cost that the bank could have used to pay customers for 
remunerated deposits is thus reduced,  leading to a decrease in the level of total costs. 
Top management instability (mgt) was found to be a contributing factor in increasing total 
cost, though not significant. Rapid turnaround in CEOs causes total cost to increase. This 
could be due to the fact that the new CEO needs time to master the working environment of 
the bank in order to give it direction.  The replacement of a CEO may also involve payment 
of fees as a final liquidation account to the outgoing CEO. In addition, the new CEO may 
require additional benefits, all of which can increase the total costs of the bank. 
Table 4- 2: Estimated Parameters of Cost Frontier of Commercial Banks in Rwanda, 2007 – 
2013 
                                                                                                      Wald chi2 (8)    = 150.66 
Log likelihood = 53.79017                                                            Prob > chi2       = 0.0000 














































.5490186        .9748966 
-.1224898       .3204983 
.1245              .4580647 
.0043039        .2736918 
-.0267564       .0269985 
-.3851491       -.1772683 
-.3499036        .0120478 
-.2992601        .3451223 

























-.0029655        .4565889 
-.0071377        .136017 
-5.472615      -2.708252 













  .0042002       .0666532 
.3107238        .9575332 
-.0106181        .036092 
.0022323         .0057578 
***, ** and * indicate that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at 1%, 
5% and 10% level of significance. 
 
Following the estimates from Table 4-2, the important step that follows is to derive the cost 
efficiency of the banks in our sample. The value of gamma (γ) equal to 0.76 (see Table 4-2), 
which is high, as well as λ = 1.78, denote that most of the variations in the composite error 
term are attributed to the inefficiency component. Equally, the test on whether there is no 
inefficiency (𝐻𝑜: 𝛾 = 0 𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝐻1: 𝛾 > 0) given by 𝑍 =
?̃?
𝑆𝑒 (?̃?)
~ 𝑁(0,1) . 
(Aigner, Lovell et al., 1977; Battese, Coelli et al., 2005) support the above conclusion that 
the inefficiency component is the dominant source of random variation in the model. The t-
statistic (from  𝑍 =
?̃?
𝑆𝑒 (?̃?)
 ) is equals 4.20 whereas the critical value is 1.96 (from the critical 
values at 95 percent confidence level of significance in the standard normal distribution). 
Accordingly, we reject the null hypothesis that there are no inefficiency effects at 5 percent 
level of significance. Thus, the cost efficiency can be estimated using equation (4.14) in 
accordance with Battese et al. (2005). 
 
 4.4.2 Ratios of cost efficiency of commercial banks in Rwanda, 2007 – 2013 
 
Table 4-3 presents estimation results on the cost efficiency scores of commercial banks in 
Rwanda over the period 2007 – 2013. It shows that the mean cost efficiency over the period 
covered by this study is 88.56 percent. This implies that throughout the period, banks jointly 
would have needed only 88.56 percent of resources to produce the level of output that they 
produced. Consequently, about 11.44 percent of total costs were wasted relative to the bank 
on the frontier having the same inputs. Equally, cost efficiency improved from 85.43 in 2007 
to 92.32 in 2013. This is in line with the positive sign of eta, as argued by Battese et al. 
(2005). When eta (η) has a positive sign (0.06 as displayed in Table 4-2), this suggests 




mean efficiency has improved from 57.6 percent from that study to 88.56 percent in the 
current study. 
The banks’ cost efficiency scores range between 83.10 percent and 96.03 percent. For the 
bank operating at lower mean efficiency level 83.10 percent, this suggests that it wastes about 
16.90 percent of its resources relative to the best performing bank in the sample. Of the seven 
banks investigated where three are domestic owned and four are foreign owned, only three 
operate above the mean cost efficiency. Furthermore, of the top three performing banks with 
a cost efficiency score greater than the mean cost efficiency, two are foreign owned, 
suggesting that foreign owned banks are more cost efficient than domestic banks. This could 
be due to the fact that, foreign investors bring more advanced technology, have access to 
lower cost funds, and are more well-equipped with best practices in bank management. 
According to Arena (2008), foreign owned banks have better risk-management practices, 
well-balanced capitalisation, and easy access to funding from their parent banks. Even during 
times of financial distress, they have the option of relocating their deposits without involving 
capital outflows, suggesting that they are less vulnerable to crises. Likewise, Claessens et al. 
(2001) argue that the entry of foreign banks in emerging markets and less developed 
economies is associated with greater efficiency in the banking system because they influence 
domestic banks to adopt superior banking techniques and best practices. 
Table 4- 3: Estimates ratios of cost efficiencies of commercial banks in Rwanda, 2007 – 2013 
(in percentages) 
Bank 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean 
Efficiency 
Bank 1 81.50 82.30 85.06 86.66 89.12 89.87 88.07 86.08 
Bank 2 98.52 95.96 96.12 94.40 95.13 95.34 96.03 96.03 
Bank 3 88.61 87.48 81.98 91.91 94.13 95.93 96.93 91.00 
Bank 4 84.33 84.14 82.41 80.47 86.26 87.75 90.12 85.07 
Bank 5 82.64 81.59 83.25 83.62 87.19 88.76 88.91 85.14 
Bank 6 76.43 75.66 81.97 83.15 85.92 85.77 92.83 83.10 
Bank 7 85.96 94.15 95.99 97.96 97.57 90.42 92.66 93.53 
Mean 
Efficiency 
85.43 85.9 86.68 88.31 90.76 90.55 92.32 88.56 
Source: Summarized from cost frontier estimates 
Taking the annual mean cost efficiency, Figure 4-2 again shows that for five of the seven 




the mean cost efficiency of domestic owned banks, further emphasising that foreign owned 
banks are more cost efficient than domestic owned banks. 




These findings are in line with previous findings in the literature, such as those of Bonin et 
al.'s (2005) study on the impact of the privatization of banks in transition economies. Their 
findings show that foreign banks were most efficient and government-owned banks were 
least efficient. Similarly, Hasan and Marton (2003) concluded that bank reform in Hungary 
improved X-efficiency scores between 1993 and 1998. Banks with higher foreign ownership 
involvement were associated with lower inefficiency. However, the results depart from those 
of Tahir et al. (2010) that found that Malaysian domestic banks had higher cost efficiency of 
88.2 percent, compared to foreign banks at 75.5 for the period 2000 – 2006. 
The results of the inter-temporal comparison across banks are mixed. Nevertheless, for the 
sector, cost efficiency is at lower levels, in 2007 – 2009 and 2012. For the period 2007 – 
2009, there is a slight increase in the level of cost efficiency of about 1.25 percent in three 
years (85.43 percent to 86.68 percent). In 2012, the mean cost efficiency is 90.55 percent, 
dropping from 90.76 percent in 2011, but recovering to 92.32 percent in 2013. These findings 
are not surprising because the period covered by the study is a period where on the one hand, 
the global financial crisis occurred (2007–2009) that might have also affected the Rwandan 
banking sector. On the other hand, it coincides with the unexpected suspension or delay in 
budget support to Rwanda by development partners in 2012. These events might have 

















financial institutions and the sudden withdrawal of budget support to Rwanda by some 
donors, created a shortage of foreign reserves inflows to the banking sector. 
In relation to the effects of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis while low income countries 
are not well integrated in global financial markets, there were still affected in one way or 
another. The effects of the international global financial crisis of 2007–2009 in decreasing 
efficiency were also highlighted by Raphael's (2013) analysis of the bank-specific, industry-
specific, and macroeconomic determinants of bank efficiency in Tanzania for the period 2005 
– 2008. 
 
4.4.3 Factors influencing cost inefficiency of commercial banks in Rwanda, 2007- 2013 
 
In light of the observed cost efficiency, the study further investigated the factors contributing 
to cost inefficiencies in the banking sector within the seven-year period covered by the 
analysis. As highlighted earlier, the sources of cost inefficiencies are related to banks’ 
characteristics such as the type of ownership (foreign), government intervention in either in 
management or by means of majority shareholding (gov), and instability in top leadership 
(mgt).  
Table 4-4 below presents the descriptive statistics of these variables. The dependent variable 
related to inefficiencies effects (𝑢𝑖𝑡) was measured as a continuous variable. Variables such 
foreign, gov, and mgt were included as dummy variables. They were coded one respectively 
when at bank i at period t the majority of the total shareholding was foreign owned;  bank i 
had major government intervention to prevent its bankruptcy at period t or major 
shareholding/supervised directly by the Central Bank/enjoyed government good-will; or 
during the seven-year period bank i had two or more CEOs in office. These variables were 
coded zero otherwise.  
Table 4- 4: Descriptive statistics for estimated inefficiencies 
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Table 4-5 presents estimated parameters of factors influencing the cost inefficiency of 
commercial banks in Rwanda over the period 2007 – 2013. The inefficiency effects for bank i 
at period t are estimated using equation (4.17). The table shows two variables foreign and mgt 
that are significantely related to changes in cost inefficiency. The negative coefficient for 
(foreign) indicates that banks where the majority of shareholding was foreign owned were 
most likely to be less inefficient. These findings are consistent with those of (Gopalakrishnan, 
Wischnevsky and Damanpour, 2003; Qayyum and Khan, 2007). A possible explanation for 
these results is that customers want to use modern technology that is often readily provided 
by foreign owned banks. These banks also introduce modern management practices to day-
to-day operations. Such technology may include the use of ATMs, cellphone banking, 
telephone banking, internet banking, and point of sale services, among others, that have 
reduced some operating costs of banks. Using modern banking technology decreases queues 
in branches which in turn enhances bank tellers’ service delivery amd hence decreases 
inefficiency. 
The positive estimate for mgt implies that instability in top management positions such as the 
CEO position, contributes to an increase in banks’ cost inefficiency, indicating a plausible 
positive link between management stability in a bank and efficiency. The gov variable has a 
negative effect on cost inefficiency, albeit statistically insignificant. 
Table 4- 5: Estimates parameters of factors influencing cost inefficiencies of commercial 
banks in Rwanda, 2007- 2013 
Stoc. Frontier normal/truncated-normal model                                                                                                             
                                                                                                 Wald chi2 (3) = 45.25 
Log likelihood    = 78.792591                                                     Prob > chi2 = 0.0000   





















-.068324       -.002638 
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4.60034 
1.441631 
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-4.19 
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-9.074919       8.958081 
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  .0001412      .040193 
5.96e-88     1.000000 
-.006687       .0067554 
.0014147      .0032819 
***, ** and * indicate that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at 1%, 





Even though the variable gov is not statistically significant, the joint effects of the three 
variables on inefficiencies in cost setting is statistically significant. The study tested the 
hypothesis that coefficients of the three regressors are all zero, implying that there are no 
interaction effects (δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = 0). The test statistic, which is 45.25, has a p-value = 
0.0000 < 0.05. Accordingly, the null hypothesis is strongly rejected at all levels of 
significance, suggesting that the joint effect of the three explanatory variables is statistically 
significant even though the individual effects of one variable may be statistically 
insignificant. 
 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter assessed the efficiency of commercial banks in Rwanda for the period 2007–
2013. The measure of banks’ efficiency provides information on the financial robustness of 
such institutions to use limited inputs efficiently to produce financial services and products. 
This assessment will be useful to different stakeholders in Rwanda’s commercial banking 
sector. The highlighted efficiency measures can help commercial bank managers and 
shareholders to make rational decisions. Depositors will also be more convinced of the 
soundness of the institutions where they keep their financial assets (cash, term deposits) if 
they are aware of the extent, to which these institutions are efficient. Shareholders expect 
dividends and business continuity, while regulators can use the results to inform policy 
formulation (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Managers can improve their way of handling 
business by adopting the good practices of a highly efficient bank. 
The study’s findings reveal that the banking sector in Rwanda displays a mean cost efficiency 
of 88.56 percent, suggesting that banks would jointly have utilized only 88.56 percent of 
resources to produce the level of output achieved. This implies that about 11.44 percent of 
total costs were wasted relative to the bank on the frontier with the same inputs. The study 
also finds inefficiencies to be statistically and significantly decreasing over time with the 
entry of foreign banks in the Rwandan banking sector. Furthermore, it finds further 
inefficiencies relating to the turnover of CEOs to be statistically and significantly increasing. 
Based on these findings, it is recommended that banks’ shareholders should always work to 
reduce the turnover of top management officials. Since the entry of foreign banks in the 




inefficiency, the Rwandan government should continue to adopt incentives to attract more 
foreign banks.  
However, the results displayed in this chapter should be treated with caution because the 
bank that appears to be closer to the frontier may not necessarily be better than other banks in 
the sample. It might have achieved such performance at the cost of an increase in non-
performing assets. Further research could target UMURENGE SACCOs that are present in 
all 416 administrative sectors of the country. Assessing their efficiency is of great 
importance, as they are closer to the population, and it can be assumed that their efficiency 


















MICROECONOMIC FACTORS INFLUENCING NON-PERFORMING 
LOANS IN RWANDA 
 
5. 1 Introduction 
 
Chapter one noted that achieving sustainable economic growth via financing the private 
sector requires a safe and sound financial sector that efficiently allocates scare resources to 
productive projects. The finding in Chapter three, that the relationship between financial 
sector development and output growth is supply-leading in Rwanda suggests that, by 
developing the financial sector, more finance could be expected to go to the private sector 
that is involved in productive activities, thus promoting output growth. In chapter four, the 
efficiency of Rwanda’s banking sector was estimated at 88.54 percent. Thus, while this sector 
is not fully efficient, it displays a good indicator of cost efficiency. However, the factors that 
threaten the performance of the financial sector in general, and of the banking sector in 
particular, such as NPLs have not yet been explored, which is the raison d’être of this 
chapter. 
A loan is said to be nonperforming if at least one of the following two elements applies: First, 
there is non-payment of the principal or interest for a period of 90 days or more. Second, the 
loan or the borrower exhibit weaknesses such as the borrower’s business suffering economic 
or financial deterioration (MacDonald and Koch, 2006; Barisitz, 2011). The loan amount 
recorded as nonperforming is the gross value recorded on the bank’s balance sheet, and not 
the overdue amount comprising of the instalment on the principal and the interest. The ratio 
of NPLs is the proportion of the total value of a loan portfolio (before the deduction of loss-
loan provisions) to the total loan portfolio of the bank. 
While the level of NPLs in Rwanda has been decreasing over time (from 74.1 percent in 2001 
to 7 percent in 2013), it is still relatively high compared to its peers in the EAC and at 
international level. From international standards, a bank is considered healthy if it records a 
maximum rate of NPLs ranging between 1 percent and 3 percent (Heffernan, 2005). Except 
for Burundi, Rwanda still records higher levels of NPLs than its EAC peers. For example, for 




figures for other EAC members were 4.25 percent for Uganda; 4.87 percent for Kenya; 5.85 
percent for Tanzania; and 9.08 percent for Burundi (World Bank, 2014). Thus, determining 
the factors that explain the variation in the level of NPLs in Rwanda’s banking sector is 
crucial. 
A number of factors have been identified that contribute to the level of NPLs. Some studies 
have pointed to macroeconomic factors (Festić, Kavkler and Repina, 2011; Vogiazas and 
Nikolaidou, 2011; Saba, Kouser and Azeem, 2012; Badar, Javid and Zulfiquar, 2013; Beck, 
Jakubik and Piloiu, 2013). Others have reported macroeconomic factors and bank specific 
characteristics (Männasoo and Mayes, 2009; Dash and Kabra, 2010), while yet other studies 
have focused solely on specific banks’ characteristics (Olokoyo, 2011; Biabani, Gilaninia and 
Mohaba, 2012; Ali, 2013). A limited number of studies have integrated borrowers, business 
type and loan characteristics in relation to NPLs (Roslan and Karim, 2009; Mokhtar, Nartea 
and Gan, 2012). However, while there is a growing literature on NPLs, their causes, and the 
effects on the economy, little attention has been paid to the borrower and some other features 
of loans such as type of business and loan conditions. The borrower is a key player in the 
borrowing-lending process. He/she can either divert the loan due to moral hazard behavior or 
may willfully refuse to repay. Business sectors and loan conditions also matter in this 
process. Some sectors may be riskier than others and some loan terms can also be a source of 
default. 
These factors relating to borrower, loan type and conditions influencing NPLs have not been 
extensively discussed in the banking literature, especially in emerging and less developed 
countries, although the banking sector is an important component of the financial sector in 
these countries. A few studies such as those by Mokhtar et al. (2012) and Roslan and Karim 
(2009) have examined micro-lending in Malaysia, but ignored the banking sector. 
In view of the foregoing discussion, this chapter investigates the influence of borrowers’ 
characteristics, business characteristics and loan characteristics on the level of NPLs in the 
banking sector in Rwanda. The study contributes to the literature as these factors were 
neglected in previous studies despite the fact that the banking sector represents the largest 
component of the financial sector. On the other hand, the study uses the banking sector in 
Rwanda as a case, where economic research is in its early stages. It will thus serve as a 




The findings indicate that across institutions, the relationship between repayment period and 
NPLs is negative, suggesting that the longer the repayment period, the more likely that the 
level of NPLs will be lower. Put differently, an extension of the loan repayment period can 
reduce the level of NPLs given that it decreases the stress of the borrower in meeting loan 
repayment obligations. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 presents the effects of NPLs to the 
economy; Section 5.3 discusses Factors influencing NPLs in Banking, Section 5.4 describes the 
methodology used in this chapter, Section 5.5 presents and discusses the results; and Section 
5.6 provides concluding remarks. 
 
5.2 Effects of Non-Performing Loans on the economy  
 
There has been renewed interest in the issue of NPLs among researchers due to its influence 
on banks’ lending and profitability as well as the performance of the economy. NPLs give 
rise to loss-loan provisions that decrease banks’ profits and hence their dividends to 
shareholders (Fofack, 2005). They also disturb the flow of credit to borrowers, as funds 
loaned out are not paid back, either in full or in part. Consequently, NPLs contribute to a 
decrease in investment and/or consumption (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). NPLs 
are also among the signals of banks’ failure and can affect macroeconomic performance 
(Freixas and Rochet, 2008; Waweru and Kalani, 2009). It is argued that banking crises can 
also drive firms, including viable banks, into bankruptcy because borrowers are unable to 
service their debt. Therefore, banks’ assets drop in value leading to insolvency that ends in 
banking crises. 
The literature has argued that deposit insurance should prevent banking crises as it protects 
depositors in the advent of bank runs or bank failure (MacDonald and Koch, 2006). 
Depositors that are fully covered by deposit insurance will not care about the selection of a 
bank when making regular deposits because they are assured of getting their money back 
should the bank fail or become insolvent. However, empirical evidence has shown the 
opposite; instead of preventing the failure of banks, deposit insurance has been a source of 
moral hazard in the banking industry that leads to banking instability (see Chang and 
Velasco, 2001; Green and Lin, 2003; Ngalawa, Tchana and Viegi, 2016). The presence of 




borrowers with high-risk projects, as they are assured cover for depositors in the advent of 
bank failure (Kane, 1989; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Mankiw, 2011; Casu et al., 
2015). This free riding behavior led to an accumulation of NPLs. 
In addition, the evidence indicates that NPLs have served as warning sign of several banking 
and financial crises (Yang, 2003; Ahmad and Bashir, 2013). The banking distress in France 
and Scandinavian countries in the early 1990s, the Asian crisis of 1997 which began in 
Thailand,  first as currency crisis where the Thailand’s currency, the Thai baht underwent 
massive devaluations, and later escalated into financial crisis, and the global financial crisis 
of 2007–2009, are among recent examples. 
Matthews and Thompson (2008) report that NPLs were among key drivers of banking 
distress in France and Scandinavian countries. In 1994, France recorded a level of 8.9 percent 
of total loans as NPLs. The French government decided on a rescue package for Credit 
Lyonnais amounting to US$ 27 billion. Equally, following a liquidity crisis in 1991, the 
Scandinavian bank crisis of 1991– 1992 cost about US$ 16 billion.  In Finland, NPLs reached 
13 percent of total bank loans in 1992. Substantial losses and insolvency in Norway led to a 
banking crisis in 1991 in which 6 percent of commercial bank loans were non-performing. In 
Sweden, 18 percent of total bank loans were reported lost between 1990 and 1993, and the 
Swedish government assisted the main banks to avert their failure. 
Yang's (2003) study on the connection between the Asian financial crisis and the level of 
NPLs in Taiwan, found that the rates of NPLs steadily increased from 1996, as a precursor of 
the 1997 crisis. The ratio of NPLs was reported to be above 6 percent, which is relatively 
high by international standards (1 to 3 percent). The same trend was observed in other 
countries in the region, and worsened during the crisis (Heffernan, 2005). From 1996 to 1999, 
the rates of NPLs varied from 3.9 percent to 9 percent in Malaysia; 4.1 percent to 6.2 percent 
in South Korea; 8.8 percent to 37 percent in Indonesia, and 7.7 percent to 38.6 percent in 
Thailand. Similarly, Arena (2008) shows that banks’ asset quality contributed significantly to 
the probability of bank failure in the 1997 East Asian financial crisis and that of Latin 
America from 1994 to 1995. In East Asia, 69.74 percent of failed financial institutions had a 
problem of NPLs while the figure stood at 55.46 percent in Latin America. This indicates that 
generally, banks with lower asset quality had a higher likelihood of failure than those that 
were stronger; with a lower level of NPLs. The majority of banks that failed were those with 




Subsequent to the increase in the level of NPLs in Thailand, the intermediation role of banks 
declined, implying that businesses shifted to other non-bank financing sources such as 
corporate bond issues or simply their retained earnings (Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul, 2003). 
During this time of financial troubles, the systemic macroeconomic and liquidity shocks that 
were additional factors that triggered the crises, not only destabilized the weak banks, but by 
contagion even the well capitalized and strong banks were affected in one way or another 
(Arena, 2008). 
It was also reported that the global financial crisis which started in the US was prompted by 
borrowers defaulting on sub-prime mortgages loans (Adebola, Sulaiman and Dalahan, 2011). 
The persistent effects of such bad loans and uncertainty about the health of financial 
institutions prolonged the crisis and depressed economic growth in many countries. The 
economic fallout of 2007–2009 highlights how a financial crisis can increase damage to the 
global economy (Stojković, 2013). Many business owners closed their companies, and retired 
people’s savings plummeted. Millions of families lost their homes and their wealth. Around 
the world, about 30 million workers lost their jobs (Claessens, Kose, Laeven and Valencia, 
2014). 
In the US, the problems relating to the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 can be compared 
with those of the Great Depression of 1929. During the Great Depression, real output fell by 
an estimated 27 percent while unemployment rose from 3 percent in 1929 to 25 percent by 
1933. There were approximately 30,000 banks in 1920 but this declined to 15,000 in 1933, 
and more than 9,000 banks closed between 1930 and 1933 causing huge losses to depositors 
and shareholders estimated at about US$ 2.5 billion (Sexton, 2008; Mankiw, 2011). Banks in 
rural areas closed due to large levels of NPLs among farmers, who were not able to pay on 
time due to low prices on farm’s products. 
In addition, NPLs affect banks and other deposit-taking institutions by reducing profits due to 
loan loss provisions, thus affecting the payment of dividends to shareholders. They also 
reduce institutions’ lending capacity, hence placing a limit on the expansion of credit, that 
indirectly affects economic growth (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). An increase in NPLs leads 
to additional costs among all financial intermediaries in the process of loan recovery. These 
include telephone calls, visiting borrowers who encounter repayment problems, and the legal 
costs associated with the process of foreclosure of the collateral pledged by borrowers when 




spend additional funds in trying to recover bad loans. While the factors contributing to 
increased NPLs are both exogenous and endogenous to the bank, this chapter focuses on 
endogenous factors that make a greater contribution to the change in the level of  NPLs in the 
Rwandan banking sector, and which are under the control of the management of banks, 
suggesting that they can be reduced or eliminated.   
 
5.3 Factors influencing Non-Performing Loans in the Banking Sector 
 
Previous studies have attributed the proliferation of NPLs to macroeconomic fundamentals  
separately or in conjunction with bank specific characteristics (Frye, 2000; Louzis, Vouldis 
and Metaxas, 2012; Orenge, 2013), poor management of financial intermediaries (Rottke and 
Gentgen, 2008; Adeyemi, 2011; Louzis et al., 2012), and poor supervision (Boudriga, Boulila 
and Jellouli, 2009; Beck, Levine and Levkov, 2010; Levine, 2012). Very few studies relate 
NPLs to specific borrowers’ as well as loan characteristics (Bhatt and Tang, 2002; Chaudhary 
and Ishfaq, 2003; Brehanu and Fufa, 2008). 
Loan quality and macroeconomic variables are closely connected to the phases of expansion 
and contraction of the business cycle. During economic booms, investors are optimistic 
regarding potential returns on new projects, and they apply for more credit to invest in 
targeted projects. The level of NPLs is lower because the high and regular revenue of 
borrowers provide them with assured means to meet their credit obligations. Conversely, 
banks and other deposit taking institutions grant loans even to low quality borrowers. In 
contrast, during an ongoing period of contraction, investors are hesitant to invest in new 
projects. Households postpone some consumption decisions. Consequently, banks hold back 
on lending decisions because borrowers are experiencing a shortage of revenue. Banks are 
cautious to raise the amount of loans as they fear they will not be repaid (Sexton, 2008). They 
tend to be selective in granting new loans. In such circumstances, bad loans are likely to have 
soared during the boom period because banks significantly increased the amount of loans. 
Some of these loans become non-performing during the recession period, therefore increasing 
the level of NPLs. 
Investigating the explanatory power of macroeconomic variables as determinants of NPLs 
using Pakistan banking data, Ahmad and Bashir (2013) found that GDP growth, interest rates, 
inflation, the Consumer Price Index (CPI), exports and industrial production, are significant 




concluded that factors such as unemployment, real effective exchange rate and foreign direct 
investment did not contribute to the level of NPLs in Pakistan. Gerlach, Peng and Shu (2005) 
fitted a regression analysis using Hong Kong data for the period 1995–2002 to examine the 
relationship between a set of variables that included economic growth, interest rates, 
inflation, the change in property prices, asset size and sector concentration in lending and 
NPLs. Their findings suggest that an increase in interest rates led to an increase in NPLs 
ratio, whereas increases in economic growth, inflation, and change in property prices, 
negatively affected the level of NPLs. 
Although most studies do not necessarily adopt the same variables, many have concluded that 
a relationship exists between a combined set of macroeconomic variables and bank specific 
characteristics and the level of NPLs. Salas and Saurina (2002) combined macroeconomic 
and microeconomic variables to explain aggregate the NPLs of Spanish commercial and 
savings banks for the period 1985–1987. They found that bank-specific determinants such as 
bank size, market power, and capital structure could serve as precursor indicators for 
increases in NPLs. Variables such as real GDP growth, bank size, market power, and rapid 
credit expansion and capital ratio explain fluctuations in NPLs. 
Louzis et al. (2012) employed a dynamic panel data method on data from banks in Greece for 
the period 2003 – 2009 to test the validity of seven bank specific hypotheses on NPLs. The 
study found that variables such as GDP, interest rates, and unemployment have a significant 
impact in explaining variations in NPLs. However, using a regression analysis to investigate 
the determinants of NPLs in Indian commercial banks for the period 1999 – 2009, Dash and 
Kabra's (2010) findings suggest that only the real exchange rate has a significant impact on 
NPLs. The remaining variables (GDP growth rate, real interest rate, inflation, loans to total 
assets ratio, bank size and growth in loans) were found to be insignificantly associated with 
NPLs. Sinkey Jr and Greenawalt (1991) applied a log-linear regression to assess the factors 
underlying loan-losses in US large commercial banks for the period 1984 – 1987. The study 
concluded that risks that ended up in loan-losses occurred as a result of external factors 
related to the economic environment, or to internal factors such as poor managerial decisions 
in granting loans or both. Their results suggest that loan-loss rates in 1987 were positively 
correlated with loan rates, volatile funds, and the amount of outstanding loans granted in the 




Some studies have also targeted a panel of countries. Babihuga (2007) used a pooled 
regression on 96 countries for the period 1998–2005 to investigate the linkages between 
financial stability indicators and macroeconomic variables. The study regressed NPLs against 
the quality of banking sector regulations and supervision, business cycle components of GDP, 
terms of trade, lending rates, unemployment, inflation and real effective exchange rates. The 
results indicate that terms of trade, quality of regulatory supervision, and a boom in the 
business cycle led to reduced NPLs. Other factors such as high inflation, lending rates, the 
unemployment rate, and depreciation of the real exchange rate did not influence changes in 
the level of NPLs. 
Empirical findings also postulate that there is interaction among NPLs and attributes such as 
borrower characteristics and loans terms. Keeton (1999) investigated the influence of loan 
delinquencies and credit growth on NPLs, using data from US banks over the period 1982 – 
1996. Applying a VAR model for analysis, the findings show a highly significant relationship 
between loan losses and credit growth. Further, he argued that in few states in the US, high 
loan losses are primarily associated with weak credit terms and the standards of the banks. 
Berger and DeYoung (1997) focused on the links between bank-specific characteristics, 
efficiency indicators, and the problem of non-performing loans. They formulated possible 
channels through which certain factors, namely, ‘bad luck’, ‘bad management’, ‘skimping’, 
and ‘moral hazard’, relate to banking efficiency and capital adequacy. They tested the derived 
hypotheses for a sample of US commercial banks spanning the period 1985 to 1994 and 
concluded that the level of NPLs was generally associated with measured cost efficiency. 
Low cost efficiency was positively related with increases in future NPLs. 
‘Bad management’ refers to mismanagement that may involve weak assessment of the loan 
application, undervaluation of the pledged collateral, and poor monitoring of the allocation of 
borrowed funds, as well as the borrower’s ongoing business. Podpiera and Weill (2008) 
provided strong support for the bad management hypothesis in a study investigating the 
influence of bad luck or bad management on NPLs using data from a panel of Czech 
Republic banks for the period 1994 – 2005. They argued that bad managers do not pay 
attention to monitoring loan portfolios, leading to an increase in NPLs. Louzis et al.'s (2012) 
study examined mortgage and consumer loans that became nonperforming and provided 
further evidence of the bad management hypothesis. This suggests that the effect of 
management quality is mainly reflected in the efficiency of credit granting procedures, where 




or simply because of a corrupt environment. Bad managers do not adequately monitor loan 
portfolios (Podpiera and Weill, 2008). The authors add that bad loans incur additional costs 
related to monitoring the defaulting borrower such as telephone calls, visits to the borrower, 
and seizing and disposing of the pledged collateral. Imprudent management is argued to have 
been the major driver of banks’ failure in the US between 1920 and 1933 (Sexton, 2008). 
Moral hazard, on the other hand, is explained by deliberate decisions of managers to finance 
high-risk, high-return projects when their banks are delicately capitalised. This moral hazard 
behaviour causes an increase in NPLs because in high-risk projects, the rate of pay back of 
borrowed money is very low. With regard to the bad luck hypothesis, unpredictable external 
factors are blamed for NPLs. These include factors such as floods and drought or economic 
recession that could lead to borrowers’ inability to fulfil their payment obligations. The 
skimping hypothesis refers to a trade-off between short operating costs and future loan 
performance. Under this hypothesis, bank managers devote less effort to ensuring higher loan 
quality in the short-run, aiming to minimise resources, albeit at the expense of a higher level  
of NPLs in the long-run (Hughes and Mester, 1993). It suggests that bank managers allocate 
less resources in initial credit assessment and continual monitoring. 
Turning to bank size, Salas and Saurina (2002) agree with HU, Li and Chiu (2004), among 
others, that bank size is likely to contribute to the reduction of NPLs. Salas and Saurina 
(2002) report a negative relationship between bank size and NPLs. They argued that a bigger 
size allows for more diversification opportunities, hence reducing NPLs. Similarly, HU et al. 
(2004) argue that large-sized banks have enhanced capabilities for loan evaluation and 
processing due to their ability to devote more resources to the whole process prior to granting 
the loan and subsequently in monitoring. In the same vein, Arena (2008) found that total 
assets which are a proxy for the size of a bank are relevant in allowing a diversified portfolio 
and consequently reducing countries’ asset risks during financial crises as was the case in 
East Asia in 1997 and Latin America in 1994 –1995. Similarly, Sexton (2008) found that the 
small size of banks in the US was among the factors that triggered their failure between 1930 
and 1933. However,  Louzis et al.'s (2012) findings rejected the diversification hypothesis 
related to bank size affecting the level of NPLs. They argue that the size variable may not 
fully capture diversification even if non-interest income is used as a proxy for diversification. 




With regard to the relationship between macroeconomic and bank specific characteristics and 
NPLs, a number of studies have focused on the influence of borrowers’ attributes and loan 
terms on NPLs. Louzis et al.'s (2012) empirical results suggest that the quantitative effects of 
the various determinants of NPLs depend on the type of loans. A consumer loan was the most 
sensitive to a change in lending interest rates while mortgage loans were not significantly 
affected by macroeconomic fundamentals. 
With respect to macroeconomic fundamentals, the ratio of business loans to GDP growth as 
well as unemployment had a significant effect on NPLs. 
A number of studies have been conducted on the relationship between microcredit and NPLs. 
Mokhtar et al.'s (2012) study on the determinants of microcredit loans repayment among 
microfinance borrowers in Malaysia focused on two important microfinance institutions 
involved in microcredit programmes, namely, Yasasan Usaha Maju (YUM) and an Economic 
Fund for National Entrepreneurs Group called TEKUN. They applied a logistic regression 
model. The findings reveal that age, gender, type of business, mode of repayment, and 
repayment amount contribute to loan repayment problems among TEKUN and YUM 
borrowers. Along the same lines Brehanu and Fufa's (2008) study on the determinants of 
repayment performance among small-scale farmers in Ethiopia using probit and logit 
regressions found that borrowers who own large farms, are located in high rainfall regions, 
and have a considerable number of livestock were most likely to be able to repay back their 
loans. Loans to this group of borrowers are most likely to increase the farmers’ productivity 
and income. They also found that additional business income earned by a farmer was a good 
predictor of repayment performance. In addition, they found that gender matters, with male 
borrowers have a higher probability of default (Roslan and Karim, 2009; Mokhtar et al., 
2012).  
The study also established that repayment period matters. An investigation of microcredit 
loan repayment behaviour in AgoBank Malaysia by Roslan and Karim (2009) found that 
male borrowers and borrowers with a long repayment period had a higher probability of 
defaulting. Furthermore, borrowers involved in non-production business activities such as the 
services or support sectors that had undergone training in their particular business, and had 
borrowed higher amounts had lower probabilities of defaulting. These findings suggest that 




wants to undertake, the higher the probability of success, and if he/she contracts a loan, the 
probability of default is lower. 
To limit moral hazard behaviour, some financial institutions grant loans in inputs instead of 
providing funds. Okorie (1986) studied repayment behaviour in an agricultural corporation in 
Nigeria. He found that borrowers who received a loan in kind (seed, fertilisers and 
equipment) had a lower probability of default relative to those who received a cash loan. The 
explanation lies in the fact that some borrowers misused the cash received, diverting it to 
their own consumption instead of allocating it to the real motive for borrowing, that is, a 
productive project. 
Several studies also suggest a significant relationship between repayment rates and 
educational level. Chaudhary and Ishfaq (2003) examined the credit worthiness of 224 rural 
borrowers in Pakistan. Applying a logistic regression model, they found that borrowers with 
higher educational levels, that were involved in a non-farm business activity, were using the 
loan for investment, and were female, had a higher probability of repaying their loans. 
Similarly, Bhatt and Tang's (2002) study on the determinants of loan repayments in 
microcredit programmes in the US found that higher educational level was significantly and 
positively related to better repayment performance. Unlike the previous studies, they found 
that female borrowers, level of household income, type of business and borrower’s 
experience had no significant effect on repayment behaviour. 
Beyond the financial sector, researchers have also studied the underlying factors responsible 
for the defaulting behaviour of households. Their findings add value to this research as they 
investigate the common problem of defaulting. Canner and Luckett (1990) fitted a logistic 
regression to assess the determinants of households’ loan repayment performance. Their 
results suggest that the marital status of the household head is significantly related to a 
household’s repayment performance. Households with married and single heads had a higher 
probability of not missing a payment or making a late repayment than separated or divorced 
adults, all other things remaining constant. Lawrence's (1995) investigation of how a default 
option changes the standard implications of the life model concluded that low-income 
borrowers have a higher average probability of default, which probably explains why they 
pay higher interest rates than high-income borrowers do. Canner, Luckett, Cook and 
Middleton (1991) reported that US households’ difficulty in making loan repayments was 




as whether or not the borrower owns a home were also influencing factors. The study, which 
covered a sample of 1 534 families, was commissioned by the Federal Reserve Board in the 
US to obtain information on consumer debt in the 1980s with a view to ascertaining how a 




This section discusses the model specification and methods used to investigate 
microeconomic factors that influence non-performing loans in the Rwandan banking sector. It 
sets the model, the logistic model that is appropriate with the categorical nature of the 
dependent variable used in this study, the non-performing loan. It defines the variables 
included in the model, the estimation technique that the study applies and highlights the way 
that results are interpreted. 
 
5.4.1 Model Specification 
 
Due to the categorical nature of our dependent variable, that is the probability that a given 
loan is non-performing, this study uses the logistic regression model (Wooldridge, 2006). 
Estimated parameters will be obtained by applying the maximum likelihood technique 
following (Taktak, Shabou and Dumontier, 2010; Khieu, Mullineaux and Yi, 2012). 
The binary response model lies primarily in the response probability as given by: 
𝑃{𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖} = 𝐺 (𝑋𝑖 , 𝛽)……………………………………………………………………………… (5.1) 
where:  
𝑌𝑖: stands for a non-performing loan that is the amount overdue not paid in full or in part for a 
period equal to 90 days and above.  
𝑋𝑖: is a 𝑘𝑥1 vector of explanatory variables that include borrowers’ characteristics, business 
characteristics and loan characteristics. These characteristics are Gender, Age, Marital status, 
Business type, Number of dependents of the borrower, and Repayment period. 




Equation (5.1) states that the probability of having a non-performing loan depends on the 
vector 𝑋𝑖 containing individual characteristics. 
G (.)  is a specified parametric function  of  𝑋𝑖
′𝛽   which is usually a cumulative distribution 
function taking on values strictly between zero and one (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). 






……………………………………………………………………… . . (5.2) 
Due to data unavailability, this study uses only six explanatory variables. 
𝑋1 stands for gender, 
𝑋2  stands for age, 
𝑋3  stands for marital status, 
𝑋4  stands for business type, 
𝑋5  stands for repayment period, 
𝑋6  stands for number of dependents of the borrower. 
 
In the interpretation of estimation results, one does not think in terms of the measures of the 
dependent variable and explanatory variables, but rather in terms of the association between 
the variables. Coefficients from a Logit model are interpreted like OLS coefficients except 
that a logit model refers to probabilities. Coefficients represent a change in the logit for each 
unit change in the predictor. The direction of the effect of the predictor variable, say signs 
and significance, is more important because the sign of the effect is the same as the 
coefficient of the predictor (Verbeek, 2008; Cameron and Trivedi, 2010).  In this chapter, the 
interpretation of the parameter estimates 𝛽𝑘 is done through marginal effects.  
It is postulated that the marginal effect measures how the dependent variable responds to a 
change in one of the regressors, 𝑋𝑘, after controlling for other variables in the model 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). The effect of a change in 𝑋𝑘 on 𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1) depends on the 
values of all X variables. This study adopts the average of marginal effect (AME) because it 
has been proven to be more realistic than other marginal effect measures, namely, marginal 
effect at mean (ME 𝑋 = ?̅?) or marginal effect at a representative value (ME at 𝑋=𝑋∗) as 
argued by Cameron and Trivedi (2010). The reality is that, no person who can actually have 
mean values on all 𝑋𝑠. For example, nobody can be 23.18 years old, and be 2.5 percent black 




The AME is computed as a sample-weighted average of the marginal effect for each 
individual case (𝑋 = 𝑋𝑖). In other words, a marginal effect is computed for each case, and 
then all computed effects are averaged.   
For continuous independent variables, the marginal effect measures the change in 𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1)  
as  𝑋𝑘 increases by one, keeping all other variables fixed (Verbeek, 2008). The impact of a 





′𝛽}𝛽𝑘 ……………………………………………………………………………… . (5.3)  
Marginal effects for categorical variables illustrate how 𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1) is predicted to change 
following a change in 𝑋𝑘 from 0 to 1, holding other 𝑋𝑠 constant, as expressed in equation 
(5.4). 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑋𝑘 = Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝑋, 𝑋𝑘 = 1) − Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝑋, 𝑋𝑘 = 0)………………………… . (5.4) 
Alongside the marginal effect approach, the parameter estimates 𝛽𝑘 can also be interpreted as 
additive effects on the log of the odds for a unit change in the 𝑘𝑡ℎ explanatory variable. For a 
unit change in 𝑋𝑘, the odds are expected to change by a factor exp (?̂?𝑘), holding the 
remaining variables constant (Alonso-Rodríguez, 2001). The quantity representing the 
percentage change in the odds, for a unit change in 𝑋𝑘, is given by 100 (𝑒
?̂?𝑘 − 1). In this 
study, however, this approach is not used. 
To measure the accuracy with which the estimated model for the Bank of Kigali Limited and 
Unguka Bank Limited approximate their data, this study uses the percentage of correctly 
predicted. The rationale for the adoption of this measure is that it is widely used to measure 
the goodness-of-fit for binary dependent variables (Wooldridge, 2006; Verbeek, 2008; 
Cameron and Trivedi, 2010).  This measure consists of comparing the predicted outcomes 
with actual outcomes based on the fitted probability of loans being non-performing 
(𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑠 ̂ =1) or not 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑠 ̂ =0. It is associated with a symmetric loss function where 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑠 ̂ =1 if 
F(𝑥′𝛽)> 0.5 and 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑠 ̂ =0 if F(𝑥′𝛽) ≤ 0.5. Therefore, observations of correctly classified 






5.4.2 Data and Variables 
 
Empirical analysis in this chapter covers two consecutive years, 2012 and 2013, for the two 
banks in the sample and one more year, 2014 for Unguka Bank Ltd, for purposes of a 
robustness check. Among the data used is defaulting borrowers’ information, which is 
sensitive in nature due to the privacy rule on customer information in the banking sector. In 
conducting this research, the idea was to cover the whole banking sector in Rwanda. 
However, due to the reluctance of most banks to share their customer information even for 
research purposes, only two banks that responded positively are covered. These are the Bank 
of Kigali Limited (a commercial bank) and Unguka Bank Limited (a microfinance bank). 
Fortunately, these two banks are the largest in the subsets of commercial banks and 
microfinance banks. The two set of banks (commercial banks and microfinance banks) 
represent more than 83.62 percent of banking services in Rwanda (Banque of Kigali [BK], 
2013; BNR, 2013). 
In 2013, the Bank of Kigali Limited had about 33.8 percent of the market share in the 
Rwandan banking sector, where 81 percent of the players are commercial banks. The nine 
remaining banks shared 47.2 percent. On the other hand, Unguka Bank Limited had 1.01 
percent of the market share out of 2.62 percent combined market share of the three 
microfinance banks in the Rwandan banking sector. The two remaining microfinance banks, 
Urwego Opportunity Bank Limited and Agaseke Bank Limited shared 1.61 percent market 
share, respectively in the proportion of 0.98 percent and 0.63 percent. 
Besides the impressive market share of the two banks vis-à-vis their peers, a recent survey 
conducted by the Association of Microfinance Institutions in Rwanda (AMIR) showed that  
these two banks are among the financial institutions that are well known to the public as 
saving institutions of choice ( Association of Microfinance Institutions in Rwanda [AMIR], 
2015). The survey revealed that Bank of Kigali Limited and Unguka Bank Limited were 
among the top four banks that are known to customers as saving institutions for their 
deposits. Seventeen percent of the participants’ stated that the Bank of Kigali Limited was 
their bank of choice, placing it in second position after BPR Limited at 20 percent. Equity 
Bank Limited was third with 10 percent of respondents. On the other hands, Unguka Bank 
Limited was affirmed by 7 percent of the respondents as their bank of choice, ahead of the 
other two microfinance banks, Urwego Opportunity Bank Limited and Agaseke Bank 




Therefore, based on the foregoing discussion, while there were constraints to accessing data 
for many institutions, by accessing data from the two biggest banks covering the two 
categories of banks that are profit oriented, it can safely be argued that the two financial 
intermediaries fairly represent their peer institutions. Thus, the factors that will be found to 
influence NPLs in the two banks can be reasonably generalized to the whole banking sector 
in Rwanda. 
Based on the available data, the study uses a set of variables such as borrowers’ 
characteristics (Gender, Age, and Marital status, the number of dependents of the borrower), 
business characteristics (type of loan), and some loan characteristics (repayment period). The 
dependent variable, NPLs is a dichotomous variable. It takes a value of “1” if the borrower 
delays payment of the principal or interest for a period of 90 days or more (Barisitz, 2011), 
and “0” otherwise (meaning the borrower delays payment of the principal or interest for a 
period between one day and 89 days). The independent variables are gender (gender), age 
(age), marital status (maritast), business type with different variants that include consumer 
loan (consl), mortgage loan (mortgl), overdraft, treasury loan (tresl), equipment loan (equipl), 
agricultural loan (agriculture), commercial loan (commerce), construction loan 
(construction), transport loan (transport), repayment period (repperiod), and the number of 
dependents of the borrower (depend). Some variables like age, marital status, and business 
type were measured as dichotomous. In case where several categories were attached to a 
variable like marital status, age and business type, a set of dummy variables was necessary, 
but taking one variable as a reference category for the group, in order to avoid the dummy 
variable trap (Greene, 2008). 
For example, in estimating the influence of selected variables on the level of NPLs in the 
Bank of Kigali Limited, the marital status variable is represented by three major categories: 
married, single, and widow, taking married as a reference category. The age variable is 
represented by four categories: aged between 18 and 30 years (age 18 – 30), between 31 and 
45 years (age 31 – 45), between 46 and 65 years (age 46 – 65), and aged above 65 (age > 
65), taking the group age 18 – 30 as a reference category. The business type variable is 
represented by five major categories: consumer loans (consl), equipment loans (equipl), 
mortgage loans (mortgl), overdraft (overdraft), and treasury loans (treasl), taking consumer 
loans (consl) as a reference category. For Unguka Bank Limited, the business type variable is 




construction (construction), and transport (transport), taking commerce (commerce) as a 
reference category. 
Before proceeding to the presentation and analysis of estimation results, it is important to 
briefly describe the two financial institutions in the sample. 
 
5.4.2.1 Bank of Kigali Limited 
 
The Bank of Kigali Limited is a company limited by shares. It was established in the 
Republic of Rwanda on December 22, 1966. Initially, it was a joint venture between the 
Government of Rwanda and Belgolaise (a Belgian bank), each owning 50 percent of the 
ordinary share capital. In 2007, the bank was fully acquired by the Government of Rwanda. 
In 2011, it was registered with the Rwanda Stock Exchange (RSE), and new shareholders 
have since joined the bank. In 2013, it was the leading bank in Rwanda with 33.8 percent 
market share in total assets of the financial sector, 31.8 percent in net loans, and 29.4 percent 
in customers’ deposits (BK, 2013). It managed to decrease its level of NPLs from 19.4 
percent in 2007 to 6.7 percent in 2013. 
A brief summary of some financial highlights of the Bank of Kigali Limited for the five years 
from 2009 to 2013 is presented in Table 5-1. The table shows that from the time Bank of 
Kigali Limited was registered on the RSE in 2011, it recorded tremendous increases in all 
highlighted financial indicators compared to 2010. In three years, 2011 to 2013, the total 
number of clients increased by 167 percent, its total deposits increased by 81.43 percent, and 
its loan portfolio rose by 96.27 percent. With these improvements, the bank has managed to 
increase profits by a significant 140 percent, and consequently, its total assets have increased 
by 113.66 percent. The bank’s market share has increased by 5.3 percent while NPLs 
decreased by 1.6 percent over the same period. 
Table 5- 1: Financial highlights of Bank of Kigali Limited, 2009 to 2013 
 Year/Subject 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 Number of 
clients 
41,900 72,182 156,597 236,055 264,946 
2 Deposits by 
customers  
(Rwf’000) 
124,586,791 154,598,382 200,109,714 226,843,505 280,489,463 
3 Outstanding 
loans (Rwf’000) 




 Year/Subject 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
4 Net profits/loss 
(Rwf’000) 
5,286,963 6,178,582 8,688,765 11,781,336 14,830,235 
5 Total assets 
(Rwf’000) 
151,871,003 197,676,646 287,899,874 322,794,214 422,360,073 
6 Rate of NPLs 8.4 8.5 8.3 6.5 6.9 
7 Bank market 
share (%) 
26.4 27.4 32.3 31.7 33.8 
Source: Bank of Kigali’s Financial Reports, 2009 – 2013. 
 
5.4.2.2 Unguka Bank Limited 
 
Unguka Bank Limited is a microfinance bank created in 2005 as a microfinance institution 
limited by shares on the initiative of young graduates from three universities in Rwanda. It 
started with a capital of Rwf 321,200,000 (US$ 609,568.63) owned by 214 shareholders 
(Unguka Bank [UB], 2013). In 2008, it raised its capital to Rwf 1,766,600,000 (US$ 
3,209,432.45), that allowed Unguka Microfinance Company limited by shares to qualify to 
upgrade to a microfinance bank in 2011, as the minimum capital requirement for that 
intermediate bank category is Rwf 1,500,000,000 (US$ 2,725,092.65). In 2012, it was joined 
by a new strategic shareholder, Rural Impulse Fund II from Netherlands, that brought in a 
capital share of 1 billion Rwandan francs and 0.5 billion as share premium, raising the bank’s 
capital to 2.8 billion Rwandan francs (US$ 4,517,288.95). From its establishment in 2005, it 
managed to control the level of NPLs to less than or equal to 5 percent. Table 5-2 presents 
some financial highlights of Unguka Bank Limited for the five years, 2009 to 2013. The 
figures in this table show that an unprecedented change in total deposits, loan portfolio, and 
total assets followed the licensing of Unguka as a microfinance bank limited in 2011. Only 
net profits did not follow this trend due to important investments in assets related to the new 
structure (status) of the bank and a 50 percent expansion in new branches. In 2013, the 
number of staff decreased due to a restructuring process aimed at providing new skills to 
drive its new microfinance status. 
Table 5- 2: Financial highlights of Unguka Bank Limited, 2009 to 2013 
 Year/Subject 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 Number of clients 13,011 16,838 26,545 27,371 28,228 
2 Deposits from customers 
(Rwf’000) 
1,135,390 1,722,906 2,937,245 4,857,839 10,365,285 
3 Outstanding loans 
(Rwf’000) 




4 Net profits/loss (Rwf’000) 146,140 210,481 169,102 173,379 189,774 
5 Total assets (Rwf’000) 2,751,765 3,731,955 5,577,368 8,906,924 15,371,912 
6 Rate of NPLs 4.08 2.3 4.0 3.9 4.0 
7 Number of staff 87 107 210 230 223 
Source: Unguka Bank’s Financial Reports, 2009 – 2013. 
 
5.5 Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
A multivariate logistic regression was used (equation 5.2) to investigate the effect of the 
micro-factors, borrowers’ characteristics, business type, and loan characteristics on NPLs, 
using the computer software Stata 13. Data were collected from the Bank of Kigali Limited 
and Unguka Bank Limited’s financial reports for the years 2012 and 2013. As observations 
are valid for only one year, this study opted for the past two years in order to check for 
variability that may contribute to the level of NPLs across, and within institutions over these 
two years. In addition, for purposes of a robustness check, a further investigation was 
conducted on Unguka Bank Limited for the year 2014. A summary of descriptive statistics of 
the variables used at bank level are presented per bank per year (see Tables 5-3 and 5-8 for 
Bank of Kigali Limited for 2012 and 2013, respectively and Tables 5-5, 5-10 and 5-13 for 
Unguka Bank Limited for 2012, 2013 and 2014, respectively). In these tables, the statistics 
are in relation to the problem of loan repayment where the borrower has delays repayment for 
at least one day (PAR 1) and above. It should be noted that a loan is called non-performing if 
the borrower delays repayment for a period of 90 days and above. This indicates that not 
every loan with repayment problems is a NPL, while the reverse holds. 
The estimation results for each bank are presented separately per bank per year (see Tables 5-
4 and 5-9 for Bank of Kigali Limited and Tables 5-6, 5-11 and 5-14 for Unguka Bank 
Limited). A summary capturing the estimation results for the two banks is also provided (see 








5.5.1 Estimates of factors influencing NPLs for 2012 
 
5.5.1.1 Estimates of factors influencing NPLs for 2012 for Bank of Kigali Limited 
 
Table 5-3 presents descriptive statistics for the Bank of Kigali Limited in 2012. As discussed 
previously, mortgl, overdraft, treasl, equipl are business type variables. mortgl stands for 
mortgage loan, overdraft for overdraft loan, treasl for treasury loan, equipl for equipment 
loan, repperiod for repayment period, age for the age of the borrower, gender for the gender 
of the borrower, and single and widow for marital status of the borrower. Consumer loan 
(consl) serves as a reference category for business type variables, age group 18 to 30 (age 18 
– 30) as a reference category for the age group variable, and married (married) as a reference 
category for the marital status variable. Table 5-3 indicates that 89.1 percent of the total 
observations under analysis represent NPLs. A large proportion of borrowers with NPLs 
problems fall into the category of overdraft loans (63.2 percent) followed by the reference 
category, consumer loans (36.7 percent). More than half are aged between 31 and 45 and 27 
percent are young borrowers aged between 18 and 30. Of the borrowers with NPLs problems, 
38.1 percent were single, a small proportion (1.36 percent) were widows and the largest 
proportion of 69.3 percent represents male borrowers. On average, the repayment period is 
10.97 months, that is, less than a year. 
Table 5- 3: Summary statistics of the key variables for Bank of Kigali Limited for 2012 
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Table 5-4 presents estimation results on the contribution of selected variables to the change in 
the level of NPLs in the Bank of Kigali Limited for 2012. The results in this table suggest 




age. A one-month increase in the loan maturity period leads to a 4.8 percent decrease in 
NPLs, ceteris paribus. These findings are in line with those of (Kung, Wu, Hsu, Lee and 
Yang, 2010; Mokhtar et al., 2012). For example, Mokhtar, Nartea et al. (2012) found that the 
longer the period of loan repayment, the lower the probability of delayed or non-repayment 
of loans in TEKUN. Borrowers whose repayment period was more than a year had a 
decreased probability of having loan repayment problems of 15.61 percentage points. 
Similarly, Kung et al. (2010) concluded that the longer the mortgage maturity period, the 
lower the probability of default. However, they differ from Roslan and Karim (2009) who 
concluded that a long repayment period was a significant contributing factor to defaulting in 
Malaysia. 
With regard to age, the probability of one’s loan being non-performing decreases as people 
get older, compared to the reference category 18 – 30 years. This means that, borrowers aged 
above 31 are more likely to have a lower probability of contributing to NPLs relative to 
young borrowers aged between 18 and 30. The estimation results reveal that borrowers aged 
between 31 and 45 and between 46 and 65 had a 3.19 percentage points and 5.17 percentage 
points lower probability, respectively, of contributing to an increase in NPLs than borrowers 
aged between 18 and 30, ceteris paribus. These findings are consistent with Canner et al. 
(1991) who established that households headed by people under the age of 35 were nearly 
four times more likely to report payment problems than those headed by an individual aged at 
least 55. However, they contradict Mokhtar et al.'s (2012) finding that borrowers aged 
between 46 and 55 had problems repaying their debt in TEKUN. Along similar lines, Kung et 
al. (2010) stated that young borrowers are less likely to default. 
The reason why young borrowers are more prone to defaulting could be that they are likely to 
have lower paying jobs. In this study, the explanation probably hinges on their lack of 
experience in business or lack of accumulated assets to complement the income expected 
from business to pay back the loan when business is not promising. However, while it is not 
significant, borrowers aged 65 years and above had 3.88 percentage points lower probability 
of contributing to an increase in the level of NPLs than young borrowers aged between 18 
and 30. This age group (above 65 years) normally corresponds with retirement, when people 





Taking consumer loans as a reference category, mortgage loans, overdrafts and treasury loans 
are found to be significantly contributing to the level of NPLs in the Bank of Kigali Limited. 
Ceteris paribus, mortgage loans have 32.61 percentage points higher probability of 
increasing NPLs than consumer loans while treasury loans and overdrafts have 20.78 
percentage points and 17.11 percentage points lower probability, respectively, of contributing 
to the level of NPLs than consumer loans. While equipment loans were reported to have 4.92 
percentage points higher probability of contributing to the level of NPLs than consumer 
loans, they were not found to be significant. The variables related to gender and marital status 
were also not statistically significant contributors to the level of NPLs. It is worth pointing 
out at this stage that the overall prediction accuracy of the model is acceptable, as the 
percentage of correctly predicted NPLs is 89.08 percent. 
Table 5- 4: Estimates of factors influencing NPLs in the Bank of Kigali Limited for 2012 
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5.5.1.2 Estimates of factors influencing NPLs for 2012 for Unguka Bank Ltd 
 
Table 5-5 presents descriptive statistics for Unguka Bank Limited in 2012. agriculture, 
commerce, construction and transport are business type variables. agriculture stands for 
loans to borrowers involved in agricultural activities, commerce for loans to borrowers 
involved in commerce activities, construction for loans to borrowers involved in construction 
activities, and transport for loans in the transport sector, repperiod for repayment period, and 
gender for the gender variable. Commercial loan (commerce) serves as a reference category 
for the business type variables. Table 5-5 shows, that, 71.42 percent of the total observations 
under analysis represent NPLs. The average repayment period is about 17.8 months, and 
78.32 percent of borrowers with NPLs problems are male. The sector with the largest 
proportion of borrowers with NPLs is commerce (57.65 percent). 
Table 5- 5: Summary statistics of the key variables used in Unguka Bank Limited for 2012 







































Table 5-6 presents estimation results on the contribution of selected variables to the change in 
the level of NPLs in Unguka Bank Limited for 2012. The table shows, that, business type 
variables and repayment period are negatively associated with the level of NPLs. Taking 
commerce as a reference category, in 2012, borrowers whose main activities were transport, 
construction and agriculture had a significantly lower probability of increasing NPLs than 
those undertaking commercial activities. They were respectively lower by 24.5 percentage 
points, 24.6 percentage points, and 27.9 percentage points compared to commercial activities. 
In addition, the overall predictive accuracy of the model appears satisfactory, as the 







Table 5- 6: Estimates for factors influencing NPLs in Unguka Bank Limited in 2012 
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***, ** and *, indicate that the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
Besides the interpretation of coefficients for each individual financial institution, a cross-
sectional comparison of the two banks is presented in order to identify the attributes that 
influence most NPLs in the Rwandan banking sector. Table 5-7 presents the summary of the 
parameter estimates across these institutions in order to draw conclusions on the existence of 
pattern of the influence of borrowers’ characteristics, business characteristics, and loan 
characteristics on NPLs. 
Table 5-7 presents estimation results on the contribution of selected variables to the change in 
the level of NPLs in the Bank of Kigali Limited and Unguka Bank Limited for 2012. The 
table shows, that, only two variables of the explanatory variables are common to both these 
banks in 2012. These are gender and repayment period. However, only the repayment period 
(repperiod) is negatively associated with NPLs. Furthermore, it is only significant for the 
Bank of Kigali Limited. This suggests that the more the repayment period increases, the 
lower the probability of a loan being non-performing in the Bank of Kigali Limited. 
Following these findings, an investigation was conducted to assess the factors that influenced 
the level of NPLs for the two banks in 2013, in order to draw a conclusion based on two 
years, although the defaulting behavior is valid for analysis for one year. Generally, a loan 






Table 5- 7: Factors influencing NPLs across the Bank of Kigali Limited and Unguka Bank 
Limited for 2012 
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***, ** and *, indicate that the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
5.5.2 Estimates of factors influencing NPLs for 2013 
 
5.5.2.1 Estimates of factors influencing NPLs for 2013 for Bank of Kigali Limited 
 
Table 5-8 presents descriptive statistics for the Bank of Kigali Limited in 2013.  age stands 
for the age group of the borrower, gender for the gender of the borrower, and single and 
widow for the borrower’s marital status. Age group 18 to 30 (age 18 – 30) serves as reference 
category for the age group variable, and married (married) as a reference category for the 
marital status variable. The table shows that 84.79 percent of the total observations under 
analysis represent NPLs. Married borrowers, who are the reference category for the marital 
status variable represent 59.7 percent of borrowers with NPLs problems. Similar to the 2012 
figures, the age group of borrowers with minimal NPLs problems is the group aged 31 to 45 




aged between 18 and 30 represent 27.29 percent of borrowers with NPLs problems. About 
69.7 percent of borrowers with NPLs problems are male. On average, the repayment period is 
3.38 months, that is, about a quarter of a year. Compared to 2012 where the average 
repayment period was 10.97 months, the average repayment period decreased by 7.58 
months. 
Table 5- 8: Summary statistics of the key variables used in the Bank of Kigali Limited for 
2013 
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Table 5-9 presents estimation results on the contribution of selected variables to the change in 
the level of NPLs in the Bank of Kigali Limited for 2013. The table shows that in 2013, only 
age and repayment period made a significant contribution to the level of NPLs in this bank, 
all other things remaining equal. Borrowers aged between 46 and 65 had 8.12 percentage 
points lower probability of increasing NPLs than borrowers aged between 18 and 30. The age 
group of 46 to 65 years made the lowest contribution to the increase in NPLs in the Bank of 
Kigali Ltd. These estimation results are consistent with Canner et al.'s (1991) findings, but 
contradict those of Mokhtar et al. (2012) that stated that borrowers aged between 46 and 55 
had problems repaying their debt. Again, the overall prediction accuracy of the model is 
satisfactory, as the percentage of correctly predicted NPLs is 84.74 percent. 
Table 5- 9: Estimates of factors influencing NPLs in the Bank of Kigali Limited for 2013 
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***, ** and *, indicate that the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
 
5.5.2.2 Estimates of factors influencing NPLs for 2013 for Unguka Bank Limited 
 
Table 5-10 presents descriptive statistics for Unguka Bank Limited in 2013. As highlighted in 
Table 5-5, agriculture, commerce, construction and transport are business type variables. 
agriculture stands for loans to borrowers involved in agricultural activities, commerce stands 
for loans to borrowers involved in commerce activities, construction stands for loans to 
borrowers involved in construction activities, and transport stands for loans in the transport 
sector. repperiod stands for the repayment period variable, and gender for the gender 
variable. Commerce loan (commerce) serves as a reference category for the business type 
variables. Table 5-10 shows that 36 percent of the total observations under analysis represent 
NPLs. The average repayment period is about 23.63 months and 81.77 percent of borrowers 
with NPLs problems are male. As was displayed in the 2012 outcomes, the sector with the 
most borrowers with loan problems is commerce (the reference category). For 2013, it 
represents 44.72 percent. The table also shows that significantly fewer borrowers whose main 
activity is construction and agriculture contributed to an increase in NPLs than those in 
commerce. They respectively represent 11.2 percent and 16.5 percent. 
Table 5- 10: Summary statistics of the key variables used in Unguka Bank Limitedfor 2013 
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Table 5-11 presents estimation results on the contribution of selected variables to the change 
in the level of NPLs in Unguka Bank Limited for 2013. Although the transport sector was not 
found to significantly contribute to an increase NPLs in 2013, controlling for commercial 
activities, the sector appeared to be the highest contributor to the increase in NPLs with 7.7 
-Constant     1.9147***                                                                                                                    
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percentage points lower than commerce. This is followed by construction and agriculture at 
20.57 percentage points and 22.33 percentage points, respectively lower than commercial 
activities. Therefore, managers of Unguka Bank Limited should pay attention to the 
commercial and transport sectors when assessing loan applications from new borrowers.  
The study results in Table 5-11 also reveal that, ceteris paribus, a one-month increase in the 
loan maturity period leads to a 2.27 percent decrease in the level of NPLs, and is statistically 
significant. As observed in the Bank of Kigali Limited, the gender variable was not a 
statistically significant contributor to the level of NPLs. Furthermore, the overall prediction 
accuracy of the model looks fair, as the percentage of correctly predicted NPLs is 62.92 
percent.  
Table 5- 11: Estimates for factors influencing NPLs in Unguka Bank Limited for 2013 
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***, ** and *, indicate that the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
 
As performed for 2012, a cross-sectional comparison of the two banks for 2013 is made in 
order to identify the attributes that most influenced NPLs in the Rwandan banking sector for 
that specific year. Table 5-12 below presents a summary of estimation results on the 
contribution of selected variables to the change in the level of NPLs in the Bank of Kigali 
Limited and Unguka Bank Limited for 2013. As noted for 2012, the table shows that only 
two variables, gender and repayment period are explanatory variables that are common to the 
Bank of Kigali Limited and Unguka Bank Limited. However, contrary to the findings in 
Table 5-7 for 2012, the repayment period (repperiod) is statistically significant and 




Table 5- 12: Factors influencing NPLs across Bank of Kigali Limited and Unguka Bank 
Limited for 2013 














age 31 – 45 






























































Number of observations 
Log likelihood 
LR chi2 
Prob. > chi2 












***, ** and *, indicate that the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
Given that the repayment period was significant for the two banks in 2013, while in 2012 it 
was only significant for the Bank of Kigali Limited, we carry out a further investigation on 
Unguka Bank Limited for 2014. We used data collected from borrowers’ files in its six large 
branches who were at risk of at least a one-day delay (PAR 1). These branches are 
Nyarugenge, Remera, Nyabugogo, Musanze, Rubavu and Muhanga. They held an estimated 
58.4 percent of the total Portfolio at Risk (PAR1). The findings are reported in Table 5-14. 
 
5.5.3 Estimates for factors influencing NPLs for 2014 
 
Table 5-13 presents descriptive statistics for Unguka Bank Limited in 2014. agriculture, 
commerce, construction and transport are business type variables. agriculture stands for 
loans to borrowers involved in agricultural activities, commerce stands for loans to borrowers 
involved in commerce activities, construction stands for loans to borrowers involved in 
construction activities, and transport stands for transport loan. repperiod stands for the 




the gender of the borrower variable, maristat for the marital status of the borrower variable, 
and depend stands for the number of people dependent on the borrower variable. Commerce 
loan (commerce) serves as a reference category for the business type variables. This table 
shows that 50.96 percent of the total observations under analysis represent NPLs. The 
average repayment period is about 25.10 months. Male borrowers with NPLs problems 
represent 86.53 percent. Most borrowers with NPLs problems (61.5 percent) fall into the age 
group 31 and 45. This is followed by young people aged between 18 and 30 (the reference 
category) at 22 percent. As was the case in 2012 and 2013, the economic sector that accounts 
for most NPLs is commerce (the reference category) at 56.22 percent. The variable depend 
which stands for the number of people dependent on the borrower is unchanged; on average 
1.81 persons (approximately 2 persons) are dependent on the borrower. 
Table 5- 13: Summary statistics of the key variables used in Unguka Bank Limited in 2014 
Variable N Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
NPLs 
gender 
age 31 – 45 
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Table 5-14 presents estimation results on the contribution of selected variables to the level of 
NPLs in Unguka Bank Limited for 2014. The table indicates that in 2014, male borrowers 
had a 17.10 percentage points higher chance of contributing to the increase in the level of 
NPLs than female borrowers, ceteris paribus. Controlling for commerce, borrowers involved 
in transport were most likely to default, suggesting that transport activities make a larger 
contribution to the level of NPLs than other activities, ceteris paribus. The transport sector 
had a 21.55 percentage points higher contribution to the increase in NPLs relative to 
commerce. Consequently, managers of Unguka Bank Limited should pay attention to the 
transport and commercial sectors when assessing loan applications. 
The repayment period is reported to negatively affect the level of NPLs and is statistically 
significant. A one-month increase in the repayment period leads to a 2.56 percent decrease in 




the borrower’s care (depend) and the age groups of the borrower were not statistically 
significant factors contributing to the level of NPLs. As for 2013, the overall predictive 
accuracy of the model appears to be fair, as the percentage of correctly predicted NPLs is 
65.57 percent. 
Table 5- 14: Estimates for factors influencing NPLs in Unguka Bank Limited for 2014 
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***, ** and *, indicate that the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
 
From the findings exhibited on Tables 5-7, 5-12 and 5-14, it is established that an extension 
of the repayment period significantly and negatively affects the level of NPLs. It is probable 
that the extension of the repayment period helps the borrower to be less financially distressed 
by the burden of servicing the loan. Accordingly, the probability of paying back the borrowed 
funds increases, which leads to a lower level of NPLs. Gender was found to be associated 
with mixed outcomes. The question remains, what is a reasonable repayment period that 
could minimize the level of NPLs? 
Table 5-15 presents a summary of available options for a minimum repayment period that 
could lead to a significant reduction of NPLs towards zero. The period varies between 21 
months and 37 months for the Bank of Kigali Limited for 2012 and 2013, respectively 
suggesting that the level of NPLs could decrease toward the lowest level if the repayment 




months, to 43 months and 39 months respectively for 2012, 2013 and 2014. Therefore, one 
can conclude that an average repayment period of about four years could significantly reduce 
the level of NPLs.  
This is not surprising as the institutions targeted customers and activities as well as products, 
and credit terms and conditions might differ. On the one hand, the largest commercial bank in 
the country, Bank of Kigali Limited, serves a range of customers such as large corporations, 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs), public entities, embassies and other international 
organizations. On the other hand, Unguka Bank Limited is a microfinance bank competing in 
the same market segment served by commercial banks while serving low-income customers 
who are the target of microfinance institutions. 
Table 5- 15: Summary of available options for repayment period 
Repayment Period Bank of Kigali Ltd Unguka Bank Ltd 
2012 2013 2012 2013 2014 
Minimum repayment period  1 1 3 1 1 
Average repayment period  11 3 18 24 25 
% decrease in NPLs due to one 
month increase in the maturity of 
the loan 
4.8 2.7 1.7 2.3 2.5 
Theoretical period required to 
eliminate NPLs towards zero 
percent 
21 37 59 43 39 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
To sum up, a repayment period varying between three to four years could contribute to a 
significantly lower level of NPLs in the Rwandan banking sector. 
The overall predictive accuracy of the model appears satisfactory, as the percentage of 
correctly predicted NPLs varies between 62.92 percent and 89.08 percent, which is greater 
than 50 percent in all cases. However, it is not straightforward to conclude whether these 
findings can help predict repayment problems in Rwanda in the future due to the uniqueness 
observed in each institution with respect to the data available, the targeted market, and the 
loan filing system in relation to borrowers’ characteristics, and loans aspects. However, the 
study’s findings shed light on some isolated behavioral problems with respect to borrowers’ 
age, economic activity undertaken, and the maturity of the loan that bankers can use in 





5. 6 Concluding Remarks 
 
The primary objective of this chapter was to investigate the influence of borrowers’ 
characteristics, business characteristics and loan characteristics on the level of NPLs in 
Rwanda, using a sample of a commercial bank, the Bank of Kigali Limited and a 
microfinance bank, Unguka Bank Limited. The ultimate objective was to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of the micro-factors contributing to NPLs. However, 
mitigating this problem lies in the hands of managers.  
The study’s results on the factors influencing NPLs in Rwanda reveal that borrowers’ 
characteristics such as age, business type, and repayment period are among the factors that 
influence NPLs in the country’s banking sector. In 2012 and 2013, the repayment period 
(repperiod) had a negative effect on the level of NPLs. With respect to age, at the Bank of 
Kigali Ltd, the probability of loan default decreased with age. All things remaining equal, 
borrowers aged between 31 and 45, and those between the ages of 46 and 65 and above are 
most likely to make a lower contribution to the level of NPLs than young borrowers aged 
between 18 and 30. Younger borrowers might have less experience in business or earn low 
wages. Taking into consideration business type, mortgage loans, overdraft and treasury loans 
were found to be significantly contributing to the level of NPLs in the Bank of Kigali Ltd 
relative to consumer loans, ceteris paribus. The repayment period was found to be negatively 
related to NPLs and was statistically significant. 
With regard to Unguka Bank Ltd, controlling for commerce, the transport sector had the 
highest probability of increasing NPLs, ceteris paribus. The repayment period was found to 
have a negative effect on the level of NPLs for 2013 and 2014, and this was statistically 
significant. 
The cross-institutions comparison revealed that, only the repayment period variable 
(repperiod) was significantly and negatively associated with NPLs. This suggests that the 
more the repayment period increases, the higher the probability of paying back the borrowed 
funds, given that the borrower is somehow less financially distressed by the burden of loan 
servicing. On average for a given loan, a repayment period of about four years could 
significantly lower the level of NPLs towards zero in the banking sector in Rwanda. 
As highlighted earlier in Section 5.3.2, a limitation of this chapter is that it was not possible 




sensitivity issue related to the data in relation with the privacy of the customer. In addition, 
variables such as borrowers’ educational level, credit history, and number of dependents, 
could not be readily obtained from all banks. The study thus relied on data (without names of 
customers in complying with the privacy principle) from the two largest banks in their sub-set 
(commercial banks and microfinance banks) and focused only on two years, 2012 and 2013 
with a check for robustness in 2014 for Unguka Bank Limited. While there is independent 
behaviour among banks over time, an investigation covering an interval of at least five years 
could shed more light on this subject. Thus, our results are to be treated with caution in 
predicting a borrower’s behavior vis-à-vis business type and loan characteristics in 
influencing NPLs due to the uniqueness of each institution with respect to the data available, 
the targeted market, and the reporting system. 
It is therefore recommended that the Central Bank put regulations in place to sensitize 
financial institutions to extend the loan repayment period and oblige them to record the 
borrower’s characteristics in their loan assessment records. These include gender, age, marital 
status, educational level, employment status, income, number of dependents, outstanding 
loans with other financial institutions, and credit history. This could be useful in future 
research of this kind where comparisons of findings can be made over a medium to long 
period and contribute to policy formulation by lending institutions. 
In addition, the Central Bank should conduct a comprehensive survey on the factors that most 
influence defaulting behavior that could be used in different policy-oriented studies. This 
type of survey could be conducted every five years as with the Integrated Household Living 
Conditions Survey, EICV (Enquête Intégrale sur les Conditions de Vie des ménages). 
Likewise, the Central Bank should reinforce measures to sensitize borrowers to pay off their 
loans as failure to do so adversely affects the sector and the economy as a whole. Finally, the 
Central Bank should initiate or sensitize private businesses to create a body to assess the 
overall rating of customers applying for loans. This rating body could help lending 














The literature on financial intermediation and economic growth posits a link between 
economic growth and an efficient banking sector with low ratios of NPLs. Based on this 
notion, through its Vision 2020 the Government of Rwanda aspires to transform the country’s 
economy into a middle-income one driven by the private sector financed by a developed 
financial sector. However, there is a paucity of research on the directional relationship 
between financial sector development and economic growth in Rwanda. The main objective 
of this study was therefore, to assess the mechanism that relates financial sector development 
to economic growth. In doing so, several interrogations needed to be carried out. What causal 
relationship exists between financial sector development and economic growth in Rwanda? 
How efficient is the Rwandan banking sector? And what are the microeconomic factors 
influencing NPLs in Rwanda? The answers to these three questions were provided in chapters 
three, four and five respectively. They are in line with the three specific objectives under 
which the main objective of this study is achieved and making three inter-related papers 
found respectively in chapters three, four and five. 
Chapter Three investigated the directional relationship between finance and economic growth 
in Rwanda using a Cointegrated Structural Vector Autoregressive model on quarterly data for 
the period 1996:1 to 2010:4. The central argument was that identifying the mechanics 
through which financial intermediaries relate to economic growth in Rwanda is essential vis-
à-vis the Government of Rwanda’s belief that the financial sector can serve as a catalyst for 
economic growth in the country by providing finance to the private sector.  
The second objective was to assess the efficiency of commercial banks in Rwanda. This was 
achieved using a stochastic frontier analysis approach on a set of banking data for the period 
2007 to 2013 in line with Battese (1992), Battese and Coelli (1995) and Greene (2005). 
Efficiency evaluation of banks is of interest to many stakeholders, and this was the core of 
chapter four. Owners and potential investors seek assurance of sustainable profitability of the 




understanding the extent to which they can contain resources that were wasted due to 
identified inefficiencies, thus improving their performance for the attainment of the bank’s 
overall objective, which is wealth maximisation. Regulators can make use of the findings to 
formulate policy in relation to reducing inefficiencies, improving the soundness of the 
banking sector. 
The third objective was to determine the factors influencing NPLs in Rwanda. This was 
achieved using a logistic regression approach following (Wooldridge, 2006) on data from a 
sample of two different types of banks for at least two consecutive years, 2012 and 2013. The 
findings of this study will be useful to financial intermediaries’ managers, shareholders and 
regulators. Individual financial intermediaries that seek solutions to existing NPLs while 
preventing the proliferation of new ones could make use of these findings. Collectively, 
financial intermediaries could engage stakeholders such as shareholders, regulators and 
policymakers to find solutions to the factors that cause NPLs identified in this study. Based 
on the highlighted factors, it is recommended that regulators adopt measures to reduce NPLs 
that impede the banking sector’s performance. 
 
6.2 Summary of findings 
 
The first objective was to investigate the relationship between financial intermediation and 
economic growth in Rwanda applying a cointegration procedure and a structural VAR. The 
findings indicate that domestic credit to the private sector and potential liquidity available, 
which are proxies for financial development in this study, account for the largest proportion 
of fluctuations in real output growth. Domestic credit to the private sector accounts for 36.28 
percent of the fluctuations in real output growth in the first four quarters, which increases to 
54.47 percent after eight quarters and 58.83 percent after 20 quarters. Potential liquidity 
available accounts for 33.46 percent of the variations in real output growth after four quarters, 
and drops to 27.72 percent after eight quarters and 24.89 percent after 20 quarters. These 
findings support the supply-leading hypothesis that indicates that financial sector 
development causes growth in output. 
 
The second objective was to assess the efficiency of commercial banks in Rwanda using 
stochastic frontier analysis on a set of banking data for the period 2007 to 2013. The findings 




The bank operating at the lower mean efficiency level of 83.10 percent wastes about 16.90 
percent of its resources relative to the best performing bank in the sample. Overall, the 
findings show a mean cost efficiency of 88.56 percent, implying that about 11.44 percent of 
total costs were wasted relative to the bank on the frontier having the same inputs. This 
suggests that banks jointly would have utilized only 88.56 percent of resources to produce the 
level of output that they produced. Moreover, inefficiencies were found to be statistically 
significant in decreasing over time with foreign banks’ involvement in the Rwandan banking 
market and increasing with the rapid replacement of CEOs. 
The third objective was to identify the factors influencing NPLs in the Rwandan banking 
sector. The results show that borrower characteristics such as age, business type, and 
repayment period, among other factors, contributed to the variation of the level of NPLs in 
Rwanda. Combined, the findings reveal that repayment period is negatively associated with 
NPLs. On average, a repayment period of about four years could significantly lower the level 
of NPLs in the Rwandan banking sector. 
 
6.3 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The relationship between financial sector development and economic growth in Rwanda is in 
line with the supply-leading hypothesis, where the financial sector drives economic growth. 
The study observes that the largest proportion of variations in economic growth are explained 
by changes in domestic credit to the private sector and potential liquidity available, which are 
the proxies for financial development. This provides evidence that development of the 
financial sector leads to economic growth in the country. Thus, the financial sector could be a 
driver of economic growth in Rwanda. Accordingly, the country should reinforce incentives 
that lead to the further development of its financial sector, and attract businesses that could 
easily make use of available financial services. 
 
The study also investigated the efficiency of commercial banks in Rwanda and the results 
showed that the sector performed at a mean cost efficiency of 88.56 percent vis-à-vis the 
bank on the frontier with the same inputs. It is imperative to understand the efficiency of the 
commercial banking sector in Rwanda because it provides information on the financial health 
of these deposit-taking and lending institutions in efficiently transforming inputs into 




statistically significant, decreasing over time with foreign owned bank setting up in the 
country, and increasing with the rapid turnover of CEOs of commercial banks in the sample. 
This calls for banks’ shareholders to reduce the turnover of top management officials, 
especially CEOs because their short term in office is associated with increased inefficiencies. 
Government needs to put incentives in place to attract foreign banks to Rwanda, as it was 
found that they contribute to the efficiency of the banking sector. Further research could 
assess the efficiency of UMURENGE SACCOs that are spread throughout the 416 
administrative sectors of the country. As they are closer to the population, their efficiency 
could contribute to changes in living conditions, especially in rural areas. 
 
The study further examined the factors influencing NPLs in the Rwandan banking sector. Its 
findings indicate that across institutions, the repayment period is negatively associated with 
NPLs, suggesting that if lending institutions could extend the repayment period, NPLs in 
Rwanda will decline. In addition, the study findings show that borrower’s characteristics such 
as age and business type are among the factors that impact on NPLs in one way or another. 
The probability of default among young borrowers aged 18 to 30 is relatively high, compared 
to the probability of default among older people, ceteris paribus. 
 
All else remaining equal, the study observed that mortgage loans, overdrafts and treasury 
loans make a significant contribution to the level of NPLs relative to consumer loans in the 
Bank of Kigali Limited. In Unguka Bank Limited, the transport sector contributed more to 
the increase in NPLs relative to the commercial sector. It is thus recommended that bank 
managers pay attention to these sectors when assessing applications for new loans. 
 
To solve the problem of data availability, this study recommends, firstly, that the Central 
Bank of Rwanda sensitizes or obliges banks to keep complete and updated information on 
borrowers’ characteristics. These include gender, age, marital status, educational level, 
employment status, income, number of dependents, outstanding loans with other financial 
institutions, credit history; and sectors financed as well as credit characteristics such as 
amount borrowed, interest rate charged, repayment period, repayment mode, business 
revenue, repayment amount, and type of collateral. Secondly, to supplement this data from 
banks, the Central Bank should conduct a regular, comprehensive survey on the relationship 




loans’ characteristics. These two suggested data collection channels could add value to other 




The major limitation of this study was the availability of adequate data for the empirical 
analyses from which conclusions were drawn. Firstly, in chapter three, the initial intention 
was to cover a period of about three decades. However, because the economy of Rwanda was 
destroyed during the 1994 genocide, the starting point was 1996 when the economy started 
recovering, up to 2010, after which data for many variables was not available. Moreover, 
these variables were initially available in annual frequency for the period 1996 – 2010. To fit 
our analysis, data were interpolated to quarterly series using the Quadratic-match average 
approach. 
 
Secondly, in chapter four, the efficiency of a given bank refers to the best performing bank 
among the seven in the sample operating under the same conditions, not relative to best 
practice somewhere else, that was beyond the scope of the sample for this study. It is also 
possible that the bank that appears to be closer to the frontier might not be convincingly 
better than others because it might achieve such performance at the cost of an increase in its 
NPLs. 
 
Thirdly, in chapter five, data onthe borrowers’ characteristics did not cover all borrower 
characteristics. For example, data on educational level, employment status, income, 
outstanding loans with other financial institutions, and credit history was not available. Data 
on business type as well as loans’ characteristics were only partially available for all banks in 
the sample. In addition, due to sensitivity issue related to the privacy on details of a bank’s 
customer, especially concerning defaulting borrowers, it was not possible to compile data for 
all financial institutions operating in Rwanda’s banking sector. 
 
Despite these shortcomings, the overall objectives of this study were achieved. The study 
established the directional link between financial intermediation and economic growth in 
Rwanda that is supply-leading; found that the commercial bank sector is efficient in cost 




contribution to reducing NPLs in the Rwandan banking sector. It can therefore be concluded 
that it is possible that financial sector development contributes to economic growth in 



































Appendix 1: Consolidated Statement of profit or loss and other comprehensive income: bank 
name 
                                                                                             For the year ended 31 
December 
 In millions of (i.e. euro)                                                         Year t                       Year t-1 
Interest income 
Interest expense 
Net Interest Income 
Fee and commission income 
Fee and commission expense 
Net fee and commission income 
Net trading income 
Net income from other financial instruments at  




Net impaired loss on financial assets 
Personnel expenses 
Depreciation and amortization 
Others expenses 
Profit before tax 
Income tax expense 
Other comprehensive income 
Items that will never be reclassified to profit or loss 
Remeasurements of defined benefits liability (asset) 
Related tax 
Items that are or may be reclassified to profit or loss 
Foreign currency translation difference for foreign operations 
Net gain (loss) on hedges of net investment in foreign operations 
Cash flow hedges: 
    Effective portion of change in fair value 
    Net amount transferred to profit or loss 
Fair value reserve (available for sale financial assets): 
    Net change in fair value 
    Net amount transferred to profit or loss 
Related tax 
 
Other comprehensive income, net of tax 
Total comprehensive income 
Profit attributable to: 
    Equity holders of the bank 
    Non-controlling interest 
Profit 
Total comprehensive income attributable to: 
Equity holders of the bank    
    Non-controlling interests 
Total comprehensive income 




                                                                                             For the year ended 31 
December 
 In millions of (i.e. euro)                                                         Year t                       Year t-1 
Basic earnings per share (i.e. euro) 
Diluted earnings per share (i.e. euro) 
Year t: is the current year 
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